Therefore, the significance of acknowledging the existence of a claim of legal error as a ground for a request to amend the assessment is that it is not possible to claim that the appellant should be silenced, since the estoppel is based on contradictory factual representations or reports, out of awareness of the legal significance derived from them. And this is not the state of affairs in our case. In the case at hand, the appellant reported in her self-assessments the acquisition of a "right in the land", and there is no dispute about this.
The appellant's argument that her winning of the "Buyer's Price" tenders does not amount to the acquisition of a right in real estate within the meaning of the law, in light of the correct legal-taxation interpretation of all the contracts and documents she signed, was raised in the application to amend the assessment, and it is based on a mistake in understanding the legal and taxation result derived from the factual situation, and not on a factual correction.
- A claim of estoppel may, for example, be heard in a situation where a taxpayer has created a certain factual representation in his VAT reports, and a factual representation is contrary to income tax – for example, that he is a business owner, on the level of tax appeal, and is not the owner of that business for income tax purposes. However, in the case at hand, we are not dealing with contradictory factual representations. The entire conduct on which the respondent seeks to base the claim of estoppel does not amount to a contradictory factual argument.
- Second, the Respondent's arguments, relating to the approval of the Article 50 The law, or the argument regarding the obligation to report a capital sale, also do not establish a claim of estoppel against the appellant. It should be emphasized that the appeals in question deal with the question of whether the appellant Purchased "Right in real estate" in the meaning of the law when it won the "Buyer's Price" tenders, which is the subject of the appeals. Regardless of the question of stage taxation Acquisition of Rights, which is the subject of the hearing of these appeals, on the level of Sale of Rights By the appellant – who is not the subject of the appeals – it is doubtful in my view whether the appellant should be taxed on the level of capital gains, and it appears that the taxation applied to the appellant's income from the sale of the apartments to the beneficiaries is in any case on the fruity level and not on the capital level. But all of this is more than necessary.
Therefore, and without derogating from the fact that the Real Estate Taxation Appeals Committee is not authorized to deal with questions of the appellant's taxation in the income tax level, and in any case the taxation level in the income tax level is not part of the hearing of these appeals, the question of whether there is an impact or implication of the judgment in the appeals in this case on the appellant's reports or tax liability in the income tax level will be examined by the competent authority in the Tax Authority. If necessary, to the extent that the appellant's argument is accepted on the merits of the matter and to the extent that it is found that any tax was deducted from the state coffers as a result.
- Did the appellant acquire a "right in the land" within the meaning of the law?
- In order to decide the central and substantive question in the appeals at hand, whether the appellant acquired a "right in real estate" within the meaning of the Real Estate Taxation Law, when it won the "Buyer's Price" tenders that are the subject of the appeals, and when it signed the lease contract, the appendix to the special conditions and the building contract, it is necessary to examine, first and foremost, whether from a material point of view the appellant received from the State a "lease" right within the meaning of the law, and to the extent that the answer to this question is positive, whether it is a "lease" for a period exceeding twenty-five years.
It should be noted that I have found it appropriate to first discuss the question of whether the appellant received from the State a "lease" right within the meaning of the law, even though this argument was argued by the appellant as an alternative claim, since in my opinion, to the extent that it was determined that from a material point of view the appellant did not receive from the State a "lease" right within the meaning of the Real Estate Taxation Law, then all the other arguments are superfluous in any case.