In order to realize this government project, the state demanded control over the number of apartments, the size of the apartments, their geographical location, their construction specifications, the prices of the apartments to be sold, as well as the determination of the criteria for the sale of the apartments to specific buyers, with a defined characteristic (homeless or housing improvers), the timing of the sale, the stipulations in the sale agreements to those entitled to "Buyer's Price" and the denial of the ability to transfer these apartments from those entitled to other third parties who are not "eligible", for a significant period of time (five years) – up to the point of canceling the lottery win and selling the apartment.
This means that the state controls all aspects of the project, and determines all its terms in every respect. The state wanted to create a situation in which there would be a defined quantity of "buyer's price" apartments – in location, area and specifications according to the state's wishes, to be sold to eligible people who won lotteries according to the terms of sale set by the state. Thus, in practice, the state is the real party that sells the rights to the entitled buyers of the "Buyer's Price" apartments, who are required to sign a lease contract with the ILA in order to receive the legal rights in these apartments. The contracting companies, and the appellant among them, who submitted the "Buyer's Price" tenders, are the "executors" of the "Buyer's Price" project, and serve as the state's projectors in order to reach the final result that the state looked forward to – increasing the supply of apartments for those eligible and providing the possibility of purchasing an apartment at a reduced price, which the winners of the lottery could afford.
- It is clear that the subsidized price of the land in the "Buyer's Price" tenders is not intended to benefit the Appellant, but rather its purpose is to enable those entitled to purchase the apartments in the project at a significant discount. Were it not for this goal to which the State set its eyes in the framework of the "Buyer's Price" project, there is no doubt that the Appellant (and all the other contracting companies that submitted the "Buyer's Price" tenders) would not have been able to purchase land at a subsidized price from the State.
Even in this way of determining the price, both the price paid by the contracting company in exchange for the "lease" right, and the price at which the company is required to sell the apartments to those eligible, reflects the uniqueness of the "Buyer's Price" project compared to any other tender published by the ILA. In the usual case, when the state wishes to sell lease rights in real estate to a contracting company, it is clear, by virtue of the state's role to protect its assets and the public coffers, that it would have acted to sell the rights in the land at a price equal to the market value, and this is not the case before us. In the case under discussion here, the discount on the price of the land is intended to bring about the result of granting a discount to the eligible residents.