I will emphasize once again that I do not ignore the fact that sometimes the owner of the property imposes various restrictions and conditions on the lessee in relation to the use and possession of the property, for example – by determining the purpose of use, or selling to a specific target population, but it can still be said that we are facing the purchase of a "lease" right. At the end of the day, the question is not whether the property owner has set limits on the lessee's use of the property, but rather the question is What is the strength and cumulative significance of these restrictions, and to what extent do they exceed the accepted restrictions imposed by a property owner on a lessee, in order to ensure that his residual rights as the owner of the property will not be violated during and at the end of the lease period?
Where the restrictions imposed by the property owner on the "lessee" reach a level where he is almost completely deprived of discretion as to what he is entitled to do with the property – he should not be considered a "lessee", but rather he should be considered as someone who has received permission from the property owner to enter the land in order to perform a service for the property owner.
In the case at hand – all that the appellant received from the state was permission, limited, limited, bounded and defined in detail to enter and hold the land for the purpose of building "Buyer's Price" apartments and selling them in accordance with the strict rules and conditions of the landowner, the state. This permission does not amount to a "lease" according to the program, even if a title of "lease" has been attached to it.
- In my opinion, therefore, the consolidation of the rights and obligations held by the appellant and imposed on it, according to the contractual legal system that it signed, is in practice identical to the right of an executing contractor, who receives permission from the property owner to enter the property and hold it for the purpose of construction, which is carried out in accordance with the instructions of the property owner, in accordance with the specifications set by the property owner, in accordance with the schedule set by the property owner, and with an undertaking to sell the construction products to the person whom the property owner instructs to sell for a predetermined and defined consideration or with a commitment to return the land at the end of the construction to the owner of the property (and of course there is no legal or economic difference between these two situations). All this, until the completion of the construction, and when the only option available to the contractor is to increase its profits by reducing the construction costs and increasing the gap between these costs and the price of the square meter of the apartment to which it has committed, as I explained above.
- The appellant therefore acted, on behalf of the ILA and the Ministry of Construction and Housing, in accordance with the clear policy of the State through the government, to allocate land for the construction of "Buyer's Price" apartments to those eligible and to reduce the price of housing. The appellant's rights according to the contractual system are not the same as the rights of a "lessee holder", not in the general legal sense, and certainly not in the taxation sense.
The language of the definition of a "right in real estate" in the Real Estate Taxation Law clearly testifies that the test for its existence is a substantive test, a test of content, and not a formal-technical test, i.e., a right that Software It is a lease, it will be considered a right in the land.