In accordance with the case discussed here, since that the appellant in fact held the land during the construction period and afterwards transferred the apartments to the eligible purchasers - My position is that during this period, the construction period, the appellant's possession of the land does not have the characteristics and characteristics of a "lease" in accordance with the provisions Real Estate Taxation Law.
- The appellant also referred in its summaries (see paragraph 110 of the appellant's reply summaries) to real estate taxation decision 1009/18 (Appendix 8 to the appeal), which deals with a tender BOT, in which a commercial company built a parking lot for a local authority, when it was agreed that at the end of the construction period, the company would operate the parking lot for 24 years and 11 months. The tax decision stipulates that the construction period will not be taken into account in calculating the lease period, and that only the period of time during which the company will operate the parking lot and will be able to make profits from its operation should be addressed.
In comparison with the state of affairs in the appeals before us, it can certainly be said that during the construction period, which is the period during which the appellant held the land, the conditions that allow this period to be regarded as a "lease" in accordance with the provisions were not met Real Estate Taxation Law.
- I have given my attention to another argument raised by the respondent, according to which the appellant's position contradicts the provisions of the tender on the subject of payment of taxes, but I am unable to accept it.
In clause 5.4.1 of the Tirat Carmel tender (there is an identical provision in clause 5.5.1 of the Kiryat Ono tender) it was determined that:
"The winner will bear all taxes (such as purchase tax) applicable to him in accordance with the law."
I do not believe that there is an obligation to pay purchase tax to the appellant because of what is stated in this section. All that was determined in the said clause in the tender is that to the extent that the appellant has an obligation "in accordance with the law" to pay tax, then it will be paid by it. However, to the extent that there is no such obligation according to the law, it cannot be argued that only because of what is stated in the aforementioned clause in the tender, the appellant will be liable to pay tax.