See also: Civil Appeal 8249/01 Hadera Real Estate Appreciation Tax Administration v. Zinndorf, IsrSC 59(1) 711, 719 and Civil Appeal 7933/01 Slover v. Beer Sheva Real Estate Appreciation Tax Administration (June 11, 2008), where it was clarified:
"For the purpose of defining a "right in real estate" for the purpose of taxation, the essence of the right, which the chain of engagements between all the parties enables to be transferred, up to the last link in it, is important. This last link is likely to project backwards to the previous links in terms of the nature of the overall contractual system as a system dealing with rights in real estate. In our case, the chain of engagements between the Association and the Administration, between the Association and its members, and between the Association and the Appellant, is intended to enable, at the end of the day, the granting of lease rights in the land for 49 years to the purchasers of the housing units in the marketed apartments, which will be referred to the Association by the Appellant. The exclusive marketing right that was given to the appellant in respect of the apartments, accompanied by the power to instruct the Association, and through it to the Administration, who are the purchasers with whom a lease agreement should be concluded in due course, constitutes a link in the chain of engagements, which is intended to enable the purchasers of the marketed apartments to purchase a registered property right in the apartments when the time comes. This right gave the appellant legal power to determine the fate of the housing units and the fate of their purchasers, and ultimately to the granting of property rights to them. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case before us, the right granted by the appellant is, in essence, a "right in the land" in its meaning In Section 1 to the law.
- In the case discussed in the appeals here, it is clear that the third alternative of the definition of "sale" does not exist at all. Not only did the appellant not receive the right to refer to the state, the owner of the land, purchasers for the "buyer's price" apartments, in accordance with her choice, but she was obligated to transfer the aforementioned apartments only to eligible purchasers determined by the state, in accordance with the conditions of eligibility and the results of the lotteries held by the state.
- In other words, the State did not grant the appellant "the right to order the granting of a right in the land", but on the contrary – it imposed on it a duty to grant the right in question.
The appellant was required to fulfill its duty under the terms of the tender, as part of the actions it must perform, as the executor of the "Buyer's Price" project for and on behalf of the state. The appellant did not receive any "right" in the land within the meaning of the law in the context of the transfer of the rights to the eligible purchasers, but was obligated to take care of the transfer of the rights in the apartments to the eligible purchasers, as part of the service it provided to the state. In these circumstances, there is no support for the argument as to the impact that the decision in these appeals, to the extent that the appellant's argument is accepted, on the eligible apartment buyers. There is not and is not likely to cause any infringement of the proprietary rights of the eligible purchasers of the apartments in the "Buyer's Price" projects. As part of the concept of the "Buyer's Price" project, the State strived to achieve a result whereby the purchasers of the "Buyer's Price" apartments would be the owners of the lease rights therein, and in this matter as well, the appellant served as the executor. It is therefore clear that there will certainly be no argument on the part of the State regarding the validity of the registration of the rights in the "Buyer's Price" apartments in the name of the eligible purchasers.
- I will further note that the very fact that with respect to some of the land that is the subject of the appeals (those that have not undergone parcellation) the appellant was not required to register the lease right in her name at the Land Registry Office, and with respect to another part of the land that is the subject of the appeals (those that have undergone a parcellation process) was required by the State to register the lease right in its name – attests to the fact that in the present case the registration itself does not create the existence of the "lease" right. Rather, it serves as a "technical" tool for the purpose of performing the service that the appellant was required to perform for and on behalf of the state – that is, the registration of the rights in the name of the eligible buyers of "Buyer's Price" apartments.
In this regard, see the provision of section 24 of the Special Conditions Appendix, entitled "The Lessee Undertaking to Deal with the Apartment Buyers", where it was held that: