In the Talmud, a distinction is made between two types of witnesses: denial witnesses - referring to witnesses who contradict the statements of other witnesses, and conspiracy witnesses - referring to witnesses who testify about other witnesses that at the time of the event "you were with us," so how can you testify about an event in which you were not present? Conspiratorial witnesses are therefore witnesses whose testimony turned out to be false testimony following the testimony of the conspiracy witnesses who testified that "you were with us" at the time of the incident. The plain meaning of Scripture is that those conspiring witnesses will be sentenced to the same sentence that was supposed to be imposed on the person whom they tried to incriminate, in the sense of "and you shall do to him as he plotted to do to his brother." However, later on, the Gemara is precise in the halakha and establishes an exception to the law: "When he 'plotted,' and not when he 'did.'"Beatings 5b). In other words, if the conspirators succeeded in their mission and the sentence had already been carried out, then the conspirators were not punished in the same way (and on this point there is a dispute among the poskim, whereas according to the Rambam, this is true only with regard to the death penalty but not with regard to the punishment of flogging or money, but there are those who maintain that the exception also applies to flogging and money). And why did I need to? If, as a result of the silencing claim, the defendant removed the publication, it can be said that the plaintiff has already succeeded in his plot and the exception will apply "when he 'plotted' and not when 'he did'," so that if I hold to the position of those who believe that the exception also applies to money, then in such a case he should not be charged the amount of the claim.
- My colleague's judgment demonstrates that reality precedes the trial by a number of steps.
Until yesterday, the problem of estoppel lawsuits was indeed the focus of attention in the field of defamation lawsuits. Today, however, the problem in focus is the opposite - how to respond to conspiracy theories spread on social media and traditional media. Sometimes, this is not just a single false rumor, but part of a broad fabric of A complex and complex conspiracy. In order to deal with such phenomena, will the tools of Prohibition of Defamation Law? Are these tools sufficient to provide a legitimate and justifiable response to false conspiracy theories, and to reach out to the victims of the publication? Are the sums that are routinely awarded by the courts enough to curb the phenomenon?