The Essential Similarity Between the Defendants' Chip and the Plaintiffs' Chip

66.     Hence, there is relevance to the question of whether the defendants' development included characteristics similar to those of the plaintiffs.  Dr.  Bressler's answer was in the affirmative.  He clarified that the defendants' chip and the plaintiffs' chip are the same, in fact, only in a different design, i.e., in other editing and arrangement, while insisting on the essential similarity between the chips (425, Q.  31-21):

Q: Because it's a completely different sensor, right, sir?

A: It is a sensor in a different arrangement.

Q: I don't know what an arrangement is, is it a different sensor or not another sensor? You don't need English either, answer me in Hebrew.

[...]

The witness, Dr.  Bressler: In architecture and design, different design.  A sensor for the same action, the purpose is the same, it functions in a very similar way, it is built in a slightly different way because it is a slightly different architecture and a slightly different design, yes.

Adv. Liraz: I mean, it's a different sensor, sir.

Adv. Dayan: No, he didn't say that.

The witness, Dr.  Bressler: It has a different design and a different architecture.

67.     The expert further explained in his testimony (426, Q.  22-31) the development of his position on this matter, and this is also learned from the different basis that stood before him when he formulated the various opinions:

1. Thus, in the first opinion, he did not yet have the defendants' patent applications, and therefore his conclusion there was that he could not determine that the chip structure had been stolen. At this stage, he could not have known that the defendants' chip was in the X configuration, and he did not know at the time that the plaintiffs had also developed X-type chips in the past before reaching its current optimal chip structure.

Therefore, the expert noted in his first opinion (on page 3) that if the defendants declare that their chip is not a pair of Indians with a metal strip, then the dispute is over.  However, the expert did not assume that the defendants' chip would bear a substantial resemblance to the plaintiffs' chip, even though it was not a pair of resonators with a metal strip.

4. In his second opinion (in paragraph 4.4.3., on pages 26-27 of the opinion), the expert explained the essential similarity between the ventures - in terms of: purpose, structure, mechanism of action, similar result, and the ability to scream between the plaintiffs' chip and the defendants' chip. The expert further noted (ibid., at paragraph 4.4.3.2) that although the plaintiffs' microantenna is different from the defendants' micro-antenna, it is doubtful whether this difference establishes a "material difference" with regard to the equivalents doctrine.

• In his third opinion (in paragraph 4) and the fourth, the expert explicitly determined that the defendants stole the third secret (the chip structure) from the plaintiffs.

Thus, the position expressed by the expert during his testimony in court is consistent with the development of his position in the course of the various opinions he submitted, in accordance with the changing evidentiary basis that was before his eyes.

68. The defendants argued in their summaries (at paragraph 117) that in his fourth opinion, the expert did not explain how the defendants' chip resembles the plaintiffs' chip, but that in doing so they ignore the overall evidentiary picture.

On pages 29-30 of his second opinion, there is a detail in the table of four issues in which there is a substantial similarity between the plaintiffs' chip and the defendants ' chip, and in the "reading" immediately after the table, the details of the concern about the infringement of trade secrets are noted (see at the end of paragraph 4.3 at p.  32).