The Applicant added that the fact that the Respondent is seeking monetary relief does not grant the Tribunal substantive jurisdiction; Insofar as the Respondent wishes to claim relevant monetary remedies listed in section 93A of the Police Ordinance that are included in the framework of the employment relationship between the Respondent and the Applicant, the Respondent must first apply to the appropriate court to which the substantive jurisdiction is vested to hear his case in accordance with the Administrative Courts Law, 5760-2000 (hereinafter: "Administrative Courts Law" (according to Item 37 of the First Addendum and at the end of the litigation in the competent court), to the extent that the results of the proceeding create a need for financial relief, then the plaintiff can apply again to the Labor Court (paragraph 13 of the application).
The Applicant referred to the provision of section 24(a) of the Labor Courts Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter: "the Labor Courts Law") and argued that in section 93A of the Police Ordinance the matters listed in section 24(a) were expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Labor Court, when it comes to a police officer serving in the Israel Police, who has a clear command nature.
In the Applicant's opinion, the declaratory remedies and the injunction, as well as the requested monetary remedies, derive directly from the plaintiff's claims regarding his dismissal from the police and his return to service - claims that are found in the framework of the employment relationship between the police officer and the police. In order to clarify the claims, it is necessary to clarify the proper exercise of the organizational authority and the management of personnel in the police, as well as the manner in which decisions are made in the case of the respondent during the relevant periods, when these matters fall under the category of "appointment of a police officer to the position and/or transfer from duty" - matters that are explicitly listed within the scope of section 93A of the Police Ordinance (sections 54-56 of the application). Therefore, the Applicant argued that the examination of discretion when examining the decisions that the Respondent complains about in the framework of his claim is left to the Court for Administrative Affairs and not to the Labor Court.
- On the other hand, the Respondent argued that he did not seek to cancel the administrative act, but rather to examine its outcome, against the background of his claims that he was entitled to monetary compensation for the manner in which the Applicant's powers were exercised vis-à-vis him. Acceptance of the Applicant's position will lead to a split in the hearing between the Administrative Court and the Civil Court in a distorted manner (paragraphs 24-25 of the response).
The respondent referred to the case law in the Karhili case (paragraph 26 of the response and the references therein) and added that indeed the decision of the High Court of Justice determines that section 93A of the Police Ordinance prevents the Labor Court from hearing the dismissal of police officers, but section 76 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 5744-1984 (hereinafter: "the Courts Law") allows the court to hear a question under the jurisdiction of another instance, when it is a matter that is secondary to the claim. To this, the respondent added that in his case there is no need to discuss the question of dismissal, since the matter was decided by the Court for Administrative Affairs, it is not a lawsuit whose essence is to ascertain the legality of the dismissal of the policeman, and therefore the Labor Court is given the authority to hear the claim at hand (paragraphs 27-28 of the response). In addition, the respondent argued that monetary claims and claims for infringement of cogent rights are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Court (paragraph 29 of the response). It was further argued that section 93A of the Police Ordinance prevents the Labor Court from hearing the cause of dismissal of police officers, but does not prevent the Civil Court from hearing a tort-monetary claim stemming from administrative decisions such as dismissal. Similarly, the Labor Court's jurisdiction to hear grounds for harassment, wage differences, forced unpaid leave, infringement of pension rights, deductions in violation of the Wages Protection Law, 5718-1958, and more (paragraph 30 of the response) is also not denied.