Labor Dispute (Be’er Sheva) 57632-01-25 Dvir Alon – State of Israel – Israel Police - part 7

It should be emphasized that the above principles apply even when we are dealing with an action that arose in one of the matters listed in section 93A of the Ordinance, and even when monetary relief is sought and a decision on the matter listed in section 93A is only in the case of garra.  Therefore, even such an action is not within the jurisdiction of the Labor Court" (Labor Appeal (National) 4522-11-18 Michael Zelig - State of Israel, [Nevo] given on March 29, 2020, hereinafter: "the Zelig case").

19. It was also held in the Zelig case that even claims submitted to the Labor Court that are primarily for monetary relief, and the discussion of the issues listed in section 93A(a) of the Police Ordinance is secondary, the Labor Courts will not hear them by way of drag:

"In accordance with the case law, the purpose of section 93A, by virtue of which the direct authority of the Labor Court to hear matters listed in section 93A of the Police Ordinance was denied, must also be respected when the court is considering whether to require a decision on a particular matter in the case of a claim for monetary relief.  In other words, the nature of the matter and its being a subscriber in section 93 of the Ordinance tip the scales.  Therefore, when a decision is required in the matter of the subscription in section 93A ofthe Police Ordinance, even if it involves financial relief, there is no place for the Labor Court to require this within the framework of the discretion granted to it by virtue of section 76 of the Courts Law, together with section 39 of the Law."

From the general to the individual

20. After considering the arguments of the parties and in accordance with the spirit of the case law cited above, we are persuaded that the grounds listed in the statement of claim fall within the scope of the matters listed in section 93A of the Police Ordinance. Therefore, the Labor Court lacks substantive jurisdiction to hear them, and the substantive jurisdiction is vested in the Administrative Affairs Court.  Let us explain.
21. The Respondent was employed by the Applicant and the remedies to which he petitions are based on the employment relationship between the parties. Therefore, the three-stage test found in section 24(a)(1) exists in our case.  Now, and in accordance with the spirit of the case law, we must examine whether the Respondent's claims in his claim against the Respondent are enumerated in section 93A of the Police Ordinance, and therefore the Administrative Court will have the sole authority to hear them.
22. A reading of the statement of claim indicates that most of the plaintiff's claims are based on the conduct of the police towards him from the moment the suspicion was raised against him regarding the commission of the alleged offenses until the termination of his employment, as well as subsequently in the conduct with him upon his return to service, in matters related to his placement in a position other than in the Southern District and the police's request to deduct a debt from his salary - issues that are indisputably within the scope of section 93A of the Police Ordinance. When relevant to our case, "the appointment of a police officer to the position, his transfer from one position to another or from one place to another in the position [...] His suspension from office, his dismissal from the corps..."
23. In the statement of claim, the Respondent complains at length about the flaws in the process of terminating his employment, the illegality of his dismissal and the Applicant's conduct towards him from the day the allegations were made against him, his investigation by the DIP, his dismissal twice, first on the grounds of "disgrace" and then on the grounds of "incompatibility", until finally the implementation of the decision regarding his reinstatement in January 2024 (paragraph 22.2 of the statement of claim). With regard to the alleged abuse, the respondent claimed in the statement of claim that the applicant "bitterly" accepted the judicial decision ordering his reinstatement to work, and therefore she did not spare any means to try to dissuade the respondent from returning to police service and to choose the path of "voluntary retirement" (paragraph 22.2.b of the statement of claim).  The Respondent detailed that the alleged abuse was expressed in selective enforcement, his removal from the Southern District, the demand for payment of a debt, the Applicant's taking disciplinary measures against the Applicant - actions which, according to the Respondent, were intended to harm him in every possible way.
24. We see that most of the respondent's claims are the result of the process of his dismissal from the respondent and the process of his return to the respondent's service and the conduct with him since he returned to service. This means that the alleged grounds are a direct result of the issues listed in section 93A of the Police Ordinance quoted above; Also, taking into account the explanatory notes to the section which were also cited above, which explicitly state the methods of employment of a police officer and the special conditions of his employment, there is no dispute that the conditions of service of a police officer are also included under section 93A. 
25. We will add that the plaintiff's claims of abuse were made in a manner that connects them to the grounds for dismissal and his reinstatement. The respondent claimed in the statement of claim that the abuse was expressed in humiliation for two years until he was reinstated to work in the police, a reduction in his salary, failure to respect the decision of a medical entity, the removal of the plaintiff, and more (paragraph 22.1 of the statement of claim).  These arguments, in the manner in which they were argued, do not allow for an in-depth examination of the question of whether it is possible to correct the main argument of the dismissal and return of the respondent to service.  The manner in which the allegations were raised in relation to the abuse is in fact directly connected to the process of dismissal and reinstatement of the plaintiff to service and the alleged abuse, since in view of the case law cited above, it is necessary to examine the reasons that led to the alleged grounds, while in our case there is no dispute that the dismissal proceeding and the process of reinstating the respondent to service, his placement in a position, etc., are matters that are clearly covered by section 93A of the Police Ordinance.  For these reasons, section 76 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version] also does not grant the Labor Court jurisdiction to hear, since this is not a secondary matter to the claim, contrary to the respondent's interpretation of section 76 of the Courts Law and the ruling on the matter in the Karhili case.
26. We will further note that in the framework of the hearing on the question of whether the plaintiff indeed experienced abuse of the applicant upon his return to service, the court will be required to discuss the questions listed in section 93A of the Police Ordinance, on matters that have been excluded from the court's substantive jurisdiction. The respondent's claims are directly related to the conditions of service and in the language of section 93A: "Appointment of a police officer to the position, his transfer from one position to another or from one place to another in the position...".
27. In addition, the respondent's argument that he does not seek to cancel the administrative act but rather to examine its outcome, has no substance since the decision in the administrative petition was given with regard to examining the plaintiff's return to service, after the determination that the reason for dismissal was changed from disgrace to non-conformity. The judgment in the administrative petition did not discuss the proper conduct of the dismissal process itself or the conduct of the police towards the respondent upon his return to service, the alleged debt demand, and his removal from the southern region.  The hearing of the administrative petition focused on the question of the respondent's reinstatement to service under certain conditions, when it was agreed that the respondent's case would be returned to the police for further discussion and examination of the existence of an alternative examination that the respondent could perform that would enable him to return to service.  It should be noted that in practice, the applicant was reinstated to the service, and in the statement of claim he claimed the failures of the police vis-à-vis him regarding his reinstatement.
28. The respondent noted in his response (paragraph 36) that this was "a systemic failure, the responsibility of many senior parties..."; This statement supports the conclusion that the Respondent's case, with all of its claims against the Respondent and its senior officials who allegedly made decisions in the Respondent's case, may be examined by the court authorized to do so in accordance with the Police Ordinance, and certainly not by way of a tug-of-war on the grounds that the Respondent is seeking monetary relief.
29. In light of the aforesaid, and in view of the spirit of the case law quoted above, as well as the explanatory notes to section 93A of the Police Ordinance, it is not possible to accept the respondent's arguments with respect to the hearing of his claims "as a incidental hearing in the framework of a claim for monetary relief..." (paragraph 22 of the response); Similarly, the respondent's arguments that he wishes to examine the results of the administrative act should not be accepted. These arguments contradict the manner in which the respondent formulated his claim on all the grounds enumerated therein.  In addition, even if the Labor Court had granted the Respondent's request to hear these arguments, in order to reach a correct and just decision, the Labor Court would have been required to discuss and render decisions on the issues listed in section 93A of the Police Ordinance by way of toggling, and the Labor Court has no jurisdiction to do so, both by law and by case law.

Conclusion

30. In light of all of the above, the application should be granted. The Labor Court lacks substantive jurisdiction to hear the Respondent's case, and accordingly, the claim is dismissed out of hand. 

It is clear that the aforesaid does not prevent the respondent from filing his claim with the competent court.

31. In the circumstances of the case, and taking into account the outcome of the proceeding, there is no order for costs.
32. The right to appeal to the National Labor Court within 30 days.