On August 2, 2022, Officer Siyanov sent an e-mail request to a national fraud officer, along with his request to the Registrar of Companies, noting that he suspected that the attempted murder was allegedly carried out because the victim had gotten him into financial trouble by registering his details with the same two companies. It was also noted that it was found that the suspect had indeed filed a complaint on April 18, 2021, in a fraudulent civil file (N/2).
- From the defendant's statement to the police dated April 18, 2021 (P/98), it emerged that the defendant filed a complaint that he had signed without his knowledge, under the influence of drugs and alcohol, as a shareholder in D.S. Crops in a tax appeal and in El Company. E. June 13.3 in a tax appeal and as a result he received debt demands and documents that do not belong to him. The defendant stated that he did not know who signed the documents and where the signature was made. He claimed that he was under the influence of drugs and did not know exactly what he was doing. The defendant attached a statement of claim in a summary proceeding filed by Bank Hapoalim in a tax appeal against D.S. Yavolim in a tax appeal and Mr. Dimri Shimon in the sum of ILS 221,770 (fund).
- From the documents of the Registrar of Companies in connection with El, E. On March 13, 2017, in a tax appeal (P/80), it appears that this company was incorporated and registered on August 28, 2017. On March 3, 2020, the transfer of shares of the company from Mr. Mark Davidson to the defendant was recorded. The defendant was registered as a shareholder and sole director of the company. The registered address of the company's offices was registered at 8 Saharon Street, Apartment 4, Jaffa, with the "Tarkin family". On March 9, 2020, a transfer of shares from the defendant to another person who was registered as a shareholder and director of the company was registered, after the Registrar of Companies rejected the defendant's registration on the grounds: "The entity updated as the filler of the form is not updated in the register as a director."
The documents of the Registrar of Companies in connection with D.S. Harvest in a tax appeal (P/81) indicate that the company was incorporated and registered on December 5, 2019. On July 1, 2020, all of the company's shares were transferred in the name of the defendant, Ashbir Tarkin. It also emerged from the attached documents that on June 27, 2020, about three days before the transfer of the shares to the defendant, a letter of demand was sent to the company regarding the settlement of its debts to Bank Hapoalim Ltd.
- In his interrogation on July 28, 2022 (P/84A, P/84B), the defendant stated that he maintained his right to remain silent. When he was accused that the motive for the attempted murder he had committed was a business relationship between him and the complainant, and that the complainant stated that the defendant had served as a "monkey" in the company, and therefore had accumulated debts, and therefore shot the complainant, the defendant chose to maintain his right to remain silent. When the defendant was told that the complainant had shirked responsibility towards him, and referred him to another party because he was only a mediator, he replied: "I wish liar people to die in agony". When asked about the motive for the act, the defendant replied: "I told a social worker what needs to be said and everything is good, I went to the fraud police and said what needs to be said, everything is good" (pp. 16-17 of the transcript of the interrogation).
- The defendant confirmed in his testimony that he filed a complaint with the police's fraud department, because he said he had signed documents without his knowledge, and as a result received debt demands, and even claimed that he did not know who did it to him. The defendant stated that the complainant had nothing to do with it. When asked what his explanation was for the complainant's knowledge of this, the defendant replied: "People know from this story" (p. 605 of Prut).
- The complainant's testimony that the dispute between him and the defendant is on a business background relating to the fact that the complainant mediated between the defendant and another person in order for the defendant to be registered as a "monkey" in the company is consistent with the defendant's complaint to the police dated April 18, 2021, and with the documents of the Registrar of Companies in connection with two companies. The defendant's testimony in this matter, after his silence in his interrogations, which included a sweeping denial of the motive, or any other dispute, and on the other hand, a claim regarding lack of knowledge of a connection between the complainant and the complaint filed by the defendant with the police, amounts to tendentious and suppressed testimony that I have not found to be reliable. The defendant, for his part, refrained from claiming the existence of a dispute between him and the complainant, since he denied any connection to the shooting incident attributed to him; The complainant, on the other hand, confirmed that he mediated between the defendant and another person, in order for the defendant to serve as a "monkey", and in this way he in fact gave testimony that accepts responsibility and has the potential to implicate him in the commission of alleged criminal acts. The complainant's version was substantially corroborated by the documents of the Registrar of Companies and by the defendant's claims to the police on April 18, 2021 (P/98). Even the defendant's "wishes" for the death in agony to liars, after he was accused that the complainant had stated that he was only a "mediator", and referred the defendant to another person, regarding his claims of entanglement in debts, strengthens the conclusion that there was "bad blood" between the complainant and the defendant, at least on the part of the defendant, against the background of his entanglement in debts in the circumstances described.
- In these circumstances, as explained, it is not necessary to prove, and consequently also to determine, the existence of a motive for the commission of the offense attributed to the defendant. However, the accuser proved the existence of a possible motive based on the evidence, which provides an answer to the question of the subjective internal "why" from the defendant's point of view, due to which he accumulated residue and anger against the background of his alleged exploitation that led to his entanglement in financial charges, without me expressing any opinion as to the truth of the matter. It was therefore found that there were circumstances that led to the accumulation of circumstances for which the defendant could be attributed a cause of action to harm the complainant, and mainly it was found that the complainant was in possession of the information Personal Rav about the defendant, which indicates the degree of acquaintance between them. Since a motive is not part of the elements of the offense in our case, and in any case it is not necessary for a conviction for attempted murder, I will suffice to indicate the possible motive, although not certainty, of the act of shooting attributed to the defendant.
Identification of the Defendant by the Complainant as the Perpetrator of the Shooting - Discussion and Conclusions
- The identification of a defendant as the person who committed the act attributed to him in the indictment is a necessary foundation for establishing his criminal responsibility, and as such, the prosecution bears the burden of proof as to the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense to the extent that it is more than reasonably sufficient.
- Identification of a defendant as the perpetrator of the offense can be done by witnesses and even by means of circumstantial evidence. The identification of a defendant does not, in and of itself, require assistance, and a single testimony is sufficient in this regard. "With regard to proving the identity of the accused, a distinction must be made: between a witness who 'knows' the defendant 'prior acquaintance' - formal or informal - regardless of the event that is the subject of the indictment, or 'sufficient' acquaintance as a result of the contact that took place between them in the context of the commission of the offense...; and a witness who 'does not know' the defendant from 'prior acquaintance', but who claims that he is able to 'identify' him by the character that was engraved in his memory as a result of the contact that took place between them incidentally or during the commission of the offense. The first does not 'identify' the defendant, but rather 'identifies' him as the perpetrator of the offense; while the second one 'identifies' him as the perpetrator of the offense. The obligation to conduct an identification procedure relates to those suspects for whom there is no 'prior acquaintance';" (J. Next, on the evidence, some Tuesday, 5770-2009, at p. 1177).
- Given the constant fear of false identification or mistaken identification, against the background of the recognition of the limitations of the perception and memory of flesh and blood witnesses, all the more so when the court is asked to base the conviction of a defendant on identification testimony as a single testimony, the case law developed guiding principles for the process of examining and evaluating identification testimony. Therefore, the identification of a defendant as a perpetrator of an offense based on the victim's testimony is examined according to two criteria: first, the subjective credibility of the identifying witness; The second is the objective reliability of the identification itself (Criminal Appeal 9040/05 Ohayon v. State of Israel (7.12.2006); Criminal Appeal 8902/11 Haziza v. State of Israel (November 15, 2012)). The first criterion examines the general credibility of the identifying witness in relation to the entire criminal event and its circumstances, the witness's willingness to tell the truth, and his ability to be precise in the details. The second criterion examines the reliability of the identification, i.e., whether the identification of the suspect by the witness can be relied upon or not. This last examination is conducted separately from the first, and it focuses, in fact, on examining the credibility of the witness in the specific question of identifying the suspect. The reason for examining the reliability of the identification separately in terms of the general credibility of the witness is the desire to avoid possible errors on the part of the witness with regard to identification, even if the reliability of his testimony in relation to the criminal incident itself is not in doubt. This was discussed by the Honorable Justice H. Cohen in a criminal appeal 648/77 Kariv v. State of IsraelIsrSC 32(2) 729, 758 (1978):
"... With regard to reliability, the identification of the defendant by the victim of the offense is not the same as the testimony of what happened to him, even if we assume that the common denominator is the credibility of the identifier and the witness as telling the truth. His credibility as a truth-teller imprints a stamp of subjective truth on both the identification and the testimony of the act; But until a court can turn this truth into an objective truth (as it were), it must first be certain that the witness, in his innocence that his entire testimony is true, has not made a mistake, neither out of distraction, nor out of the limitations of human memory, nor out of external or subconscious influences. When we are dealing with an anecdote from the mouth of a truth-telling witness, and the story is logical and reasonable, there is usually no reason to fear such mistakes; If you don't say yes, there will be no end to the psychological rumors and controversies, and our entire system of evidence will eventually collapse. whereas in the identification of the accused by the victim of the offense, when there is no other evidence linking the defendant to the offense, there is usually a fear of such mistakes - not because in this matter the credibility of the identifier as a truth-teller has been impaired in any way, but even though it has not been impaired at all. According to what is written in the books, almost all of the mistaken identifications that led to the conviction of innocent people were made in good faith by true witnesses: just because they trusted the judges or jurors, they were also believed about the identifications. We must learn the simple lesson from mistakes that have already been exposed and sufficiently investigated, and that is that with regard to the identification of the accused by the victim of the offense, the reliability of the identifier is not sufficient. However, it is needless to say that even with regard to this identification, there is an insurmountable condition, as a starting point, that the identifier should be trusted by the court as a truth-teller."