In Miscellaneous Criminal Applications 7919/19 Urich et al. v. State of Israel (25.12.2019) The question of the consequences of the premature search that was carried out illegally on the applicants' mobile phones on a late decision to issue a search warrant for those devices was discussed. In the same matter, the issue of searching on the basis of informed consent was not required to be decided on its merits, and in this regard the Honorable Justice Elron (para. 17) noted as follows:
"In the present case, there is no dispute that the search of the applicants' mobile phones was carried out in violation of police procedures, and in contravention of the conditions set out in the Ben Haim case for granting 'informed consent' to conduct a search of a person's body with his consent. It therefore follows that there can be no dispute that there was a defect in the manner in which the search was carried out on the applicants' mobile phones - and the main question is the implications of this defect on the applications for the issuance of search warrants on the devices.
In any event, there is no need to decide the question of whether the Applicants' consent could have been satisfied if it had met the conditions for granting 'informed consent' as defined in the Ben Haim case. In any event, I will note that this is a complex and complex issue, on which the legislature should give its opinion (see also: Criminal Appeals Authority 9446/16 Chief Military Prosecutor v. Sigawi (June 19, 2017) (hereinafter: the Sigawi case); and see also section 90 of the Criminal Procedure Bill (Enforcement Powers - Invention, Search and Seizure), 5774-2014, Government Bill 574 (hereinafter: the Invention, Search and Seizure Bill)))."
Thus the Honorable President E. Hayut ruled in an additional criminal hearing 1062/21 Jonathan Urich v. State of IsraelVerse 26 (11.1.2022):
"The questions that need to be decided in the additional hearings before us are, as stated, interpretive questions relating to the provision of section 23A of the Ordinance. This section states that a search of a computer will only be carried out pursuant to a judicial order - as opposed to other searches, which can be carried out in certain circumstances without a warrant (see section 25 of the Ordinance). It should be noted that opinions differ regarding the possibility of sufficing with the interrogee's 'informed consent' for the purpose of conducting a search of his computer without a warrant (see: Urich I, at paragraph 17), but this question exceeds the scope of the discussion in our case, since there is no dispute that in both cases the subject of the hearing was not given 'informed consent' as aforesaid."