In Parashat Issacharov Justice (as described at the time) D.  Beinisch emphasized that this set of considerations is not without difficulties, and left the question to come:To what extent will the courts in Israel consider taking into account the importance of the evidence and the severity of the offense attributed to the defendant in the exercise of their discretion according to the doctrine of judicial invalidation?" (ibid., in verse 73).  Later, in a criminal appeal 5956/08 Al 'Uqah v.  State of Israel (November 23, 2011) Justice N.  Hendel ruled that weight should not be given to the severity of the offense in the framework of examining the admissibility of evidence, and this determination was reiterated by Justice A.  Shoham in a criminal appeal 2868/13 Haibtov v.  State of Israel, at para.  89 (August 2, 2018).

On the other hand, Judge (as he was known at the time) Y.  Amit expressed a different opinion in a criminal appeal 5417/07 Nikolai Bonner v.  State of Israel, verse 21 (May 30, 2013), as an old island: "In my opinion, there is room to consider the severity of the offense within the framework of the purposes of the investigation of the truth, the concern for public safety, and the interest of the victim of the offense.  To be precise: I do not come to say that in every offense of murder or any other serious offense, the weight of the severity of the offense will tip the scales in favor of the defendant.  However, the severity of the offense within the framework of 'cost-benefit' considerations must be one of the components within the framework of the complex and delicate system of checks and balances of the doctrine of disqualification outlined for us by the Issacharov Rule.  I have no choice but to reiterate the words of Justice Beinisch (ibid., p.  566): 'It is important to emphasize that none of the considerations that we discussed have exclusive or decisive status, and that the relative weight of the aforementioned considerations will be determined by taking into account the circumstances of each case on its own merits'" (see also: Criminal Appeal 6144/10 Getzau v.  State of Israel, paragraph 3 of the judgment of Judge Y.  Amit (April 10, 2013); Criminal Appeal 4039/19 Daniel Nachmani v.  State of Israel, para.  50 (March 17, 2021)).

85. Alongside the fulfillment of the considerations detailed above, I am of the opinion that in this case proper weight should also be given to the third set of considerations, which deal with the necessary balance between the effect of the invalidation of evidence on the administration of justice, while examining the nature of the offense attributed to the defendant and the degree of its severity. As stated, we are dealing with a main offense involving attempted murder, which is an attempt to commit the most serious offense in the statute book, when the camera footage enabled the initial identification by which the defendant was arrested very soon after the act that day.

Admittedly, after gathering all the evidence and testimonies against the accused, the disqualification of the videos as admissible evidence does not imply the acquittal of the accused, since based on the testimony of the complainant's identification of the accused, and the demand for evidentiary corroboration, it appears that the accuser presented a host of additional evidence, besides the photographic footage, which can meet this requirement.  However, not only does the photographic footage, insofar as it is found admissible, assume a significant evidentiary mass to substantiate the determination that the defendant committed the act attributed to him in the indictment with regard to the shooting at the complainant, but - and this is the main thing - the evidence derived from the filmed footage is what led to his capture and all the other evidence that can support the complainant's testimony against him.  Therefore, the disqualification of the videos, even if it does not lead to the acquittal of the defendant in this case, will damage the fabric of evidence incriminating the defendant, in a manner that may lead to injustice in the broad sense and damage to the public's trust in the judicial system, and there is no place or justification for this.

86. Thus, given the various interests, a balance is required that corresponds to the concrete circumstances of the case before us, between the public interest in revealing the truth and protecting public peace in a manner that favors the inadmissibility of the videos documenting the act and the route of the shooter from his home and back, which link the defendant with a very high probability that he committed the offense; and the obligation to protect the integrity of the criminal proceedings and the rights of the accused, as interrogees and defendants, as well as third parties, by invalidating the admissibility of the videos obtained in violation of their rights. In examining the extent of the damage versus the social benefit involved in the disqualification of this evidence, the question arises whether the degree of harm to the public interest as a result of the invalidation of the evidence and the social cost involved are not high enough in the present circumstances.
87. There is no dispute that the court must ensure with the investigative authorities that their authority operates on the basis of fair interrogation norms. In the circumstances of the defendant's case, I have come to the conclusion that the defect that occurred in the process of penetrating the various security cameras, in the circumstances described above, and without taking it lightly, does not constitute crossing a red line, so that the violation of the rights of the defendant as an interrogee, as well as the strict adherence to the fairness of the criminal proceedings and the deterrence of the enforcement agencies, retreats against the harm to the values and social interests of the prosecution of a criminal who committed acts such as those attributed to the defendant.  alongside interests such as: the public's trust and sense of security regarding the ability of the investigative and enforcement agencies to perform their duties properly and in real time; the effectiveness of the criminal proceeding; the ability to bring to justice those who have sinned in committing such serious offenses; the quest to discover the truth; the wise use of the resources of the legal system; The intelligent management of the proceedings, and especially the desire to do justice to someone who almost lost his life as a result of the offense.
88. from all of this compilation, taking into account that even if there was a flaw in the process of collecting evidence from the security cameras, and even though things should have been done differently, and to the extent that there was a concern that that that evidence would be harmed, it could have been collected until an intrusion order was received from the court; and given that we are dealing with objective evidence whose credibility is not in dispute and has an independent and separate existence from the illegality involved in obtaining it; Given the severity of the offense and the required balance between the conflicting interests, as explained above, I am satisfied that all the considerations that I have detailed lead to the conclusion that the various flaws that occurred in the actions of the police are retracted by the public interests that I have considered, first and foremost the fight against crime and the protection of public peace and security. The social cost involved in disqualifying the evidence is greater than the social benefit.  Accepting the videos as admissible evidence will not materially infringe on the defendant's right to a fair trial, therefore, I have not found the evidentiary findings obtained from the filmed footage to be invalidated, and therefore I determine their admissibility.  Given that these are artisanal evidence, their credibility was not impaired by the very way in which they were obtained, and since no claim of any harm to the content of the videos was heard, their weight was not compromised.

Identification of the defendant in the footage

89. As stated, the family of the defendant Tarkin placed a security camera near the door of their apartment in their apartment building at 8 Saharon Street, Tel Aviv-Jaffa (P/49). The videos from this camera, which were found to be admissible and reliable, show that the suspect left his family home on July 20, 2022 at 12:41 p.m., with the details of his clothing as follows: a black short shirt, long black pants, a black casket hat and black shoes, and returned home at 1:58 p.m.  At 2:16 P.M., he was seen leaving his house again, after changing his clothes, and was seen wearing a short black shirt, orange shorts, a black casket hat on his head and black shoes on his feet (P/49, P/73).
90. In his testimony in court, the defendant confirmed that security cameras were installed in his home on Saharon Street, including a camera that stood above the apartment door (p. 560 of Prut).  The defendant confirmed that he was the one who was documented in the video, which was shown to him, when he returned to his apartment at 1:58 P.M., and left about 15 minutes later dressed in other clothes, with which he was later arrested (pp.  560-561 of Prut).  The defendant confirmed in his testimony that the black clothes he wore until he returned to the apartment, which he had exchanged for others, were seized by the police during a search of his apartment (pp.  562, 566 of Prut).
91. Later, at 1:03 P.M., the defendant was filmed in dark clothes, riding an electric bicycle from Rubinstein Street toward Sumkan Street. At 1:04 P.M., he was filmed under the building at 22 Nardor Street, where he waited for about 20 minutes.  During those minutes, he walked from side to side, until he finally removed his helmet to smoke, and thus his face was fully documented in the video (P/5A, P/35).  It should be noted that the defendant has the footage in which he was seen as alleged to have taken off his helmet and smoked a cigarette.  The defendant confirmed in his testimony in court that he does indeed smoke cigarettes, because he is familiar with the photographed place and usually walks around it.  The defendant confirmed that it was someone of Ethiopian origin who resembled him, but denied that he was the one who had been seen in the video (pp.  567-568 of Pruth).
92. In the Supreme Court's ruling, it was determined that the court may rely on the appearance of the defendant and his impression with regard to the identification of the defendant. Thus, for example, the words of the Honorable President (retired), Justice M.  Naor in Criminal Appeal 3151/08 Davidov v.  State of IsraelVerse 13 (26.05.2010):

"Let us move on to the appellant's argument that for the purpose of convicting the appellant, there is no substitute for the court's direct impression of the film.  It has been held in the past that the court is entitled to take an impression of a video film and determine, based on its eyes, whether the defendant before it is the person in the video (see, for example: Criminal Appeal 2653/98 Ben David v.  State of Israel, IsrSC 52(4) 529, 539 ff.  (1998); Criminal Appeal 6864/03 Rockenstein v.  State of Israel, IsrSC 58(4) 657, 669 et seq.  (2004); Criminal Appeal 602/06 Avraham v.  State of Israel, paragraphs 4-6 (unpublished, January 22, 2007)).  However, the court is not obligated to make an independent impression, and of course, it is not obligated to decide whether the defendant before it is the person in the film solely on the basis of his own impression."