In fact, the object-relational requirement of indifference is engulfed in the higher psychic element of purpose. The result is that, in practice, with regard to the mental element of an attempted murder, only awareness of the elements of the factual element and the purpose of the commission of the offense, which is expressed in the "purpose of killing", must be proved. With regard to the object relation to the result and the completion of the finished offense, "ordinary intent" is required to kill, as opposed to "premeditated intent",
which consists of a decision to kill, preparation and the absence of a cantor. In other words, it must be proven that the person who is trying to commit an offense will want the result of the finished offense, but for reasons that are not dependent on him, the result was prevented (Criminal Appeal 5922/22 Kozlov v. State of Israel (13.8.2023)).
In this context, see the words of the Supreme Court in a criminal appeal 6731/23 Strug v. State of Israel, paragraph 12-13 (July 16, 2024):
"At the same time, the mental element required for the formulation of attempted offenses is divided into two - on the cognitive level, the perpetrator's awareness of the nature of the act, the circumstances, and in consequential offenses - the possibility of causing the result (section 20(a) of the law); And on the objective level (in consequential offenses) it must be proven both that the object component required in the finished offense is proven, and that the perpetrator will commit the offense 'with the aim of committing it', that is, in order to complete the finished offense (see also: Rabin Wakey, at p. 566, which insists that in practice, these two requirements in the object realm converge).
In the offense of attempted murder, the object component that is required is subject to the application of Amendment 137 to the Law (Penal Law (Amendment No. 137), 5779-2019, S.H. 230 (hereinafter: the Reform of the Offenses of Killing or the Reform)) was initially intended - i.e., an objectival component identical to that required for a conviction for the offense of murder that preceded the reform as formulated in section 300(a)(2) of the Law (see: Criminal Appeal 1474/14 Anonymous v. State of Israel, paragraphs 65-72 (December 15, 2015)). With the establishment of the reform in the offenses of manslaughter, the issue of the object component required in the offense of attempted murder arose - whether, like the law that was in place before the reform, the element of intent must be proven first; Or perhaps it is now sufficient to prove intent as it is common in the Penal Law, and in the case of the basic offense of murder under section 300(a) of the Law.