The District Court's Judgment
- In its judgment, the District Court ruled that there was substance to the respondents' arguments that the Family Court did not give sufficient weight to the claim of judicial estoppel that they claimed with respect to the applicant. In its ruling, the court noted that the Applicant's attempts to disavow the claims he made in the proceeding he conducted against his father, by explaining that he had been misled as to the fact that the Respondent had paid the father's debts that had fallen on the farm amounted to bad faith, especially when the Applicant's claims, which he is trying to disavow, are the ones that helped him win his claim against his father in which he received the rights in the disputed farm. The court ruled that the applicant is in fact claiming an exception regarding the applicability of the rule of judicial estoppel - and this claim must be proven. But May: The court further ruled that even if the applicant's claim had been proven, it would not have been of any benefit to him in light of the overall contractual system between the parties.
- The District Court further ruled that even though the Family Court found that the Applicant should be exempted from his obligation to the Respondents due to the language of the letter of undertaking that violates the provision of section 8(a) ofthe Inheritance Law, when the intention of the parties behind that undertaking - to give a gift during life and not a gift after death - was clear to the parties with respect to the overall contractual system between them, there is no reason to exempt the Applicant from this undertaking because of the flawed language used in it. In this regard, the District Court found it appropriate to emphasize that the phrase "one hour before my death", on which the Applicant bases his claim that this is an invalid undertaking, is also found in an agreement made between him and his father on July 28, 1996, which was established in the framework of the judgment of the Family Court of Rishon LeZion.
- The District Court further ruled that although there is no dispute that section 8 of the Inheritance Law is intended to ensure that any transaction of the rights of the deceased will be in a will and not in an agreement intended to be implemented after the death of the testator, since this is a provision that restricts freedom of contract, it should be interpreted very narrowly, as has been determined more than once by this Court. Therefore, the District Court held in our case that since we are not dealing with the transfer of the farm after the Applicant's death, but rather during his lifetime, the Applicant's ability to sell the property to another was not impaired, provided that the consent of the nephews to this effect is obtained, in accordance with Sections F and G of the Letter of Undertaking.
- Moreover, the District Court noted that even if it had been determined that there were clauses in the letter of undertaking that were void by virtue of section 8(a) of the Inheritance Law, in accordance with section 19 ofthe Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, where the contract can be separated into parts, only the part that carries with it the ground for cancellation can be canceled, and it is not necessary to cancel the entire contract; therefore, The court ruled that in our case, it is possible to cancel only the parts of the letter of undertaking that use the phrase "one hour before my death", and leave the rest of the obligations in place. To this, the District Court added that even according to Section 31 of the Contracts Law, the court can determine relative nullity, or restitution under Section 21 of the Contracts Law, if there is a part of the contract that is illegal (as stated, by virtue of Section 8(a) of the Inheritance Law).). In these circumstances, the District Court ruled that since all the agreements were actually executed decades ago, and even the Applicant himself relied on the same contractual system, the relative nullity of the letter of undertaking should be ordered at most.
- The District Court also ruled that a similar result can also be reached by virtue of the laws of enrichment and not by law. The court justified this determination by saying that in exchange for the respondent's obligations and the agreements she entered into with her father, the rights in the farm were transferred to the applicant, and they were not created solely by the Family Court's determination in the framework of the proceeding that took place between the father and the applicant. To this, the District Court added that the interpretation that the Applicant sought to give to the clause that conditions the sale of the farm on the joint consent of the nephews - so that this clause will apply only after the rights in the farm are transferred to the nephews - renders the letter of undertaking meaningless in practice; Therefore, this interpretation that grants the applicant an exemption from payment of compensation to the respondents for rights that would have been entitled to them in one way or another should not be accepted.
- On the basis of all of the above, the District Court ruled that the appeal should be partially accepted, so that the hearing would be returned to the Family Court for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation due to either of the respondents or both of them together as a result of the sale of the farm, deducting the applicant's expenses in the framework of the legal proceeding he conducted with his father, which even the respondents themselves do not deny.