The clarification of the identification requirement will be made on the basis of those details that have been published and are known to those around the person claiming the injury. Whether it's the close one or the extension. This is the case with the claim of implicit defamation, as well as in the claim of publication in a book defined as a work of fiction, and in the distinction between "literary fiction" and "legal fiction". Harm to the plaintiff is possible even if only those who are his close acquaintances recognize him as a character from the book, and even if it is only a handful of people. And when a handful is sufficient for an injustice to arise, the details must be examined as they are known to that handful. Those "acquaintances" of the plaintiff.
On this it was determined (emphasis added - the undersigned):
Literary fiction expresses an "unwritten contract" between the reasonable reader and the author. One of the terms of the contract is the lack of connection between the work and reality. This is not the case with legal fiction. The law, contrary to the professional-literary position expressed by the expert professors in the opinion, does not rule in a binary world, in which the work is catalogued into one drawer and not another. The sentence examines the degree of fiction of the work. Sometimes the work is somewhat reminiscent of events that took place in reality; Sometimes the work is based on these events but without a complete correspondence; Sometimes, these events are reflected in the work itself, as they are written and written. Examining the degree of fiction is not a theoretical matter. This will be done according to the reader's familiarity with the events that appear in the work. Only the soul mate of the real character knew how to identify the events described through the shittin. Some of the character's close acquaintances also knew her identity. Some of her distant acquaintances, and sometimes the reasonable reader, without a name or a character, knew how to identify her. The adoption of a legal policy based on the literary worldview of the scholars Hirschfeld and Hever is inappropriate. Such a policy allows those who wish to do so to publish things that amount to an invasion of privacy and defamation, in literary-fictional garb. The reader, explained, will witness the literary spectacle and will be able to ignore the real one. But the acquaintances and admirers of the real figure will recognize him easily, process the data in their consciousness, and reach realistic conclusions; Not fiction. In this way, the door will be opened to nullify the laws of protection of privacy and the prohibition of defamation. (Civil Appeal 8954/11 Anonymous v. Anonymous, IsrSC 66(3) 691, 769)