Caselaw

Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 49593-12-22 Amit Steinhardt v. Eliyahu Eshed - part 19

November 13, 2025
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An examination of the defendant's arguments shows that, in fact, they do not attempt to refute this claim of the plaintiff.  The defendant repeats the argument that it is not possible to link the fictional character, "the villain", to the plaintiff, and therefore there is no point in attempting to claim defamation.  The defendant does not claim that the use of such derogatory epithets in the book does not constitute defamation, and for good reason.

  1. The Prohibition of Defamation Law states that the publication of defamation constitutes a tort (section 7 of the law) and defines "defamation" as something that is (inter alia), liable to "humiliate a person in the eyes of the public or make him a target of hatred, contempt or ridicule on the part of others" and even as something whose publication is liable to harm a person, "in his business, profession or profession".

As is well known, defamation law reflects an attempt to strike a balance between weighty rights and interests that "pull" in opposite directions: the right to a good name on the one hand, and the right to seek expression on the other.  Tension sometimes arises between these rights.  Emphasizing the search for the phrase allows one to "tolerate" a more offensive expression of a person's good name.  Emphasizing the right to a good name will make it easier to perceive an expression as defamatory, and will inevitably lead to a reduction in the search for expression.  Among these rights there is a "balance point".  A point to which emphasis has been placed on the search for expression and publication may not be perceived as an expression of defamation; And from then on, the spotlight will be directed at gaining a good name and the publication will be perceived as defamation.  That equilibrium point is not fixed.  After all, this point of balance reflects a value assessment and changes according to the circumstances.  An expression in a publication that is perceived as defamation in one situation may not be considered defamation in different circumstances (see, for example: Civil Appeal Authority 10520/03 Ben Gvir v.  Dankner, [published in Nevo] 12 November 2006, paragraph 1 of the opinion of Justice Ayala Procaccia).

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