Civil Case 40447-12-22 Gil Zeitan v. Florida Israel Luxury Towers Ltd. - part 2

From the aggregate, it emerges that the main issues that require a decision are the following:

39. The question of representation and deception (contractual-tort) - whether the defendant's promises on television and in the meetings were a "contractual undertaking" or "words of praise" and a purely business expectation. The plaintiff seeks to determine that there is room for reliance on the defendants' expertise and on media publications that created a representation of a safe "exit".  The defendants refer to the signing of a contract that includes a clause that cancels any oral representation made prior to the signing.
40. The promise of repurchase - this is a clear factual dispute. On the one hand, the evidence supporting the plaintiff is his own testimony, the testimony of his brother (my father) and the WhatsApp messages that ostensibly imply such consent.  On the other hand, the evidence supporting the defendants is the absence of a clause in the written contract, and the fact that the plaintiff's family (the mother and brothers) were involved and did not insist on anchoring the promise in writing.
41. Personal Liability and Lifting the Veil - It is necessary to examine whether the defendant acted in personal bad faith that justifies imposing liability on him, or whether the "corporate veil" that protects members of the company must be maintained.
42. And finally, the issue of the damage and its reduction - on the part of the plaintiff it was argued that the damage was the gap between the purchase price and the real market value, plus expenses and mental anguish, while on the part of the defendants: the increase in the dollar rate "offset" the loss, and the plaintiff refused offers of assistance in the sale, and thus did not reduce his damage.

00The Representation and Deception Claim

43. At the heart of the dispute is the gap between the television and frontal presentations and the legal and physical reality of the lots. The plaintiff claims that the defendants created a "representation of sure success", while promising phenomenal returns of 100%-150% within a short time and selling the plots as a "once-in-a-generation opportunity" at a discounted price of 75% of the market value - a representation that turned out to be false in light of the defendants' own low purchase prices and the state of the area (forest without infrastructure).  On the other hand, the defendants claim that a "guaranteed return" was never promised, but only a "potential expectation" based on past data was presented, and that the plaintiff, who was accompanied by his family members, consciously signed an agreement that included a waiver clause (clause 6.2) that cancels any representation made orally.  According to them, the claim of deception is an attempt by the plaintiff to be released from a transaction that he regretted before the proper investment time had passed, while the plaintiff sees this as a "working method" designed to capture unsuspecting investors.
44. Parties to negotiations, and in particular real estate sellers, are obligated to act in good faith and in an acceptable manner by virtue of section 12(a) of the Contracts (General Part) Law. This duty includes an increased duty of disclosure, especially when it comes to the sale of an apartment "on paper" or land that is not available for construction, and failure to disclose material information can be considered a breach of this duty.  The standard of good faith is objective, and does not require an intention to mislead.  Civil Appeal 2274/21 Neta Mor v.  Elad Israel Residences in Tax Appeal (Nevo 1.1.2023), Civil Appeal 4697/05 Gabbao Establishment v.  David Dudai (Nevo 27.8.2012), Civil Case (Nevo District) 4532-02-12 Tuglili Properties in Tax Appeal v.  Yaakov Tessler (Nevo 14.8.2014).
45. A sweeping determination that from the moment a contract is concluded, pre-contractual representations no longer have any meaning, is inconsistent with the law. Pre-contractual misrepresentation can be a basis for a defect of will (mistake or deception) or a lack of good faith in the negotiations.  In some cases, pre-contractual representations can even be considered part of the terms of the contract itself, especially in consumer contracts.  A waiver clause in the sale agreement, which denies the validity of pre-contractual representations, does not necessarily invalidate these claims, since the courts use principles such as good faith to protect the weak party.  Civil Case (Hai District) 67265-05-18 Merom Bar v.  Yuval Alon Building Company in Tax Appeal (Nevo 4.6.2025), Civil Appeal Authority 1103/17 Opera on the Sea in Tax Appeal v.  Yania Litvak (Nevo 6.3.2017), Civil Case (Shalom App) 24396-09-09 Moshe Bustan v.  A.P.  Larom-Israel Company in Tax Appeal (Nevo 31.1.2016).
46. Deception usually refers to a past or present factual or legal fact. A promise relating to the future is an expression of intent, and does not constitute a basis for a claim of deception, unless the party making the promise knew at the time that it did not intend to keep.  In such a case, the promise contains a false factual statement about the state of mind of the guarantor.  The presentation of a "potential expectation" based on false data or while concealing material information can be considered a misrepresentation.  (G.  Shalev and A.  Zemach, Contract Law (2019) chapter 13 misrepresentation).
47. The plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the misrepresentation or lack of good faith and his engagement in the contract. If such a connection is proven, the plaintiff will be entitled to compensation.  The usual damages for lack of good faith in negotiations are reliance damages, the purpose of which is to put the injured party in the situation he would have been if he had not entered into the negotiations at all.  In cases of misrepresentation, when the contract has not been canceled, the injured party may be entitled to compensation calculated by subtracting the contractual price paid for the property, by the ratio of the value of the property with the defect to its value without the defect.  Although the buyer is required to perform inspections, the seller's duty of disclosure prevails, especially when the information relates to a material matter.  In cases of significant deception, even if the buyer was negligent in failing to perform inspections, this does not diminish the responsibility of the seller who misled him.  However, in some cases, the court may attribute contributory fault to the buyer who did not check the legal and planning status of the property.  Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) 22116-04-22 Shmuel Sudri v.  Kuds in Tax Appeal (Nevo 7.8.2024) (Sec.  75 and references therein), Civil Appeal 2642/19 Har Adar Local Council v.  David and Yonatan Shopping Center in Tax Appeal (Nevo 20.5.2019).
48. With regard to the defendants' claim that the defendant is none other than the marketing entity, it should be noted that Israeli law recognizes liability for negligent misrepresentation, which is based on the tort of negligence, even when the information is provided by a party other than the owner of the property or a direct party to the contract. This liability has been extended beyond professional experts and includes any negligent transfer of information or misleading information, in writing or conduct, to another party that is expected to rely on the information.  In order to impose this liability, it is required that the person providing the information has special skill in the field or that the information was provided in the ordinary course of business, and that he intended that the injured party rely on the information.  In the case of real estate marketers, these conditions are usually met.  Civil Appeal 7440/19 Emblaze in Tax Appeal v.  Double U Trading Fund Inc.  (Nevo 27.4.2021), Civil Case (Tel Aviv District) 45111-01-12 M15 Consultants Ltd.    Verint Systems in Tax Appeal (Nevo 2.2.2020).
49. The duty of good faith in negotiations, which is set forth in section 12 of the Contracts Law (General Part), applies to a "person" conducting negotiations, and is not limited only to the future parties to the contract. It also applies to a person who takes part in negotiations on behalf of one of the contractors, even if he is not a party to the contract signed at the end of the negotiations.  A breach of this duty can be expressed in failure to disclose material facts or by making false representations.
50. After examining the arguments of the parties and the evidence material, I have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff met the burden of proving that the defendants made false representations to him and breached the duty of good faith in the negotiations. I was persuaded that the defendants created a "narrative of safe and risk-free success", both through the defendant's appearances in the media and in the frontal meetings, using expressions such as "a once-in-a-generation opportunity" and promising exceptional returns in short periods of time.  These representations turned out to be far from reality: in practice, the defendants concealed a material fact according to which the plots had been purchased by them a short time earlier for about half of the price at which they had been sold to the plaintiff - a fact that renders their declaration of a "discount price" or "market prices" meaningless.  In addition, it was proven that the plots were sold as "ready for construction", while in fact it was forested land that required significant development, a fact that constitutes a false factual representation and not merely a "future expectation".
51. I do not accept the defendants' argument that the waiver clause in the contract exempts them from liability. As the legal analysis shows, the duty of good faith and the increased duty of disclosure that applies to real estate marketers perceived as "experts" outweighs formal contractual restrictions, especially when it comes to active deception and a clear power disparity between the parties.  The fact that the plaintiff did not conduct independent inspections on sites such as Zillow does not detract from the defendants' liability, since the seller's duty of disclosure is absolute and is not contingent on the buyer's vigilance.  Hence, the plaintiff proved a direct causal connection between the extreme misrepresentations and his engagement in the transaction, and therefore he was entitled to compensation for his damages.

The Question of Repurchase

52. Another substantive factual dispute relates to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant promised him personally and orally, at the time of the purchase, that he would purchase the plots back from him after a year if he so wished. The plaintiff and his brother, Avi, testified that the defendant presented himself as someone who "always purchases plots" and provided a complete sense of security in the transaction, while also relying on WhatsApp correspondence, which according to them attest to the defendant's willingness to make the purchase in real time.  The plaintiff explained the absence of a clause in the written contract by saying that he had full confidence in the defendant and that "there is no need to record this." On the other hand, the defendants categorically deny any such promise, and claim that this is a baseless claim intended to create a retroactive "insurance certificate" for an investment whose value did not rise as expected.  The defendants emphasize that there is no mention of such an undertaking in the written agreement, which contains an explicit waiver clause on previous representations, and argue that the WhatsApp messages were a show of courtesy and service towards a customer under pressure and not a legal obligation.  In addition, they attribute to the plaintiff's obligation to refrain from bringing his mother to testify, which they claim could have refuted his version regarding promises allegedly made at the time of signing.
53. As a rule, an oral undertaking to purchase land back, even if it was given at the time of the purchase of the plots, is not valid in itself due to the substantive written requirement set forth in section 8 of the Real Estate Law. However, in exceptional and exceptional cases, when the "cry of fairness" arises and there is a blatant violation of the principle of good faith, the court may soften the written requirement and enforce the undertaking, while examining the degree of reliance of the injured party and the degree of guilt of the disavowed party.
54. Israeli law states that an undertaking to make a real estate transaction requires a written document, and this requirement is substantive (constitutional) and not purely evidentiary. This means that in the absence of a written document, the undertaking is invalid, and "if a document is not made, the parties have done nothing and nothing." This requirement is intended to ensure the seriousness of the transaction, to prevent hasty and frivolous engagements, and to provide certainty to the content of the transaction.  Civil Appeal 1463/22 The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v.  Himanuta in Tax Appeal (Nevo, July 14, 2025), Civil Case (Hai District) 13723-03-18 Omer Gadir v.  Late Goat Muhammad Gadir (Nevo, January 28, 2020) (and references therein).
55. In the case at hand, the promise of repurchase of the plots was given (also according to the plaintiff's version) orally and was not included in the written contract, and therefore, according to the strict rule, it has no binding legal validity.
56. Over the years, case law has softened the strict written requirement, especially in cases where there is a blatant violation of the principle of good faith. Other Municipal Applications 986/93 Kalmar v.  Guy, IsrSC 50(1) 185 (1996) It was held that in "special and exceptional" cases in which the "cry of fairness" arises, it is possible to overcome the written requirement by virtue of section 12 of the Contracts Law (General Part), which requires good faith in negotiations.  The use of this exception will be done with great caution, especially when the contract was actually fulfilled or there was significant reliance on it, and the degree of guilt of the party who reneged on the undertaking is also examined.
57. Even when the written requirement is softened, proof of the parties' intention to enter into a binding contract and sufficient specificity of its terms is still required. The court will examine the parties' behavior before, during, and after the engagement.  It is possible to fill in missing details in a written document by means of legal provisions or external evidence, and even to rely on several documents together.  In cases where there is a complete absence of a written document, external evidence, such as WhatsApp messages, can serve as an indication of discretion, but their content and context must be carefully examined.  In the case at hand, the plaintiff must prove that the WhatsApp messages, together with other testimonies (such as the testimony of his brother), attest to the defendant's discretion to commit to a repurchase, and that this is not just a "show of courtesy and service".  The waiver clause of previous representations in the written contract strengthens the defendant's position, but does not necessarily block claims of extreme bad faith.
58. A central element in the "cry of fairness" is whether there has been a change in the situation following the oral promise, such as partial fulfillment of the contract or significant reliance on the injured party. If the plaintiff relied on the defendant's promise and changed his situation for the worse (for example, he purchased the plots based on the promise of repurchase), this will strengthen his claim of bad faith on the part of the defendant.  The refusal to bring the mother to testify, without detracting from the explanation given in this regard, weakens the plaintiff's position in this matter.
59. After examining the testimonies of the plaintiff and his brother against the defendants' denials, I have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff has not met the burden of proving the existence of a binding legal obligation to repurchase the lots. The starting point is the substantive written requirement under section 8 of the Land Law; In the case at hand, not only was such an undertaking not anchored in a written document, but the sale agreement includes an explicit waiver clause that negates any representation or promise made orally prior to the signing.  Although Israeli law allows in extreme cases to soften the written requirement by virtue of the "cry of fairness", I am not persuaded that the circumstances of the case before me amount to that rare exception.  While the WhatsApp messages that were presented attest to a certain willingness on the part of the defendant to discuss the matter, they do not constitute "specific" or "discretionary" at the level required to create a binding contract for the purchase of real estate, and can be interpreted as a mere demonstration of service as claimed by the defendant.
60. Moreover, the plaintiff's refusal to bring his mother to testify - someone who was present at the critical meeting in which the promise was allegedly made - acts in accordance with his obligation on the evidentiary level. The plaintiff's explanation regarding the advanced age of the mother does not constitute a sufficient justification for not submitting an affidavit on her behalf, and in accordance with the prevailing evidentiary presumption, it can be assumed that if she had testified, her testimony would not have supported his version.  Therefore, even if words in this vein were made as part of a marketing "sales conversation", they did not mature into an enforceable contractual undertaking, and the plaintiff, as someone who took part in a commercial transaction accompanied by family members who understand marketing matters, cannot be heard claiming that he relied on an oral promise that contradicts the engagement documents he signed.

Personal Responsibility

61. The plaintiff argues that the defendant and the company should not be separated, in light of the claim that the defendant is the "living spirit", the owner, the manager and the only dominant figure who stood before him. All the representations, both on television and in the frontal meetings, were made by the defendant personally.  The defendant is the brain and engine behind all the activity, and the company is only a "legal cover" for his actions.  The plaintiff adds that the defendant gave him a personal promise that was not only related to a contractual obligation of a company, but to a personal misrepresentation intended to mislead him.  According to the plaintiff's position, the defendant presented himself as an "expert" and took advantage of the plaintiff's innocence, and therefore he is personally liable for damages (by virtue of the tort of fraud or negligence) thatdoes not depend on the existence of a contract with the company.  According to the plaintiff, this is a case of abuse of legal personality - the defendants use a complex corporate structure (an Israeli company markets versus an American company that owns assets) in order to evade liability and leave the buyers facing a "broken trough" during legal proceedings.
62. On the other hand, the defendant wishes to dismiss the personal claim against him and order its dismissal, based on the principles of corporate law. The defendant emphasizes that the company is a separate legal entity from its owners.  He acted at all times as an organ (representative) of the company and not as a private person.  According to him, the sale agreement was signed with the company, and every action he performed was within the framework of his role as a manager.  According to the defendants, the plaintiff did not meet the heavy burden of proof required to lift the veil under the Companies Law (such as proof of the mixing of personal assets, deliberate fraud of the corporation or microfinance).  It was argued that even if there is a business dispute, it does not justify attributing personal debts to the manager.
63. The defendant emphasizes that the plaintiff signed documents with a corporation, and was aware that he was entering into a commercial transaction with a company. No written evidence was presented indicating that the defendant assumed any personal guarantee for the company's debts or for the success of the investment.
64. The dispute can be summarized as follows - while the plaintiff tries to convince the court that the defendant's personal conduct (especially the representations in the media) requires the imposition of personal liability in order to prevent injustice, the defendant clings to the legal formalism of corporate law, arguing that an investment collapse or claims of contractual misconduct should be clarified only with the company, and not with the manager personally.
65. Imposing personal liability on an organ in a company and lifting the corporate veil are two separate legal doctrines, where personal liability focuses on the personal actions of the organ and preserves the principle of the company's separate legal personality, while lifting the veil ignores this principle and attributes the company's debts to its shareholders in exceptional cases of abuse of the legal personality. In the case at hand, the plaintiff's claims of personal liability in torts (fraud or negligence) require proof of the elements of the tort personally against the defendant, without a direct connection to the existence of a contract with the company, in contrast to claims of lifting the veil that require compliance with strict conditions inthe Companies Law.
66. The law essentially distinguishes between imposing personal liability on an organ in a company and lifting the corporate veil. While personal liability is imposed on the organ itself for its personal actions, it preserves the principle of the company's separate legal personality.  In contrast, lifting the veil is a more extreme remedy, which essentially ignores the principle of the company's separate legal personality and creates a direct legal relationship between a third party and its shareholders.  The advantage of personal liability is its ability to expand the circle of rivalries and contribute to the development of standards for the personal liability of officers, without eroding the generality of the principle of separate legal personality.
67. An organ in a company is not immune from a personal tort claim, even if it acted within the framework of its position in the company. If the organ personally committed the elements of the alleged tort (such as negligence or fraud), it can be held personally liable.  The company cannot serve as a "city of refuge" for wrongdoers, and every person must bear responsibility for his actions.  The plaintiff who wishes to impose personal liability in torts on an organ, must point to a specific cause of action against him and lay an evidentiary basis that indicates that the organ personally fulfilled the elements of the tort.
68. Case law distinguishes between a contractual creditor and a tort creditor. A contractual creditor is a voluntary creditor, who has chosen to engage with the company and can price the risk involved.  Therefore, as a rule, an organ does not bear personal liability for a breach of contract of the company, except in rare cases of fraud or extreme bad faith in the negotiations.  In contrast, a tort creditor is an involuntary creditor, who does not choose the tortfeasor.  In such a case, if the organist personally committed the tort, he can be held personally liable.  The plaintiff's claims of personal misrepresentation and deception relate to the level of tort, and do not depend on the existence of a contract with the company.  Civil Appeal 407/89 Tzuk Or in Tax Appeal v.  Car Security Ltd., 48(5) 661 (1994), Civil Case (Shalom Net) 42129-09-20   Nir Shapak v.  Ronen Feldhammer (Nevo 22.4.2025).
69. Lifting the corporate veil is an exceptional and extreme remedy, intended to prevent the misuse of the company's separate legal personality. Section 6 of the Companies Law establishes the conditions for lifting the corporate veil, including the use of the separate legal personality to defraud a person or deprive a creditor, or in a manner that harms the purpose of the company and while taking an unreasonable risk to its ability to repay its debts, provided that the shareholder was aware of this.  The case law emphasizes that this tool must be used with great caution, as it undermines the principle of the separate legal entity.  The plaintiff's claims of "legal cover" or "abuse" may be examined in this framework, but require proof of the strict conditions in the law.
70. The plaintiff who wishes to impose personal liability in torts on an organ is obligated to point to a specific cause of action against the organ and to lay an evidentiary foundation that testifies that the organ has fulfilled the elements of the tort. It is not enough to determine its status in the company or in the liability of the company itself.  In fraudulent claims, even though the burden is of a balance of probabilities, the required standard of evidence is higher and requires the court to examine the evidence very carefully, due to the criminal aspect inherent in the claim.
71. The plaintiff's claims that the defendant is the "living spirit" and the "brain and engine" behind the activity, and that the company is only a "legal cover", may be relevant to the examination of lifting the veil, especially if they point to a lack of legitimate economic rationale for the establishment of the companies or to the abuse of the legal personality. However, the mere fact that a controlling person or a dominant manager in the company, or the fact that the company is a sole proprietorship, is not in itself sufficient to lift the veil or impose personal liability, unless it is proven that the legal personality was misused or that a personal tort was committed.  Civil Case (Tel Aviv District) 33474-06-10 Almog (c.  A.  J.) in Tax Appeal v.  Dalton Aluminum Works in a Tax Appeal (Nevo 28.4.2016), Civil Case (Shalom Ram) 5302-11-12 Big Tools in a Tax Appeal v.  Roofing Construction and Entrepreneurship in a Tax Appeal (Nevo 21.6.2016).
72. In summary, the plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability on the defendant in two main tracks: personal liability in torts (fraud or negligence) and lifting the veil. Personal liability in torts focuses on the defendant's personal actions, such as misrepresentations and deception, and requires proof that the defendant personally committed the elements of the tort.  This track preserves the principle of the company's separate legal personality.  In contrast, lifting the veil is an exceptional remedy that allows the company's debts to be attributed to its shareholders, and requires proof of abuse of the company's separate legal personality, such as fraud or deprivation of creditors, or taking an unreasonable risk.  The plaintiff's claims that the defendant is the "living spirit" and society as a "legal cover" may be relevant to the examination of lifting the veil, but they are not sufficient in themselves to impose personal liability or to lift the veil without proving the specific conditions of each doctrine.
73. After examining the evidentiary basis, I came to the conclusion that there is room to impose personal liability in torts on the defendant, Mr. Kenan Bar-Oz, for the plaintiff's misrepresentations and misleading. As emerged from the testimonies and publications presented, the defendant was the "living spirit", the main and exclusive engine and spokesperson who stood before the plaintiff.  There is no dispute that the misleading pre-contractual representations - both those published in the media and those made in the frontal meetings - came directly from the defendant's mouth.  In this case, the company (the defendant) served almost exclusively as a technical platform for communication, while the plaintiff's full trust was placed in the defendant personally as a reputed "expert".  In accordance with the "Tzuk Or" rule, the fact that a person acts as an organizer in the company does not grant him immunity from tort liability for his personal actions.  Since I have found that the defendant personally exists the elements of the tort of fraud or negligent representation, he is liable to compensate the plaintiff jointly and severally with the company.
74. As to the path of lifting the corporate veil under section 6 of the Companies Law, I do not find it necessary to grant this extreme remedy. The lifting of the corporate veil is intended for cases in which the legal personality is abused in order to defraud creditors or to create thin financing.  Although it has been proven that the defendant used a complex corporate structure (a marketing company versus a holding company), the remedy of personal liability in torts provides a full and proper response to the plaintiff's damages without "breaking" the principle of the company's separate legal entity.  It is sufficient that the defendant committed the tort personally in order to obligate him for damages, without the need to prove the stringent conditions required for lifting the veil.  Therefore, the personal claim against the defendant is accepted by virtue of his personal tort liability.

The damage and its reduction

75. The issue of the damage and its reduction is a central part of the dispute, with the parties disagreeing both on the very existence of the economic damage and on the attempts to reduce it. The plaintiff claims that his damage was consolidated as soon as he purchased the plots at twice the real value at the time, and that the promised "profit" (100%-150%) turned out to be a huge debt.  He is demanding "restitution compensation" that will restore him to his pre-transaction condition, in addition to mental anguish and expenses.  On the other hand, the defendants present an "accounting" line of defense: they claim that due to the increase in the dollar exchange rate from the date of purchase, the value of the investment in shekel terms actually increased by more than 20%, and therefore the plaintiff did not suffer a real pocket disadvantage.  In addition, the defendants presented screenshots from the Zillow website in order to prove that the value of the assets in the US market today is higher than the price paid by the plaintiff.
76. As to the obligation to reduce the damage, the defendants claim that the plaintiff acted in bad faith when he refused their offer to assist him in selling the lots on the free market, and thus breached his legal duty to minimize his damages. The plaintiff, for his part, rejected this argument in the summaries of the reply, calling it "cynical".  According to him, the offer of assistance was empty, and that after the fraud was discovered, he could not be expected to continue entrusting his financial fate to the person who misled him in the first place.
77. As to the question of damage, I am persuaded that the plaintiff suffered a real pocket disadvantage embodied in the gap between the price he paid for the lots and their real value at the time of purchase. I do not accept the defendants' argument that the increase in the dollar rate "cured" the damage; this is a figure external to the real estate market that does not detract from the fact that the plaintiff was misled about the feasibility of the transaction and purchased a property at an exorbitant price relative to its real value at that time.  The damage in this case was not measured only by the nominal value of the money, but by the loss of opportunity and by reliance on false representations regarding a fictitious "discount" of 75%.  Therefore, the defendants must compensate the plaintiff in an amount that reflects the restitution of the excess price that was collected from him in bad faith, plus some compensation for the mental anguish caused to him as a result of the breach of trust.
78. Regarding the claim regarding the failure to reduce the damage, I found that it should be rejected. Admittedly, the law imposes a duty on the injured party to minimize his damages, but an offer by the tortfeasor to "assist" in the sale of the property after the fraud was discovered is not an offer that the injured party can reasonably expect to accept.  In circumstances in which the plaintiff has completely lost his trust in the defendants, and in view of the defendant's testimony that the subject of the sale "does not really interest him", the plaintiff's refusal to continue the business engagement with them for the purpose of selling the plots is reasonable and understandable.  A victim of misrepresentation should not be expected to once again entrust his assets to the person who misled him in the first place, and therefore this refusal does not constitute negligence on the part of the plaintiff or a breach of his legal duty to reduce the damage.

Conclusion

79. In light of all the above, I accept the claim in such a way that I obligate the defendants to purchase back from the plaintiff the plots they sold to him, at the same price paid to them by the plaintiff (ILS 143,277), plus shekel interest from the date of filing the claim until the full payment is actually made. In addition, I order the defendants to pay the plaintiff monetary compensation in the amount of ILS 30,000 (together with ILS 143,277 interest from the date of filing the claim until the actual full payment), legal expenses according to the court fee actually paid (including half a second) and attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 12,000.  The total expenses and fees will be accompanied by a shekel interest from today until the actual full payment.

The right to appeal by law.