See also the judgment of this panel Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 76264-12-24 Hapoel Be'er Sheva Football Club v. Israel Football Association [published in the Nevo database] (March 30, 2025).
- It should be noted that the case law somewhat expanded these grounds for intervention, so that in addition to the grounds for lack of authority and violation of the rules of natural justice, the case law determined that there is also the possibility of intervention in cases of extreme unreasonableness or other exceptional circumstances, see Civil Appeal 7162/06 Stern v. Egged Cooperative Association for Transportation in Israel in a Tax Appeal [published in Nevo] (February 17, 2008), which was indeed written about another internal judicial institution, but the same is true of the judicial institutions of a sports association:
"It can be summarized and said that according to the traditional approach, the court will not intervene in the decisions of internal tribunals of voluntary organizations, except in exceptional cases. The typical cases in which the court will intervene will be a deviation from authority and a violation of the rules of natural justice. Additional exceptional cases cannot be defined in advance, and they will be determined from case to case. At the same time, it is clear that the rule is non-intervention, while intervention is the exception."
- It is important to note and emphasize that the limited rules of intervention should be taken seriously, and against the background of the legislature's clear determination that the judgment of the Supreme Court of an internal judicial institution is final and cannot be appealed. Hence, it is inappropriate to break through the boundaries of intervention when there is no explicit ground, even when the court believes otherwise than the Supreme Court.
Hence, in my opinion, the court must exercise modesty, conservatism and restraint when examining a judgment of the Supreme Court, and in particular it must remember that not only does the court not serve as an appellate court against the Supreme Court, but it also does not criticize the judgment as a court for administrative matters, on the traditional grounds of intervention of administrative law, and in particular on the ground of reasonableness, but only on limited grounds.