12-34-56-78 Chekhov v. State of Israel, P.D. 51 (2)
Discussion and Decision:
- At the hearing on April 29, 2026, the plaintiff and the defendant were interrogated. After hearing the parties and reviewing the arguments of the parties, I am satisfied that the lawsuit should be accepted.
- There is no dispute that as the defendant also admitted in the statement of defense, he stopped paying the rent (see, for example, section 37). In his interrogation (p. 6, line 10), the defendant confirmed the summary of the payments (P/1). This summary shows that out of 19 months of rent (October 2024 to April 2026), three months of grace were given, and out of 16 months, only 6 payments were paid, so that the debt for rent alone was estimated at ILS 200,000. (This is even without addressing the issue of VAT). The only reason for the cessation of the payment of the rent lies, according to the defendant, in the inability to make use of the leased property for the purpose defined in the agreement, and in respect of which the plaintiff himself declared that there is no impediment to its fulfillment in the leased property.
- From the outset, I reject the defendant's argument regarding the incompatibility with the expedited litigation track for eviction of a tenant. The expedited procedural track for eviction of a tenant deals mainly with the manner in which evidence is submitted, the pace of the proceeding and the framework for its conclusion in terms of timetables, but in essence it is not a proceeding that deprives any of the parties of the right to bring witnesses and raise factual and legal claims, including with regard to the interpretation of the contract.
- The defense of a defendant against a claim for eviction of a tenant is not limited or limited to claims relating to the matter of non-payment of rent, insofar as this is the cause of action, and the range of claims that the defendant can raise is varied, including that he can raise claims of counter-infringement or offset, and this does not justify transferring the claim to a regular track. The test at the end of the day is the ability to enable a fair proceeding in which the parties' arguments will be heard, discussed and decided in a substantive and fair manner, without the relevant procedure violating the substantive right of any of the parties, even if the pace of the hearing is 'fast'.
- In our case, we are dealing with a focused argument that there is no impediment to discussing it in the framework of this proceeding. The defendant's argument is governed by section 15 of the Rent and Loan Law, 5731-1971 (hereinafter: the "Law"), the language of which is specified. Subsection (a) provides as follows:
"If the leased property is real estate and the tenant is prevented from using it for the purpose of the lease due to circumstances related to the leased property or the ways of accessing it, and the tenant has not cancelled the contract as a result, he is exempt from paying the rent for the time that the use was prevented as aforesaid; The landlord may, after a reasonable time in the circumstances of the case, cancel the contract, unless the tenant has informed him in advance that he is waiving the exemption from paying the rent."
- 00Copied from NevoThe clause does indeed grant the tenant the right to refrain from paying rent in a situation where he was unable to make use of the leased property for the purpose of renting. However, it does not prevent the landlord from canceling the contract, and as a result, it does not prevent him from suing for the eviction of a tenant if the tenant does not notify (moving to cancellation) that he continues to pay the rent. Section 15 of the Law therefore allows the landlord to cancel the agreement, in the event that the tenant does not pay due to a material defect in the property that prevents use. The law does not allow the use of the leased property without paying rent at all, as the defendant chose to do.
- In other words, even if I assume that the plaintiff declared that there is no impediment to making use of the purpose defined, while I ignore the provision of clause 4.1 to which the plaintiff referred, according to which the defendant declared that he had inspected the tenant, this does not exempt the defendant from paying rent if the plaintiff wishes to cancel the contract and the defendant insists on his refusal to pay the rent. In this situation, the defendant has the choice either to cancel the contract (and of course if he believes that he has grounds for a financial claim, he is entitled to file an appropriate claim) or to continue paying the rent. He cannot enjoy both worlds - both to own the property and not to pay the rent.
- Moreover, the entitlement to an exemption is in connection with subsection (b) of the Law, which allows an exemption only if the tenant not only did not know and should not have known about those circumstances, but also did not see them and should not have seen them in advance, and could not have prevented them. The plaintiff, whose testimony was reliable to me, confirmed in his interrogation that he had explained to the defendant about outdoor events and specific approvals at each event (the issue of the business license was not mentioned at all in the agreement and the difficulty in issuing it did not arise even in the meeting subject to A/3). On a side note, the defendant attached a certificate dated May 5, 2025, in which the local council authorized him to hold a one-time event on Lag BaOmer for up to 300 participants outdoors, in a manner that is consistent with the plaintiff's statements in his interrogation in relation to what was agreed upon between the parties (p. 2, lines 16-17).
- However, even if I assume that the defendant relied on the plaintiff and could not have known, as detailed in any case, if he wishes to fulfill the contract, before the landlord cancels it, he must announce that he is waiving the exemption from rent. There is no dispute that not only were notices sent to the defendant, but there was also the same meeting that was the subject of P/3 on November 17, 2025, in which he undertook to pay the debt that was created in respect of the rent: "I will pay everything, I am just without cash now." This, without even mentioning the Council's response of July 27, 2025. The defendant claimed in paragraph 36 of his statement of defense that after receiving the same official notice on July 27, 2025 from the Council, in which it was explicitly clarified that it was not possible to advance a business license in the existing planning situation and that a change of designation was required as a precondition, then he stopped paying the rent. This claim is also not accurate, to say the least. 2 expressly indicates that half of his total payments (six in total) were made at a later stage and in the months of August 2025 and until October 2025. During these months, he paid about ILS 20,000 per month, for a total of ILS 60,000. Only as of November 2025 was no payment paid, meaning that the Council's response did not prevent him from paying the rent, and in practice he paid only when he felt like it, and as is implied by the defendant's testimony after he succeeded in holding events that generated income that enabled him to pay the rent, as well, quite partially.
- Moreover, the defendant also confirmed P/2 - a list of events that took place and are about to be held. The defendant tried to claim that these were a total of ten incidents within a period of 500 days. Deceased/2 It is evident that at least 7 events took place between October 2025 and April 2026. However, and naturally, even before that, the Lag B'Omer event took place in May 2025 and possibly even more, but more importantly, from the same P/2 it appears that there are only a few dates left for the months of May-August 2026, while in the end it was recorded that about 15 wedding events were scheduled for the summer.
- In any event, and whatever the number of events, in these circumstances, it should not be shocking that the defendant removed the honey from the lease agreement, would derive profits from it, even if not to the extent that he expected or prayed because of his agricultural purpose - and at the same time refused to pay rent. I was negatively impressed by the defendant's testimony, which was predicted to be innocent and completely illogical. If, in fact, these sporadic and specific events do not cover even the costs of cleaning, it would have been expected that the plaintiff would agree to the cancellation of the contract and vacate the property, if only in order to reduce its damages. After the defendant knows about the "damage" caused to him and is aware of the plaintiff's position, he continues to hold on to the funds of the altar of the contract - instead of bringing it to an end. It is therefore a case of using a contractual right in bad faith.
- The defendant explained his conduct in the investments he invested in the leased property. This argument does not save him. It is not for nothing that it was determined that claims regarding defects and financial damages should be clarified in a separate proceeding, and should not serve as grounds for non-payment of rent in an eviction claim. Civil Appeal (Jerusalem District) 61641-02-24 Shmuel Aryeh Kamil v. Sigalit Poni (March 7, 2024) and Civil Appeal Authority 16555-12-25 Naftali Frigan v. Moshe Meir (December 14, 2025)).
- His claim that he began a process for a rezoning was not yet clear, but he abandoned it only after this lawsuit was filed, because he was afraid to invest money in a change of designation, and that the plaintiff would later "benefit" from these fruits if he insisted on the claim and the defendant would be required to vacate the leased property and they would not reach a settlement agreement with him. Had the defendant paid the rent and his debts on time (or at least met the outline agreed upon by P/3) and at the same time promoted the change of designation, the plaintiff would not have had any grounds to demand his eviction from the leased property. Moreover, we will not clarify how the defendant will benefit from the same procedure and approval if, according to him, the approval is for five years. Given that the contract is for four years plus an option period for an additional four years, he was entitled to continue to hold the leased property for the entire approval period, with the lease ending with the option period only at the end of 2032.
- The defendant, in bad faith, decided to disavow his obligations by virtue of the lease in order for the plaintiff to agree to compromise with him, apparently on better terms such as a reduction in the rent until the designation was changed, as well as the extension of the period to nine years, including the option (instead of a total of 8 years - clauses 7.1 and 7.4 of the agreement), as reflected in the defendant/3 and his testimony on page 7 of the agreement.
- Even if I go a long way with the defendant, and even assume that he has a reason not to pay the rent, and this is not the case (!) the lawsuit should be accepted. The defendant confirmed that he did not pay the water and electricity payments at all, even though from a contractual point of view he must also pay these payments (see also clause 8.5 of the agreement). His answer that he waited for a tax invoice is not clear (and was not mentioned at all in his statement of defense, and therefore it is doubtful whether it does not constitute an extension of the façade).
- It is even more unclear what the connection is between the solar panels, the profit from which does not appear in the contract at all, and the parties did not address this in their pleadings for non-payment of these debts. The defendant did not refer the court to any written request in which he clarifies that he does not pay the mandatory payments for the reasons that he first listed only in his interrogation. To be precise: these are not small sums. The electricity debt is estimated at ILS 32,553, while the water debt is estimated at ILS 30,705, the scope of which was approved by the defendant as aforesaid.
- The defendant sought to rely on clause 11.4, which states: "The parties are entitled to withhold any sum they owe to each other under the agreement and/or as a derivative thereof until the fulfillment of their obligations that are due and prior to its fulfillment." This clause states that the parties are entitled to withhold an amount (money) that they owe each other as a result of the contract. Not only was the claim that the defendant drafted the contract with the assistance of his counsel not contradicted, so that if there was an interpretive dispute, the rule should be used to the detriment of the drafter, I did not come to his conclusion what financial obligation the plaintiff breached, for which the defendant is entitled to delay payment until that obligation is fulfilled. After all, there is no argument that the plaintiff is supposed to arrange the change of designation or that he is obligated to pay in the matter, and it is not for nothing that the defendant took upon himself to act in the matter.
- It is implied from paragraph 55 of the statement of defense that the defendant's intention is to invest in the leased property (see also p. 9, lines 26-33 of the defendant's summary). However, I have not seen any clause in the contract that obligates the landlord to return the investments he made in the leased property (and in this regard see also section 20A of the Law), and in any event, as stated, this matter is supposed to be clarified in the framework of a separate proceeding, and there is no room for this argument in the framework of an expedited proceeding for the eviction of a tenant.
- In light of all of the above, I accept the claim and order the eviction of the defendant from the leased property and he must return it to the plaintiff no later than the 30th.5.26 When it is free of any person and object.
- In the circumstances of the case, I order the defendant to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 7,000 as well as a refund of court fees in the sum of ILS 774. The aforementioned sums will be paid to the plaintiff through his attorney within 30 days from today.
Given today, 13 Iyar 5786, April 30, 2026, in the absence of the parties.