As for the checks in the amount of ILS 14,000 and ILS 30,000, the plaintiff did not bring any evidence to show that she informed the defendant that she was filling out the checks in these amounts and presenting them for payment, but they were mentioned in a letter she sent to the defendant on February 5, 2017, which Dr. Dan confirmed in her testimony that she received. Therefore, it can be said that shortly after they were presented for payment, the defendant knew about the checks and their amount.
- The question that arises is whether the filling out of the checks and sending the warning letters is sufficient to place the defendant as someone who agreed and gave permission to fill the sums in the checks and as someone who admitted to the debt in the amounts stated therein. The answer to this, in my opinion, is no, and therefore the definition of authorization to fill the checks should be examined before the question of consideration in respect of them.
- In the affidavit of the principal witness on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. Meisler claimed that the defendant had given the plaintiff certified checks as payment for goods and "open checks as collateral for her obligations to pay for the goods that were actually purchased and held by the plaintiff" (paragraph 8 of Mr. Meisler's affidavit of the principal witness).
Therefore, according to the plaintiff's own version, the scope of the authorization is to use checks for payment for goods. However, in the next section, paragraph 9 of his affidavit, he added in passing that the defendant had breached its obligations to pay for the goods and/or the concession. However, according to his own version, one clause before the checks was intended to secure the payment of goods and not a concession, and insofar as the plaintiff filled out the amount of the concession in the framework of the checks, according to her version she acted in accordance with the authorization.
Mr. Hodis, on behalf of the plaintiff, testified that the claim relates to the purchase of goods and concessions that Dr. Dan duly undertook in tax invoices and did not comply with them (in the transcript, pp. 71, paras. 29-31). Mr. Hodis detailed that the defendant purchased goods in the amount of ILS 1,751,000 and a franchise in the amount of ILS 351,000 and explained that out of the total liabilities of about ILS 2 million, the defendant was paid approximately ILS 200,000. Mr. Hodis also confirmed that on that date, the defendant's checks were in "credit institutions" and their amount was reduced (in the transcript, pp. 72, 9-17). This implies that we also learned from this testimony of Mr. Hodis that the plaintiff filled in checks sums that did not express a debt for goods only, but in respect of additional obligations.