If so, then, as a rule, the court must be careful not to replace the editor's discretion with his own judgment. When the headline chosen by the editor is the one that is up for examination, weight should be given to its special characteristics - the title, by its nature, is intended to attract the eye and create interest among the readers, and it is formulated as a kind of "punch line" at the beginning of the article. These characteristics support the granting of autonomy for the editor's choice and style. I am aware that there is a concern that the headline will "color" the entire article, and may fix the reader during the reading, but in light of its characteristics, it can be assumed that the reasonable reader will read the headline carefully under the assumption that it seeks to give "color" and create interest.
- In the circumstances of this case, the subheading chosen is indeed eye-catching and its style is blunt - but it is located in the middle of the entire article, and reading the article gives it the full context. In addition, since the plaintiff's name does not appear in the subheading and is not mentioned beforehand, anyone who read only the subheading and did not proceed to the body of the passage will not be exposed to the fact that the title is attributed to the plaintiff; On the other hand, the reader who continued to read the passage adjacent to the subheading, which deals with the plaintiff , received the full picture and the context in which the sentence that appears in the heading was said. However, care must be taken that the motivation to generate interest and attract readers will not cause the editor to choose a title that crosses the line between "color" and "complete fiction." However, in the circumstances of this case, even if it were possible to suffice with a different heading, "This is not malicious and manipulative editing, and it falls within the scope of the 'breathing room' that should be left to the editor, without the intervention of the court" (Dayan's Civil Appeal, 519).
- In summary of this part, defendants 1-3 have a "good faith" defense even in respect of the title.
- In the statement of claim, the plaintiff also complained about the publications published by defendant 2 on Facebook and Twitter. Since he did not argue on this matter in his summaries, it can be seen that he abandoned his arguments in this matter - and therefore I do not discuss them.
- To summarize this part: the claim against defendants 1-3 is dismissed.
- Coverage and sharing of the article by others
- The article sparked a public discourse upon its publication, and was covered and shared by others - some in the media and some on social networks (examples of this were attached as Exhibit 10 to the exhibits of defendant 6). In the framework of this action, the plaintiff is petitioning for an "item" that was broadcast on the program "Before the News" on Channel 13 and discussed the article, in which defendant 2, a political editor, was interviewed in the studio, and an interview was broadcast with the complainant "Dana"; And about Chaim Levinson's tweets on Twitter, which also included the sharing of the part of the article in Politikaly that dealt with the plaintiff and the sharing of the "item" that was broadcast on Channel 13.
- Before analyzing the publications themselves, I will address the normative basis regarding sharing and repetition of previous publications. Section 19 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law allows for consideration and leniency in awarding compensation in a case where defamation is a repetition of a previous expression. From this section we learn that the repetition of defamation, or the quotation of another person's words, which are libelous expressions, do not, in and of themselves, grant immunity or protection to the advertiser. Indeed, in a long series of rulings, it has been held that "an advertiser who repeats the words of another cannot generally benefit from the protection of the truth of the publication by claiming that the person he quoted said the words. The reason for this is that a reasonable person will usually conclude from a publication that repeats the defamation said by another person, because the words themselves were true" (The Greedy Case, paragraph 120). At the same time, it was held that "when the mere statement of defamatory things constitutes an important fact in itself, and the re-publication does not verify the statements and does not add a touch of credibility to them, but rather presents them as a mere claim of a particular person, the court may suffice with proving the fact that the words were indeed said" (Civil Case (Beer Sheva District) 7129/99 Shemesh v. Shimon, Paragraph 11 (10.10.2004); Greedy Matter, paragraph 120; Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv) Kaufman v. Shaul, paragraphs 17-18 (July 25, 2010); Civil Case (Shalom B.Y.) 10872-11-20 Galili v. YNET, para. 40 (June 28, 2022)).
- The issue of republications is becoming increasingly relevant in light of the technological developments that characterize today, and reality shows that many expressions are being revisited and shared, quickly and on a large scale. These trends raise weighty questions and pose challenges in the implementation of the Prohibition of Defamation Law, which "was enacted in Israel at a time when a large part of the media whose use today is most common, did not exist at all" (Civil Appeal Authority 1239/19 Shaul v. Portable Communications Ltd., para. 8 (January 8, 2020) (hereinafter: the Case)Shaul).
- In the Shaul case, which dealt with re-publication on social networks, the Supreme Court ruled that the act of "sharing" would be considered independent publication under section 2 of the Prohibition of Defamation At the same time, the Supreme Court noted the reservations and concerns raised by such recognition (fear of a "selective lawsuit"; concern about "silencing lawsuits" and "chilling effect"; Fear of overflowing the courts and multiple legal proceedings). In light of this, it was held that the protections set forth in the law should be interpreted purposively, "taking into account the importance of the existence of an open internet space in which users can exercise their right to freedom of expression" (ibid., paragraph 55 of the judgment of Justice D. Barak-Erez). In its ruling, the court detailed additional mechanisms that will assist in the balancing act - both the use of hearing tools (such as summary dismissal for fear of abuse of the legal process) and the easing of compensation rulings (ibid., paragraphs 53-64). This is how it was summed up (in paragraph 65):