I am aware of the significant difference between a person who shares a serious journalistic investigation on the social network, and a TV channel or newspaper that publishes a new media publication following the first publication. In such a case, the question of whether there is an obligation to conduct independent checks of the facts (which came up in the first publication) by the second publisher is not simple, and there are considerations here and there. A position that grants an exemption from factual checks by the returning advertiser, especially when it comes to a media outlet with a wide circulation, is liable to cause great damage to the object of the publication about which libel expressions will be widely distributed. At the same time, the application of a requirement to verify and document in a republication the facts that emerged in the first publication is liable to impose too heavy a burden and create a chilling effect and harm to freedom of expression and the press. Although this question is not required to be decided in this case, I am inclined to the opinion that the position presented by Channel 13 can be viewed as possible provided thatthe first publication was made by an entity known for its seriousness and professionalism, and the identity of the first advertiser and the degree of its "seriousness" were taken into account by the second advertiser; and that the second publication contains no new facts about those included in the first publication. In any case, this is not a simple question, and the words were said more than necessary and without deciding on it.
- To summarize this part: the claim against defendants 4 and 5 is dismissed.
- "Tweets" Levinson
- Defendant 6, Levinson, is credited with six publications he published ("tweeted") on Twitter. Some of them as an independent "tweet" and some as a response to the "tweets" of the plaintiff and others. One of the tweets includes the sharing of the part of the article in Politikali that deals with the plaintiff, and another tweet includes the sharing of the item that was broadcast on Channel 13. According to the plaintiff, Levinson posted slanderous words about him both in the sharing of the articles and in the text of the tweets themselves. In the summaries, the plaintiff claims that Levinson acted in bad faith and malice when he shared the previous publications, which caused further exposure of them on a large scale, and to this he added his own provocations and ridicule to the plaintiff for many days. According to Levinson, the publications do not constitute defamation, and he published them in order to express his opinion, to protect important purposes, and to ward off previous defamation published about him by the plaintiff.
- To complete the picture, it should be noted that both parties are active on Twitter, and the plaintiff and Levinson have a strained relationship that began against the background of an investigative report published by the plaintiff in late 2021 regarding the case of journalist Lisa Peretz. Levinson, who is friendly with her, criticized the investigation and the prosecutor, and this led to a "virtual exchange of blows" between the plaintiff and Levinson (Exhibit 5 of Levinson's exhibits). In his summaries, Levinson refers to the following phrases published about him by the plaintiff (some of which were published about a month before the publication that is the subject of the lawsuit): "Anything less than rape is completely acceptable to Levinson";Supports workplace bullying";a troll and a negligent one";"Chaim Levinson and the seventh child were the same" - even if these previous expressions do not justify later slander expressions (Ganaim, Kremnitzer and Schnor, 209, Herzikovitz 571, New Contract Association, para. 40) - They are important in examining the overall context and how Levinson's publications were understood by the reasonable reader who was exposed to them.
- There is no dispute that a "tweet" on Twitter amounts to publication as defined in section 2 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law (the argument that immunity should be granted to social media publications was rejected by Civil Appeal 1688/18 Sarna v. Netanyahu, paragraph 4 (April 15, 2018)). As to the content of the publications themselves. As stated, in the first stage, it is necessary to examine whether the expression falls within the definition of "defamation" under section 1 of the Law, which defines defamation as follows:
| What is defamation? | Defamation is something whose publication is liable to: |