As for the alternative, the statements that were published are in connection with a public interest. According to Shenhar, "this alternative is not contingent on the victim fulfilling a public role, and therefore the defense may also apply to expressions of opinion regarding private persons when they have committed acts or expressed themselves in a way that establishes a 'public interest'" (ibid., 636). The question of whether the section also applies to the expression of opinion on private persons was not discussed and decided explicitly in the Supreme Court's ruling. In Civil Appeal Authority 2572/04 Freij v. "All the Time", paragraph 18 (June 16, 2008), a position was expressed in recognition of this (without deciding whether the victim, who served as an intern in the State Attorney's Office, is in a public position). There are other cases in case law that have followed this path (Civil Appeal (Nez District) 1184/06 Plaut v. Gordon, para. 43 (February 27, 2008); Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 3268/05 "Emet Torah Ve-Science in Our Time" Association v. "Friday" Newspaper (1992) Ltd., para. 22 (July 9, 2008); The Carmel case, where the court assumed that the protection of expression of opinion applied to a publication whose subject is a doctor of medicine who is affiliated with the struggle against the Ministry of Health's policy regarding vaccines and is active on social networks; Civil Case (Shalom Kerr) 16488-11-15 Gil v. Boimmel, paragraph 86 (January 23, 2018), where the defense of a publication whose object was a resident of a kibbutz extension that he published on the kibbutz's community internet was recognized. This question, which is not understood above it by the language of the law, requires an in-depth analysis, and I do not decide it in this case.
- In view of all the totality that has been detailed, the content of the publications and the circumstances of the publication did not deviate from reasonable, a presumption arose that they were made in good faith and there were no reasons for its negation (according to section 16 of the Law). In examining the reasonableness of the publication, room should also be given to the plaintiff's previous tweets about Levinson and "the tone that characterized them" and the fact that they were also "sharpened, sharp and aggressive" (New Contract Association, paragraph 40). See also the Rahav case, where the court noted that a person who uses unrestrained language is expected to have a "thick skin" sufficient to tolerate expressions directed at him and formulated with similar bluntness (ibid., at paragraph 67).
- The circumstances detailed above, the characteristics of the publication, and the degree of severity of the expressions themselves, which is at the low level, justify in this case the application of the protection of trivial matters as well (according to section 4 of the Torts Ordinance [New Version] and section 7 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law). I am aware that the protection of trivial matters has been interpreted in case law narrowly and it has been determined that it should be applied in exceptional cases - but in view of the low weight given to such tweets, the ability to respond quickly, and their being swallowed up in oblivion on the Internet in a sea of colorful tweets that are spread out new every now and then - this protection should be renewed. It seems that it provides an appropriate and appropriate response to cases of this kind, the likes of which are increasingly being dealt with in the courts.
Civil Appeal 4447/07 Mor v. Barak E.T. Si (1995) Bezeq International Services Company Ltd., (March 25, 2010) hereinafter: the Mor case) expressed the opinion that the special characteristics of online publications may often lead to the conclusion that they are "trivial" (paragraph 18 of the judgment of Vice President E. Rivlin) and that "Not every condemning and obscene publication on the Internet is grounds. Many of the responses on the Internet are low-level nonsense, to which any reasonable person understands that no weight should be attributed to them, and their 'wrongful' value is accordingly" (paragraph 60 of the judgment of Justice (as he was then called) A. Rubinstein); See also Civil Case (Shalom Rishon LeZion) 13442-11-21 Shlomo v. Givati, paragraphs 76-79 (June 23, 2024), where it was determined that trivial matters are protected for publication in the framework of a chain of comments on the Facebook network.
- In our case, the plaintiff and Levinson are media professionals who often use Twitter as a means of expressing an opinion and conveying criticism, often using sharpened language and harsh and harsh expressions. The publications that are the subject of the lawsuit should be viewed from this perspective and as part of their conduct on the Internet. Admittedly, one must be careful not to "completely unleash the restraint, and instead of the market square being flooded with a thousand flowers of freedom of expression, it is precisely the heavy smell of overflowing sewage water that may take over the discourse" (Sarna case, paragraph 4). However, even if it is an "exchange of blows" on the Internet and not an "exchange of flowers", not every "tweet" is supposed to find its way to court. In our case, even if Levinson sought to upset the plaintiff and focused on him, the tweets are not among those cases of extreme and unusual expressions that justify judicial intervention.
- In view of all the reasons detailed above, the claim against Levinson is dismissed in its entirety.
- A few words before the end
- In the matter of a civil appeal, the Honorable Justice (as he was then called) Y. Amit insisted that "the article demonstrates the statement that everything is in the eye of the beholder" (p. 514). And about the difference between the way Captain R. "saw the article as being about him personally" and the way in which Ilana Dayan and the Uvda editorial board saw the article as exposing a complex situation and Captain R. is not at all the focus of it. A similar picture emerges in this proceeding as well - while the plaintiff is convinced that the article put him at the center and presented him as "a sexual pervert, a dangerous, violent and morally rotten person" (paragraph 1 of the plaintiff's response summaries), defendants 1-3 are convinced that "The nature of the writing did not focus on a single offender, but on mechanisms, systems, and power relations. The emphasis is on pattern and less on the person. The mention of the plaintiff's name was necessary in order to formulate the entire story and in order to expose the mechanism and manner in which sensitive issues such as sexual harassment were handled at Galatz" ( paragraph 8 of defendant 2's affidavit).
- After reviewing the publications and watching the broadcast on Channel 13, I do not believe that the statements presented in the publications present the plaintiff as a sex pervert and as "a dangerous and rotten person whose place in prison is like the last of the sex offenders" (paragraph 7 of the plaintiff's response summaries). Nor was it claimed by the defendants that the plaintiff was such and the matter was even clarified in the proceeding. It is understandable why the plaintiff, who complains only about the part he dealt with, sees it as the main point. However, it cannot be ignored that the part that dealt with the plaintiff occupied a small volume in the scope of the entire article, and even in the part that dealt with it, the overall context and emphasis is on the way the station handled the complaints, and not the acts themselves. Defendant 2 in an interview with her on Channel 13 clarifies this, and a large part of the broadcast there deals with the general phenomenon. Even the interview with "Dana", which the plaintiff experienced as particularly offensive, does not lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff draws in his summaries.
- Indeed, the acts attributed to the plaintiff in the publications cross the line between what is permissible and forbidden in a relationship between a civilian employee of the IDF who is decades older than young female soldiers serving at the station - but from here to the plaintiff's conclusion in his summaries that the publications portray him as a sex deviant and a serial sex offender - the distance is very great. In any event, as detailed in detail above, even the things that were said do not fall within the scope of the tort of defamation.
- Conclusion
- From all of the above, the claim is dismissed in its entirety.
- As for the legal expenses, the plaintiff will bear the expenses of defendants 1-3 in the sum of ILS 22,000, the expenses of defendants 4 and 5 in the sum of ILS 14,000, and the expenses of defendant 6 in the sum of ILS 14,000. In determining the amount of compensation, I considered the amount of the claim, the scope of the case, and the effort invested in managing it. I also considered the fact that defendants 4-6 were represented by the same law firm, but the defense cases were not identical and they were required to submit separate evidence and pleadings.
The right to appeal to the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court within 60 days from the date of the judgment.