- Section 14 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law states that if it is proven that the published defamation is a correct factual publication, and it is determined that there is a public interest in its publication, the advertiser will be protected. If so, the protection of the truth of the publication will apply if two cumulative conditions are met: (1) what was published was true; (2) There is a public interest in the publication. As to the first condition, in an additional civil hearing 2121/12 Anonymous v. Dayan Orbach, IsrSC 67(1) 667 (2014) (hereinafter: the matter of additional civil hearing), it was held that the term "truth" in the law does not refer to an absolute or factual truth, but rather to a legal truth - A truth that is "the result of the court's processing, by legal tools, of the factual reality as it is presented to it" (Matter of Additional Hearing, Civil Dayan, 707-708). Therefore, in order to decide whether the publication was true, the content of the publication must be compared with the truth as determined by the court in that matter and on the basis of the admissible evidence brought before it. It should be emphasized, and as is explicitly evident from section 14 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law, that not every gap between the facts that arise from the publication and the legal truth will lead to the negation of the condition of the truthfulness of the publication (ibid., 711). It was also determined that the protection would apply only to a publication that is true as it was at the time of publication, and not as it was predicted to be at the time.
- Moreover, in defamation lawsuits under Israeli law, the burden of proving the truthfulness of the publication is placed at the advertiser's doorstep. The standard of proof required of the advertiser is of a balance of probabilities as is customary in civil law (Additional Civil Hearing 7325/95 Yedioth Ahronoth in Tax Appeal v. Kraus, IsrSC 52(3) 1, 106 (1998) (hereinafter: the Kraus case); Civil Appeal 844/12 Molkandov v. Porush, para. 35 (February 22, 2017)). However, the case law established the rule that "the standard set before the advertiser defending this claim is high" and the more severe the acts attributed by the advertiser , the heavier the burden (Krauss, 39-40; Civil Appeal Authority 6557/20 The New Channel 10 in a Tax Appeal v. Minister of Culture and Sport - MK Miri Regev, paragraph 105 (March 13, 2024) (hereinafter: the Regev case).
- As to the second condition, the case law adopted a broad approach in the interpretation of the term "public interest" for the purposes of section 14 of the Law (Matter of Additional Civil Hearing, Dayan, 717). The purpose of a public interest is that its public knowledge is relevant to the realization of a public purpose or that the public has a benefit in knowing about it - whether for the purpose of forming its opinion on public matters or for the purpose of improving its way of life (Civil Appeal 1104/00 Appel v. Hasson, IsrSC 56(2) 607, 621 (2002) (hereinafter: the Apel case)). It was also held in the Apel case that when the publication relates to a public figure in connection with public affairs, and in circumstances in which the public benefit from it is significant, special weight, although not decisive, should be given to freedom of expression, within the framework of the interpretation of the defenses in the Prohibition of Defamation Law. The justification for this derives, inter alia, from the need to protect expressions relating to public figures and public affairs, in order to enable free and critical discourse for the purpose of shaping political and public attitudes in society (Dark Matter, 621). See also the case of the Civil Appeal Dayan, where the Honorable Justice E. Rivlin noted that "the tendency of the court to classify a publication as one that is of public interest will prevail where the publication relates to a public figure" (ibid., 452).
The(3) The evidentiary rules that apply to the testimony of a person claiming to be a victim of a sexual offense
- A publication that attributes sexual allegations to a person is serious advertising. As such, the burden of proving a true claim in the publication must be met. At the same time, the case law has designed special evidentiary rules for the analysis and assessment of the reliability of victims of sexual offenses. The characteristics and purposes underlying which the Honorable Justice (as he was then called) Y. Amit discussed other municipal applications 7426/14 Anonymous v. Daniel, paragraphs 9-10 of the judgment (March 14, 2016). It was held as follows:
The task of proving [sexual offenses] often involves special complexity. In contrast to other offenses, the discussion of sexual offenses in many cases requires addressing the question of whether an offense (corpus delicti) was indeed committed, as opposed to the question of identifying the perpetrator of the offense. In addition, naturally, most sexual offenses are committed in secret, in the presence of the offender and the victim only. Therefore, a conviction for sexual offenses often depends on the credibility that the court will grant to the complainant on the one hand and the defendant on the other, in the sense of 'word for word'. This is not the end of the difficulty, since sexual offenses are also characterized by the fact that they tend to leave a mark on the victim in the form of strong negative emotions, including fear, guilt, and shame. The event itself is traumatic and has implications for the manner in which the crime victim behaves and functions 'in real time' and on his ability to describe the event in retrospect, while in quite a few cases the incident leaves its mark on the behavior patterns of the crime victim even after a long time has passed.