Civil Case (Center) 63837-03-22 Aharon Itzkowitz v. Tal Mordechai Naveh - part 17

Defendant 1 testified in his interrogation that he would not have wanted a commercial unit like that of the Itzkowitz family, even though according to him it was a unit with a higher value, he could ostensibly have sold it and purchased another apartment (par. of June 20, 2024, pp. 149, paras. 20-26, pp. 150-156).  When the developer offered him to receive a commercial unit identical to that of the Itzkowitz family, his counsel replied that in order to examine the proposal, he was required to obtain documents (p. 157, paras. 1-7).  This answer is unclear.  Defendant 1 and his counsel have all the documents required to examine the offer.  After all, according to defendant 1 himself, the  value of an apartment in consideration for Itzkowitz is 30% higher than the other apartments that are for residential use.  This is based on his refusal to engage in an evacuation-reconstruction deal.  Therefore, it is not at all clear what information or document he is missing.  This answer actually proves that the objection is unfounded and that defendant 1 himself does not believe that the consideration for the Itzkowitz family is excessive.

In addition, defendant 1 did not know the size of the Twito family's apartment at all and erred in thinking that it was a smaller apartment (pp. 126-130 of the par. of June 20, 2024).  The fact that defendant 1 did not know the material details that constitute the basis of his objection, details that could easily have been known to him, had he only examined the documents submitted in the proceeding, testify that his objection is not sincere and genuine.

147. Fourth, in any case, the compensation received by the Itzkowitz family and Twito does not harm the defendants. Even if it had been proven that the Itzkovitz family and the Twito family were receiving excess compensation (and it was not), this was a benefit beyond the letter of the law, at the expense of the developer.  Not at the expense of the apartment owners.  The benefits do not harm the defendants, do not come at their expense and do not infringe the rights of the defendants (see and compare: Civil Case (Jerusalem District) 7236/05 Levin v. Ravid (Nevo, May 15, 2006)).  The consideration to the defendants according to the agreement is certainly worthwhile.  Instead of their current apartment in an old building, without a safe room and in a building that is not reinforced against earthquakes, the defendants will receive a new, larger apartment with a balcony, parking and storage, and a safe room, and a building that is reinforced against earthquakes.  Obvious and important benefits.  There is no doubt that the defendants will benefit from this transaction.
148. In summary of this part, and in view of the aforesaid, the defendants have not been able to prove that the Twito and Itzkovitz families received excess considerations or that the defendants were discriminated against.
149. The defendants further argued (by defendant 1) that the mechanism for selecting apartments in the project generates unequal consideration and that the fact that additional points were set for apartment owners according to the date they signed the agreement constitutes a violation of the principle of equality in the distribution of considerations (paragraph 9 of the affidavit of the principal witness of defendant 1). After examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it should be rejected.  First, contrary to what is claimed, according to the apartment selection mechanism, apartment owners do not receive an "additional score" according to the date they signed the agreement, but rather, the score is determined according to the characteristics of the apartment only.  Only if there are apartments with identical scores, then the order of choosing apartments between these only will be determined according to the date on which these apartment owners signed the agreement.  Second, the agreement, in which the apartment selection mechanism is anchored, was also examined and approved by the foyer, whose role is to accompany the apartment owners in the project on behalf of the municipality, both by the apartment owners themselves, whose signatures approved the mechanism, and by their attorney.  Third, the mechanism for selecting apartments is reasonable and not unequal.  It is clear that to the extent that certain apartments in the project receive the same score after an objective and substantive appraisal examination, it is necessary to find a way to determine the order of priority of each of their owners.  The date of signing the Pinui-Binui agreement does not constitute an offending or unreasonable path.  An offending or unreasonable way is one that applies various priority provisions and discriminates against different apartment owners without justification.  This is not the case in our case.  Fourth, the investigation of defendant 1 shows that his refusal to engage in the Pinui-Binui transaction does not stem at all from the mechanism of selecting the apartments.  When defendant 1 was asked in his interrogation about the mechanism of selecting apartments, at first he did not know how to point out what he thought was unequal in him, but rather evaded an answer and replied that he was afraid that he would not receive an apartment at all – that is, according to him, there was no problem with the mechanism of selecting apartments (Par. of June 20, 2024, pp. 164, paras. 3-18).  After being confronted with the question again, he replied that he expects to choose an apartment "with parameters similar to mine, according to a certain addition that is fixed" (p. 166, paras. 20-24).  However, this is exactly the mechanism in the agreement.  When confronted with the fact that this is exactly the mechanism in the agreement, he replied, "This is not the essence of the problem, the essence of the problem is that there are different considerations for different tenants, and there is a developer who acts in bad faith and there is a concern that the project will not be built" (p. 167).  In other words, defendant 1's refusal to the project does not stem from the mechanism of selecting the apartments.
150. In summary, after examining the arguments of the parties and the evidence submitted on their behalf, and after being impressed by the testimonies of the witnesses and experts, I found that the project is equal to all the apartment owners in the project, including the defendants, and that the defendants' refusal to enter into an agreement on the grounds of lack of equality in consideration is unreasonable in the circumstances of the case.

The Entrepreneur's Conduct

151. The defendants made many claims regarding the developer's conduct, including, inter alia, lack of transparency, lack of production of documents, pressure exertion, conflict of interest, lack of good faith, that the developer is a signing contractor whose purpose of the agreement is only to collect a brokerage fee, and more. I will preface by noting that the defendants did not prove their claims and I did not find that there was a flaw in the developer's conduct.  I will examine the defendants' arguments individually below:
152. As for the defendants' claim that the developer exerted pressure on the apartment owners to sign the agreement. The plaintiffs claimed that the apartment owners were not behaving like people who had been subjected to improper pressure, many tenants appeared for the court hearing held on September 28, 2023, and in addition, when the representation in the case was replaced, the apartment owners again signed power of attorney.  In other words, the apartment owners want the project (paragraphs 23-25 of Mr. Keinan's main testimony affidavit).  After examining the arguments of the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the defendants' claim should be rejected.  The defendants did not present any evidence of exerting pressure on the apartment owners.  On the contrary.  I got the impression that the apartment owners are sincerely interested in promoting the project.
153. The defendants claimed that the developer acted in bad faith and lack of transparency while concealing facts, documents and information attesting to material and procedural failures (lack of equity, financial strength and lack of experience), with most of the apartment owners being elderly and difficult to day. Despite many requests, no documents were submitted, including the agreement and its annexes.  The plaintiffs denied the allegations.  After examining the defendants' arguments in this context, I have reached the conclusion that they should be dismissed.  The defendants did not prove that there was a defect in the developer's conduct in this context.  The defendants did not prove that the developer acted in bad faith or concealed facts or documents.  Defendant 1 also did not know in his interrogation what documents he was missing and admitted that he would not have written to e-mails in which his attorney requested documents and he did not see correspondence on the subject (par. of June 20, 2024, pp. 79, 20-26, pp. 80, 1-26, 81 s. 1-14).  If there was a lack of documents at the time the claim was filed, since the beginning of the proceeding, the defendants have received all the required documents, so that as of this time their refusal to enter into the agreement cannot be based on a lack of documents or a lack of transparency.
154. The defendants claimed that the developer was a signature contractor whose purpose was to collect a brokerage fee (an organizing agreement). This argument was made in vain.  The defendants did not mention, explain or prove how the agreement constitutes an "agreement for the organization of an evacuation and reconstruction transaction" in accordance with section 1 of the Urban Renewal Law (Agreements for the Organization of Transactions), 5777-2017.  Moreover, the agreement signed by the apartment owners with the developer is an evacuation-reconstruction agreement, it specifies the project, the considerations, the guarantees, etc.  In accordance with the agreement, the developer acted to promote the project so that a plan was approved and a building permit was granted under conditions.  In these circumstances, I found the argument to be rejected.  Even if the defendants' argument was correct, I did not find that it was sufficient to prove that the defendants' refusal to enter into the agreement was reasonable.  After all, the defendants complain about the entrepreneur's conduct.  If, in their view, all the developer wishes to do is to organize the project and not to serve as its initiator, then the rest of the defendants' claims regarding the identity of the developer are superfluous.
155. The defendants claimed that the developer was declared a violator of the law and that his debts were transferred to collection proceedings through the Enforcement and Collection Authority. After examining the claim, I have reached the conclusion that it is irrelevant to the question of the defendants' refusal to engage in the Pinui-Binui transaction.  However, according to the Registrar of Companies' drafting, in 2022 the entrepreneur had a debt due to non-payment of an annual fee that was transferred to a fines collection center (Appendix C to defendant 1's amended statement of defense).  However, this does not prove the reasonableness of the defendants' refusal to enter into the agreement.  In addition, the debt from 2022, when the defendants' refusal to enter into the transaction was given earlier, so that the defendants' refusal did not, and does not derive, from that debt of non-payment of an annual fee.
156. The defendants claimed that after the approval of the new zoning plan, the developer sold shares to foreign hands without the knowledge and consent of the apartment owners. I did not find any flaw in the statement.  The defendants did not claim a breach of the agreement, nor do they have the right to make such a claim when they did not sign the agreement and are not a party to it.  The defendants did not prove that there was a connection between the sale of the shares and the manner in which the project was carried out or that they suffered damage from the sale of the shares.  From the material before me, it appears that the project was not delayed due to the sale of the shares and that the representative and the living spirit behind the developer remained the same person, Mr. Keinan.
157. The defendants claimed that the developer did not declare a family member who owns an apartment in the project (the Keinan family) in violation of the duty of due diligence. After examining the claim, I found it to be rejected.  The defendants' argument does not count the circumstances enumerated in section 2(b) of the Pinui-Binui Law, in which the refusal of an apartment owner to an eviction transaction will not be considered an unreasonable refusal.  Even though this is a list that is not closed.  Second, as appears from the testimony of Adir Keinan and Zion Keinan, the matter was known in advance and was presented to the apartment owners (para. 5.5.24, pp. 195, 1-6, pp. 229, 19-26, p. 230, paras. 1-3).  Third, no other developer was interested in the project, and the apartment owners were the ones who persuaded the developer to promote the project (par. of September 28, 2023, pp. 18, paras. 7-9).  Third

Defendant 2's refusal to sign the agreement since the apartment in consideration it will receive will be without three air directions

158. Defendant 2 claimed that she demanded that the developer receive the same air directions as she has in her existing apartment today, as is customary in transactions of this type, and that her medical condition requires her to live in an apartment with at least three air directions (paragraph 44 of the amended statement of defense and paragraphs 14-18 of the original statement of defense). In her main testimony affidavit, defendant 2 also stated that due to special medical needs, she was required to have an apartment with three air directions (paragraphs 18-19 of her main testimony affidavit).  The plaintiffs claimed that defendant 2 did not submit a document or opinion proving that she had a medical disability that prevented the use of air conditioning (paragraph 73 of Mr. Keinan's affidavit).
159. After examining the arguments of defendant 2, I found that they do not amount to a reasonable refusal to enter into an evacuation-reconstruction agreement under the law.
160. First, I accept the plaintiffs' argument that defendant 2 did not prove that her medical condition requires a three-way apartment. All defendant 2 presented was confirmation from the National Insurance Institute that she has 93% permanent disability.  No medical documents were presented linking her percentage of disability to the prevention of the use of air conditioning.  During her interrogation, she testified that the doctors advised her to stop using air conditioning (para. 19 May 2024, pp. 429, paras. 21-25), but she did not present documents to prove this, and she herself admitted that she did not have such documents (p. 431, paras. 11-26, p. 432, paras. 1-15).
161. Second, defendant 2 did not prove that it had a right to receive an apartment identical to its existing apartment with respect to air directions, and it did not prove that this is customary in Pinui-Binui transactions. However, section 2(b)(d) of the Pinui-Binui Law states that a refusal will be considered a reasonable refusal if "there are special personal circumstances of the refusing apartment owner due to which the execution of the evacuation and construction transaction, under the conditions agreed with the other apartment owners, is unreasonable."  At the same time, the section constitutes an exception to the rule, only "in rare cases the personal circumstances of the recalcitrant apartment owner, all the more so his subjective attitude towards his apartment of residence, will justify his refusal to be regarded as a reasonable refusal" (Schwarzberger, at para. 35).  Our case is not that rare case in which the personal circumstances of defendant 2 justify her refusal to enter into the agreement.
162. Thirdly, I am not convinced that this is a genuine and honest argument that should be taken into account. During the proceeding, the developer offered the defendant a consideration apartment with three air directions.  Defendant 2 did not accept the offer, which eventually became irrelevant.  The developer then went further and suggested to defendant 2 to examine the possibility that she would sell her apartment on the free market when the developer would pay her the broker's salary, instead of receiving a three-way apartment.  Defendant 2 ostensibly accepted this offer, but subsequently filed a notice and a request for instructions in which it asked the developer to undertake that its consideration apartment, which according to the proposal would be sold to a third party, would be an apartment with three air directions.  This request is puzzling, inconsistent with the agreements of the parties that received the validity of a decision, and is unreasonable.  If the reason why defendant 2 needs an apartment with three air directions is medical needs, then why does defendant 2 require an apartment with three air directions when she sells it and does not live in it at all? Ultimately, the developer offered the defendant proposals that provide a solution to the difficulty on which defendant 2 based its refusal, and defendant 2 remained in its refusal.  See the Schwarzberger case in verse 41, which is relevant for our purposes:

"It should be emphasized that after the hearing that took place before us and following our proposal, the parties conducted additional contacts, in the framework of which the appellant was offered additional offers, which appear to be even preferable to the offers made to her in the past – which the District Court found fair – in the framework of which the appellant was offered consideration that exceeded the value of her current apartment, along with a waiver of her obligation to pay legal expenses.  Nevertheless, the appellant insists on its refusal on the grounds that the various offers deprive it, since they do not currently provide it with value equal to the consideration that the other apartment owners in the building who joined the project will receive in the future.  Thus, the appellant discovers that in her opinion she is entitled to enjoy the benefit inherent in the project, without joining it.  This approach should not be accepted, which means a violation of equality between the recalcitrant tenant and the other apartment owners in the condominium.  After all, if this approach is accepted, the recalcitrant tenant will enjoy an economic benefit that exceeds that of the other apartment owners, since, unlike them, he will not have to wait until the completion of the project or endure any difficulties and risks, in order to enjoy the economic benefit inherent in the evacuation and construction project.  To be precise, the recalcitrant tenant does not have a vested right to enjoy the full benefit inherent in an evacuation and construction project that he refuses to join.  All the more so in a case such as this, when the appellant was offered to join the project on favorable terms compared to the other apartment owners, or to sell her current apartment for a consideration that exceeded its value, offers that she rejected."

163. In the aforesaid circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that the refusal of defendant 2 to enter into an evacuation-reconstruction agreement due to the fact that the apartment for consideration it will receive will be without three air directions, is an unreasonable refusal.
164. I will now turn to additional arguments raised by the defendants in order to justify their refusal to enter into the agreement.

Additional Claims of the Defendants

165. First, the defendants argued in their summaries against the plaintiffs' opinions and the Paz Economics Witnesses. It was claimed that Mr. Tutian on behalf of Paz Economics was not familiar with the relevant data, and contradictions arose in some of the data he uploaded (p. 100 of the paragraph of February 23, 2025).  After examining the claim, I found that it should be rejected.  In any event, the expert's interrogation of Mr. Tutian, which took place in 2024, does not establish a reasonable refusal by the defendants that was given years earlier.  In order not to find the paper missing, I will examine the main arguments of the defendants in this context:
     • Paz Economics' argument regarding equality in consideration is incorrect, since it did not examine the agreement – after examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it should be rejected, since, as stated above, the considerations are equal.
     • Paz Economics did not examine the considerations for the apartment owners and did not know what the final considerations were for the tenants – after examining the claim, I reached the conclusion that it is irrelevant and does not raise or detract from the conclusion I reached based on the evidence before me regarding the final considerations for the apartment owners, which are not in dispute.
     • Paz Economics did not know in the investigation what the terms "uniform coefficient" and "consideration apartment" meant – after examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it was incorrect and did not arise from the investigation.
     • Paragraphs from another opinion were copied into the opinion and therefore it is not possible to rely on the opinion – after examining the claim, I have reached the conclusion that it should be rejected. Even if there was a clerical error in the opinion, I was under the impression that Paz Economics showed proficiency, professionalism and understanding, and that the testimony was coherent and reliable.
     • Tutian of Paz Economics said in his interrogation that the value of a square meter built in an outbound state is higher than the value of a square meter built in an inbound state, which contradicts paragraph 16 of Mr. Keinan's affidavit. After examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it should be rejected.  In his interrogation, all that was said was that "even if the value per square meter is built, it may sometimes be lower, in the new situation, because for that matter there is more density...  Still, at the end of the day, each rights holder receives a higher number of units (building rights).  For this reason, the value in the new product will always be more valuable" (p. 294 of para. of May 19, 2024).  Contrary to what is claimed, this statement is exactly in line with paragraph 16 of Mr. Keinan's affidavit that "this is a good and vital project for the tenants..."
     • As to the defendants' other arguments regarding the plaintiffs' opinion lacking reference to Standard No. 15; Paz Economics did not know how to explain the expenses stated in the opinion, why the entrepreneurial profit declined, and whether it met the policy of the introduction; and that according to Paz Economics' investigation, the expenses in the opinion were inflated – in view of the conclusion I reached for the reasons detailed above, I did not find that they were substantial.
     • In these circumstances, I have not found that there is substance to the defendants' claims as to the plaintiffs' opinion.
166. The defendants raised additional arguments for which they refuse to sign the agreement. I will address these arguments below:
167. The defendants claimed that the developer did not provide the guarantees required for the construction of the project, such as an autonomous guarantee. After examining the claim, I found that it should be rejected.  The defendants did not point to a bank guarantee, which according to them was missing.  Defendant 1 admitted in his interrogation that he did not know what guarantees he was missing (p. 105 of 20 June 2024, paras. 4-7).  Defendant 2 claimed that the guarantee it lacked was a guarantee for rent and that in any case the guarantees would not help if the project was "stuck" (pp. 444-446 of the minutes of May 19, 2024).

After examining the claims, I came to the conclusion that they were wrong.  In accordance with the agreement, the lending bank must provide a bank guarantee so that the bank will undertake and be responsible to the apartment owners with an absolute and unconditional guarantee for the payment of any amount due to the apartment owners from the developer in connection with the agreement (i.e., including rent).  According to the terms of the guarantee, the bank undertakes to pay any amount required up to the amount of the increased guarantee within 14 days of receiving the first written demand (in accordance with the wording of the bank guarantee attached to the agreement).

168. The defendants argued that the agreement was invalid because the first suspension clause in the agreement, as to the dates of signing the agreement, was not fulfilled. After examining the claim, I found that it should be rejected with both hands.  The conduct of the parties shows that the agreement is valid.  Both the developer and the apartment owners conducted and acted in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.  In accordance with the agreement, the project began to be carried out and in 2023 a building permit was even issued under the conditions for the project, and in accordance with the agreement, the apartment owners who signed the agreement filed a lawsuit against the recalcitrant apartment owners.  Furthermore, neither party submitted a cancellation notice and the apartment owners did not sign cancellation affidavits in accordance with clause 3 of the agreement.  It should be noted that in support of their claim, the defendants cited  Civil Case (Tel Aviv District) 8991-10-15 Kochava Yosef v. DCS Reinforcement of Buildings in a Tax Appeal (Nevo, August 22, 2021), in which the plaintiffs' claim to cancel an agreement entered into between the tenants and the company for the execution of a reinforcement and renovation project in the building in accordance with the provisions of TAMA 38 was accepted, since the conditions included in it were not met.  However, the circumstances of that case are different from our concerns.  In that case, this is a claim that was discussed as part of the relationship between the parties who signed the agreement (the apartment owners and the developer).  The plaintiff apartment owners were a party to the contract and sought to cancel the agreement for a number of reasons, and even the conduct of the parties proved that the agreement was void.  These circumstances are different from our interest in that we are not dealing with a dispute between apartment owners and the developer.  The parties to the agreement are definitely interested in upholding the agreement.  The argument was raised by the recalcitrant defendants, who are not parties to the agreement, as a defense argument, in an attempt to justify their refusal to sign the agreement.
169. The defendants claimed that the apartment owners were misled and/or that the developer and/or the Keinan family, together with other apartment owners, exerted pressure on other apartment owners to sign the agreement. After examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it should be rejected because it was merely claimed and not proven.  The defendants did not attach evidence to the claim, and in any event, if there had been an actual claim, the apartment owners would have raised the claims during the proceeding, did not sign the new power of attorney in favor of the new attorney, or would have sought to withdraw from the agreement.  However, none of the apartment owners did so.  On the contrary.  In addition, from the beginning of the project, the apartment owners were accompanied by a foyer that assisted them, supervised the proceedings and explained their rights to them after examining the agreement (and even opened a WhatsApp group of the apartment owners' representatives with a foyer, which proves the close connection between the foyer and the apartment owners' representative (pp. 357, paras. 11-20 of para. 19.5.24).  A significant number of the apartment owners appeared for the hearings and some were even interrogated.  During these discussions, the apartment owners expressed their desire to realize the project.
170. The defendants claimed that the terms of the agreement were unreasonably poor. After examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it should be rejected because it was not proven.  In addition, the fact that most of the apartment owners (except for the defendants) signed the agreement accompanied by an experienced lawyer on their behalf, are interested in the project and filed a lawsuit against the recalcitrant defendants, proves that, in their view, the terms of the agreement are good.  In addition, the defendants did not point to a condition in the agreement that was unreasonably poor.  From the totality of the evidence before me, I was under the impression that the terms of the agreement were good and that the project was economically worthwhile for all the existing apartment owners, including the defendants.
171. The defendants claimed that the developer lacked experience. After examining the claim, I came to the conclusion that it should be rejected.  The developer, Koach Investments Ltd., is a project company that was established ad hoc for the project.  The company is held by three shareholders who are companies with experience in the field of entrepreneurship and urban renewal.  Keinan also invests in real estate.  The plaintiffs' claim that the developer is accompanied by experienced consultants such as an architectural firm that accompanies the project, which also represents large companies such as Azorim, Africa Israel, Aura and others (paragraphs 86-90 of Mr. Keinan's affidavit), was not contradicted.  Moreover, the project is a small project that is not in an area of demand for the construction of an evacuation-reconstruction project and therefore does not "attract" large developers in the market.  Despite the strong desire of the apartment owners to promote a Pinui-Binui deal, they encountered difficulty in recruiting a developer (as evidenced, the project's entrepreneurial profit is not among the highest).  Only after the apartment owners contacted Mr. Keinan did he agree.  In addition, the developer has proven that so far he has worked well to promote the project, he initiated the plan that was eventually approved and the project is currently in a situation where a building permit was granted under conditions.
172. The defendants claimed that the developer lacked financial strength. The claim has not been proven and it has not been proven that this is an honest and genuine objection.  In his interrogation, defendant 1 did not know how to answer why the developer did not have financial strength and evaded his response (pp. 95-102 of the par. of June 20, 2024).  In addition, I accept the plaintiffs' argument in their summaries, which was not contradicted, that in any event the project will be accompanied by bank accompaniment and guarantees will be given to the apartment owners in the value of the consideration apartments, while the lending bank in any case examines the developer itself from an economic point of view before the accompaniment is given (pp. 22-23 of the transcript of the summaries).
173. It should be noted that the defendants raised many additional arguments as to why they objected to the project, regarding the selection of the project's representatives, the lack of authorization to file the claim, the transfer of the developer's shares to other companies, technical arguments regarding the developer's incorporation documents and the definition of the entrepreneur's activity in accordance with the approval of withholding tax; The buildings were not declared dangerous structures; The agreement lacks essential details; No conflict of interest affidavit was signed. Most of these arguments were not proven on the factual or legal level, were not proven to be relevant, and in any case it was not proven that they could justify the defendants' refusal to sign the agreement through the lens of the law.

The Defendants' Good Faith and Credibility

174. After being impressed by the totality of the pleadings, evidence and testimonies, I have come to the conclusion that the defendants' reasons for their refusal to enter into the agreement are not sincere and true, and that their testimonies should not be given high weight.
175. As for defendant 1, I have the impression that in addition to the fact that his counsel intervened and erupted repeatedly during his testimony as stated above, his testimony was replete with contradictions and inaccuracies, even in incidental matters that are not relevant to the claim, in a manner that reduces the weight that must be attributed to his testimony. For example:
     • Defendant 1 contradicted himself regarding his internship at Assaf Harofeh – in his pleadings and in his main witness affidavit, he claimed that he purchased the apartment because of its proximity to his place of specialization at Assaf Harofeh Hospital and that until the beginning of his internship at Assaf Harofeh, the apartment was rented. On the other hand, in his interrogation it became clear that he had not yet begun his internship at all (certainly not at Assaf Harofeh), he did not know where he would intern, and it was not certain that he would intern at Assaf Harofeh (pp. 39, 13-15, 41 s. 1-20, p. 43, 15-20, p. 44, 4-22).  In addition, in his interrogation, he testified contradictory that his intention was to intern at "one of the hospitals in the center" (pp. 39, 3-5), and also that his intention was to intern at Assaf Harofeh (pp. 43, 1-3);
     • The defendant contradicted himself as to the question of whether his apartment was rented or not – on the one hand, he testified that his apartment was rented continuously (p. 43, paras. 9-12), on the other hand, the defendants' appraiser testified that at the time of her visit to his apartment (February 27, 2024), the apartment was empty (Q. 7, p. 376 of para. 19 May 2024). Only after defendant 1 was confronted with this statement did he admit that there was a period in which the apartment was not rented due to a change of tenants and that it had been rented for six weeks (par. of June 20, 2024, at pp. 57, paras. 1-26, pp. 58, paras. 1-22);
     • The defendant contradicted himself when, on the one hand, he claimed that he had purchased the apartment because of the view from it (paragraph 50 of the amended statement of defense), and on the other hand, he testified "not because of the view, but because of the location" (par. of June 20, 2024, pp. 65, paras. 11-12, p. 69, 4-26, p. 70, paras. 1-16);
     • Defendant 1 testified contradictory that he was interested in living in the apartment and not vacating it because of its location (p. 110, 10-14), but it became clear from his statement that he did not live in the apartment and did not live in it except for a short period of time during the renovation that was carried out in it (par. of June 20, 2024, at p. 35, paras. 2-3). It is not clear why defendant 1 does not want to vacate an apartment in which he does not live at all.
     • Defendant 1, on the one hand, claimed that the Twito family received an excess advantage in that it received an exemption from payment for supplementary land from the ILA (paragraph 8.2 of the affidavit of the main witness), and on the other hand, he did not know what supplementary land was and erred in thinking that it was a building addition by the Twito family (p. 133, s. 9-26, p. 136, s. 1-26, p. 137, s. 1-14). Defendant 1 further claimed that the Twito family receives an excess advantage by receiving participation from the developer in the maintenance of the building, and on the other hand, he admitted that this is a benefit for all the apartment owners in the building (par. of June 20, 2024, p. 139, s. 23, p. 140, s. 1-15).  In other words, participation in the maintenance of the building does not constitute a benefit only for the Twito family.
176. Defendant 1 did not know material details that are an inherent part of the reasons for which he claims he opposes the project. Defendant 1 did object to the project due to the lack of economic viability, but he did not know what a bank loan was or how it affected the project (pp. 103, 12-26, pp. 105, 1-24, 106, 1-19).  Defendant 1 objected to the project due to the lack of equal consideration for the apartment owners, but in this matter as well, contradictions were found, which were detailed above.
177. Defendant 1 evaded questions and gave answers that did not answer the questions he was asked (pp. 63, s. 5-15; p. 66, s. 18-26, p. 67, s. 1-10; p. 74, s. 19-26, p. 75, s. 1-22; p. 90, s. 23-26, pp. 91-93; p. 105, s. 2-14, p. 135, s. 6-26, p. 136, s. 1-7, p. 145, s. 5-15).
178. It should be emphasized. Defendant 1 opposes the project and prevents its advancement, even though he does not live in an apartment or building at all and has no special connection to them.  As mentioned, these are old buildings that are in dilapidated condition.  They do not have a protected space and are not resistant to earthquakes (on the importance of earthquake defense in the State of Israel, see the words of the Honorable Justice D. Barak Erez in Civil Appeal 1002/14 Dov Shomroni v. Ohad Kofman et al.  (Nevo, July 9, 2014), at para. 21, and the quoted therein).  Unfortunately, the importance of a protected space has become sharper in the past year and a half, when the country was and still is in a period of war, and missiles and rockets are fired into the territory of the State of Israel every day.  The necessity is heightened when some of the building's residents are elderly people who have difficulty moving around and reaching a stairwell within alarm range.  All the apartment owners in the building in which defendant 1's apartment is located want the project, both those who live in their apartment and those who rent it out.  It is actually defendant 1 – who does not live in the building, and most of the time not in Israel at all since he studies medicine abroad – who opposes the project and in fact prevents those people, some of whom are elderly, from improving their lives and living in an apartment where there is a protected space.  It is added that prior to the purchase of the apartment, defendant 1 knew that there was an arrangement for an evacuation-reconstruction agreement, so that there was a chance that an evacuation-reconstruction project would begin (par. of June 20, 2024, pp. 63, paras. 9-12), and yet he chose to purchase the apartment, taking the risk (or chance) of the project's realization.  And now he chooses to stick a stick in his wheels, without justification.
179. Difficulties were also found in defendant 2's version. On the one hand, defendant 2 claimed that it did not object to the project and that it did not ask for excess consideration, and on the other hand, it sought to be the owner of the only apartment with three air directions and thus receive excess consideration, despite the fact that according to its opinion it intended to sell the apartment.  On the one hand, defendant 2 claims that she was excluded from the project, and on the other hand, she was aware of an advertisement on the building's bulletin board about a tenants' conference regarding the project [P/8].  So she, like the other tenants, was invited to the conference and was not excluded.  In addition, defendant 2 did not attempt at all to take part in meetings or meetings that took place regarding the project, to check about the project, and did not respond to the developer's letters.  On the one hand, in the affidavit of her main witness, defendant 2 stated that she also runs a law firm in the area of her apartment and was not exposed to her at any stage of the negotiations the option of obtaining a commercial unit instead of a residential apartment.  On the other hand, she admitted that she would not have agreed to receive an identical apartment to the Itzkowitz family.  To these contradictions, it should be added that the reasons alleged in the statement of defense for which she refuses the project are not identical to the reasons for which she opposed the project (the plan) in real time, to teach us that these are suppressed and artificial claims intended to serve as a defense to the statement of claim.
180. These difficulties are especially severe when a three-year legal proceeding is underway in which the defendants delay the project while the other apartment owners are eager and waiting for it.

Conclusion

181. I accept the claim and approve the execution of the transaction in accordance with the agreement signed between the apartment owners and the developer.
182. I appoint and authorize Adv. Guy Farbman on behalf of the apartment owners, who is not an apartment owner in the buildings and/or cluster, to enter into a transaction with the developer on behalf of the defendants and to sign on their behalf any document required for the execution of the project in accordance with Section 2(a)(2) of the Pinui-Binui Law.
183. After considering all the considerations, including the results of the proceeding; the fact that the plaintiffs and the developer were willing to reach agreements with the defendants that would make the proceeding redundant and the defendants did not accept their proposals, so that the claim was fully clarified; The conduct of the parties throughout the proceeding (including the request filed by the defendants to summon witnesses who did not assist in their version and the request to appoint an expert that was filed with delay, as well as the need to file an amended statement of claim due to the plaintiffs' conduct), I determine that the defendants will bear the plaintiffs' expenses, including the refund of fees, reimbursement of appraiser's fees for the additional opinion dated May 2, 2024, as well as attorney's fees in the sum of NIS 100,000 plus a lawful tax appeal (NIS 50,000 plus a tax appeal will be paid by each of the defendants). I am of the opinion that this determination is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.  All amounts will be paid within 45 days from today.  If the amounts are not paid on time, they will bear interest and linkage differentials in accordance with the law, from the last date of payment until the actual date of payment.

Given today, July 11, 2025, in the absence of the parties.