In order for an advertiser to be protected from the truth of the publication, he must prove that two cumulative conditions were met: 1. What was published was true; 2. There was a public interest in the publication. The burden of proof to prove the existence of both conditions, as stated, rests on the shoulders of those who wish to base this defense.
- I will begin with the second condition. There is no need to elaborate on the public interest inherent in informing the residents about a person who is involved in transporting people with special needs, and harming them, even if it is only a verbal injury, to the extent that this is indeed the case.
Regarding the definition of the term "public interest", in section 14 above, other municipal applications 439/88, State of Israel v. Ventura, PD 88(3) 808, 826:
"... There may certainly be situations in which public publication of matters relating to a private person may benefit the public, for example, when the publication serves the public interest in law enforcement, or the concern for the protection of the public against various risks, including health risks."
It seems that this is also the position of Jewish law on this matter, and this is how it was ruled by R. Yisrael Meir HaCohen of Radin zt"l (one of the sages of Lithuania in the 19th-20th centuries) in his book Chafetz Chaim (Rule 10, section 1):
"If one sees a person who has done wrong to his fellow, such as stealing, oppressing, or harming... He can tell these things to people in order to help those who are guilty and to condemn the evil deeds before the people."
In any event, it must be determined that in this case there was a public interest in the alleged publication.
- This is not the case with regard to the first condition. In another civil hearing 7325/95, Yedioth Ahronoth in the Tax Appeal v. Joseph Kraus, PD 52(3)1, held in connection with the defense of the truth of publication (p. 41):
"There are two parallel, independent paths for the purpose of entitlement to protection under the Prohibition of Defamation Law. Within the framework of each of them, the legislature created a connection between the nature of the publication and the breadth and flexibility of the protection it enjoys: publications that are not factual publications were given broad protection. With regard to these, it is sufficient that the publication was made in good faith, in one of the circumstances enumerated in section 15 of the Law, in order for the advertiser to be protected. In this framework, the protection of the publication does not require any evidence as to its truthfulness. On the other hand, when it comes to factual publications, the approach is rigid, and the law is that in order for a publication to be protected, it must be true and it must be of public interest. In this framework, we have seen how heavy the burden is to prove the foundations of the defense of truth in publication. This is a narrow and well-bounded defense, which places a high hurdle on those who publish defamation."