Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 2810-08-23 Prof. Shikma Bressler-Schwartzman vs. Ronit Levy - part 22

In the same appendix to the defendant's affidavit, there was also what appeared - and not hidden - a tweet by plaintiff 1 in which the private comments of Ministers Yisrael Katz andGila Gamliel and MK Hanoch Milivetsky appeared (sic.  The reference was to the intersection of the streets where Milevitzky antitrust resides).  Below each of these names is a link to a dedicated WhatsApp group.

75. Thus, the defendant succeeded in showing the court that plaintiff 4, and to a lesser extent also plaintiff 1, made public the private addresses of elected officials and two of the heads of the media discourse from Channel 14, and called for them to appear there and protest. These are the facts.  No less, but no more.  No basis has been found for the claim that plaintiff 1 was responsible, in any way, for a WhatsApp group, called "Wake up [Minister] Yisrael Katz" and in her description, the mobile phone books of the Minister Katz, of his secretary and his wife.  A screenshot of the description of this group was attached in Appendix 18, which is mentioned, to the defendant's affidavit, but nothing but the defendant's wish and placing it next to a tweet "Twitter"The work of plaintiff No. 1 did not relate this description to the plaintiff.  Thus, there is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs publicly gave, as the defendant did, a telephone number, a private stick, of any person, a stick and a stick that is not a public figure or a position holder in the media.
76. But beyond the medium, there are two fundamental differences between the defendant's publications and those of plaintiffs 1 and 4. I have already written that, in my opinion, the plaintiffs are not "public figures".  This is not the case with elected officials, nor even with those managers of media outlets, whose entire preoccupation is with current affairs and the public agenda.  Second, and no less important, in these publications of the plaintiffs, there is a clear connection between the call to protest against the tortures of those people and their public activities.  Such a connection, I wrote, was completely absent from the publications published by the defendant about the plaintiffs.  There is, therefore, no symmetry, and this is sufficient for the purpose of my decision.  I do not determine, I will make any assumptions as to whether the plaintiffs' publications were consistent with the law.  This is not the claim before me.  Thirdly, it should be said that, as I have already described above, in order to prevent possible infringement of the privacy of public figures, public law dedicates tools of its own.  It would generally be correct to give priority to these over the assumption of a dispute for the decision of private law.
77. Plaintiff 1, like plaintiff 3, added and published in "tweets" written the warning letter that their previous attorneys had sent to the defendant. At the beginning of the letter appeared the name of the defendant and her residential address (Appendix 17 to the defendant's affidavit).  However, as is clearly evident from those tweets, there was no call or allusion to a call to visit this address or to harass the defendant therein.  The sole purpose of publishing the letter was to disclose to the public the plaintiffs' decision to take legal proceedings against the defendant.  The address of the latter was a minor detail in these publications.  It was not written there in order to make any use of it, in clear contradiction to the defendant's publications, in which it explicitly called on its readers to use the telephone numbers it published.  The defendant's phone number, needless to say, never appeared in the plaintiffs' tweets.
78. Plaintiff 3, Mr. Radman Abutbul, he read, in a tweet this letter: "By the way, look for Ronit the Bibiist on Twitter...”)Name, ibid.). Two people say about this: First, does not lay any basis for the determination that plaintiff 3 sought to solicit any of the recipients of his publication to harass the defendant or to harass the account -"X" hers.  Second, writing records on a person's public account on the social network is in no way equivalent to providing his personal phone number and is not, unlike the social network, a platform for collective expressions.

I saw with horror tweets that were sent to the defendant's Twitter account and attacked her with the harshest of all words, in a manner that in my opinion is despicable and shameful - tweets that testify, first and foremost, to their authors and to the way in which they were absent (Appendix 17 to the defendant's affidavit).  However, no one connected these messages to any of the plaintiffs.  "These are the results of Shikma Bressler and her friends who sent you to harass me," the defendant wrote to those who contacted her (ibid.); But in court she presented nothing to support this hypothesis, which remained vague.  It is true, there is not even the slightest hint of evidence that any of the plaintiffs called for the sending of hate messages to the defendant or stood behind them in any way.  "The leaders of the protest published my details," the defendant added, as if prior to the plaintiffs' tweets, the defendant was a figure hidden in the tools on the social network, an anonymous and unknown user, whose mere "expose" of her account on the social network led users to stick their inferior pen sword into her.  The defendant further referred to the complaint, which she filed with the Israel Police following these notices (ibid., ibid.).  What I did not see in her complaint is any reference to any of the plaintiffs.

79. I can summarize this point: I did not find that there was a defect in the good faith of any of the plaintiffs in standing up for his causes of action against the defendant in this proceeding. Publications, published by any of them, differed from those of the defendant in more than one respect.  In any event, they did not make the plaintiffs' conduct tainted, in order not to accept the very fact that the claim was filed by them and with the arguments they raised.

Remedies

80. When room is found to impose liability in torts on the defendant according to the individual torts of invasion of privacy and defamation, the way is paved for the examination of the remedies requested. I hereby conclude this judgment.  The main purpose of these remedies, as the purpose of tort law in general, is to place the injured party in the place where he would have been had it not been for the act of damage, and in this case: to restore the plaintiffs, as far as possible, to their situation prior to the defendant's publication in their case.
81. Injunctions and Orders
82. First: for a request for orders. As I wrote at the outset, the statement of claim (drafted by the plaintiffs' previous counsel) petitioned no less than four of them: an order, which obligates the defendant to publish a notice of correction or denial of its publications; an order requiring the defendant to publish an apology for the harm done to the plaintiffs; An order to remove "all false publications published by the defendant, including any defamatory and offensive response [to these publications]" and an order instructing the defendant "to cease defaming the plaintiffs, in any forum whatsoever, and not to repeat it in the future" (paragraphs 76 and 77 of the statement of claim).

The plaintiffs' counsel did well to waive these injunctive remedies in their summaries.  The Protection of Privacy Law authorizes the court, in section 29(a) thereof, to prohibit the further distribution of the offensive information or any further use thereof, and to "order any other provision thereof." The Prohibition of Defamation Law assigns the court, in section 9(a) thereof, the power to prohibit the distribution of the offensive publication and also the power to order the publication of an amendment or a denial of such publication.  These powers, especially in view of the considerable depth of the judicial action of an injunction and its effect on the fundamental rights of defendants, must be understood as they are.  They are not to be called things that are not subscribed to.

82. Thus, the court is not authorized to compel a person to apologize, just as it is not authorized to order a party to rejoice, to be sad or to love the plaintiff. Also, part of the purpose of which is to convey a message to the readers, an apology is, first and foremost, a creature of the worlds of emotion and thought.  These have not yet reached the authority of the government officials.  It seems to me that both sides will bless this.
83. Second, a person can only be responsible for offensive publications, which came out of his hands or involvement. Even if he is found liable for damages for his publications, he should not be held liable for the publications of others.  This, even if they were - And on social media, this is common - Responses to his publications; Like, share, or retweet these.  "Every man in his sin" will be recognized (borrowed fromWords 24:16) and not otherwise.
84. Third, even if the law authorizes the court to issue an order to prevent future publications, this is - Due to the fear of excessive restriction of freedom of expression - Far-reaching remedy (Civil Appeal 214/89 Avnery Ibid., at p. 851; Shenhar, Defamation Laws supra, at p.  663).  To the extent that this is possible within the framework of a proper balance between the competing values, it is preferable to recognize that if a plaintiff believes that he has been wronged again - The road is open for him to go to court in a new lawsuit.
85. The defendant testified before me, and I have no basis not to see her testimony - It is reliable that it removed the three publications, to which this lawsuit relates, from the social network on the day they were uploaded. In these circumstances, the use of the court's power to order this in an order is redundant.  Whereas the publication of a correction or denial - What, in the circumstances of this matter, if not a redistribution of the plaintiffs' telephone numbers, should it even be noted that the callers should not expect the sale of eggs, oil, diapers and concertines? Such a remedy, after all, undermines the foundations of the claim, and it is well, as stated, that the plaintiffs waived it did well.
86. The Claim for Financial Compensation
87. As to the monetary remedy. Once again, this court has found no refuge from the Sisyphean and tedious occupation of the problem of increasing sums in defamation suits.  Did the plaintiffs really think that any court would obligate the defendant to pay them more than 600,000 shekels for three online tweets, in a claim without proof of damage? Did they find any basis in the rulings of the courts for such a standard of compensation? These questions are rhetorical.  The answer to them is no.  It is no less difficult for me to understand the fact that once again counsel has been found to believe, contrary to the case law, that a claim for compensation without proof of damage is a matter of arithmetic action of multiplication, and even if it requires even an action of connection.  Not her.
88. I can summarize things. First, ignoring the standard in case law - And we do not refer to individual judgments by which almost any outcome can be supported; but in the criteria that are formed from a broad view of the rulings of the courts - You will not be able to serve the interests of plaintiffs.  It hears, in part and again, that defendants will be required to defend themselves further.  This is not only because of the assessment that a higher claim will also be more expensive in representation and perhaps also in management, but, in particular, from the premise of the law that, as a rule, the connection between the amount of a claim and the scope of the fees for representation in it must be recognized.  This assertion is anchored today In Regulation 153(a) to the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018 and is derived from the rules of the Bar Association (the recommended minimum rate), 5760-2000.  The discrepancy between the high amount of a claim and the lower sum of winning it justifies the defendant's indemnity for the excessive fees he incurred.  This, it is emphasized, even if the claim was found to be good on its grounds and was accepted (but it was awarded a lower sum than requested).  The Supreme Court has made this rule interesting time and time again, and has seen, in particular, the judgments Other Municipality Requests 164/54 Attorney General v.  LivniIsrSC 9 1107, 1117 (1955); Civil Appeal 419/80 Hollander & Co.  in Tax Appeal v.  Hod Goose Ltd., Piskei Din 36(4) 433, 436 (1982); Civil Appeal 4494/97 Salah v.  Salah, in the tenth paragraph (published on the website of the Judiciary 4.1.2000); Civil Appeal 8713/11 Sayeg v.  A.  Luzon Properties & Investments Ltd., in paragraph 139 (published on the Judiciary website, August 20, 2018).
89. Second, the amount that the court is authorized to determine, in a claim without proof of damage, according to Section 29A of the Protection of Privacy Law and in accordance with Section 7A For the Prohibition of Defamation Law, the legislature chose to set a "ceiling". True, this is "Maximum compensation sanction" (Civil Appeal 89/04 Dr.  Nudelman The above, In paragraph 45 of its judgment of Judge Procaccia).  "Section 7A of the Law [Prohibition of defamation] Determines the maximum amount that can be awarded in favor of the victim without proof of damage" - Words Judge Dorner In the Civil Appeal Authority 7943/01 Nur v.  Yaari (Published on the website of the Judiciary 16.10.2001).  A maximum amount, in its meaning, can be awarded only in those cases, which present "maximum circumstances", i.e., those in which the purpose of the legislation justifies maximum "reckoning" with defendants.  Without demanding that any defamation plaintiff take our matter lightly, it is clear that not all cases present such circumstances.
90. ThirdWords of legislation (for the benefit of some of those who practice the legal profession) are not algebraic formulas. There is therefore no justification for automatically taking the ceiling of the amount stated therein, and multiplying it by the number of plaintiffs or by the number of defamatory publications (Civil Case (Tel Aviv District) 14264-11-14 Knafo v.  Ginzborsky (The Honorable Judge Avigail Cohen) (Published in the databases on January 4, 2018); Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 36859-11-18 Buzaglo v.  Przechatzky (Judge Cohen) (published in the databases 13.2.2019) and references in these two judgments).  Such a product justifies anchoring it in the circumstances of the case.  It will not be valid, for example, when the main thing is not the number of publications but their content.  "A claim filed for such a round and multiplication sum", I wrote, "'Suspicious' Le-khatḥila for not addressing the specific characteristics of the case in question" (Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv-Yafo) 26644-11-18 Adv. Dr.  Aligula v.  Zagi, in paragraph 21 of my judgment (published in the databases on February 4, 2021)).
91. Fourth, an increase in the amount of a claim, even if it does not amount to a "silencing claim", threatens to lead to excessive restriction of expression. Such a claim is also discussed, as a rule, not to end in a possible compromise between the parties, even if there is room in principle for it, because of the high sum that does not allow one to meet the other except in a judgment.  Even before that, an excessively high sum inevitably puts the claim in the realm of a "regular" procedure, as opposed to the faster alternative in the procedure, and sentences it to a long and lengthy proceeding - This is doubtful whether it serves the interests of the plaintiffs.
92. What is it? The rulings of the courts, which relate to defamation of a "tweet" or a "post" on a social network, and some of which has been examined and approved by the courts of appeal, makes it possible to "extract" recognition of an assessed standard for compensation. Thus, when it comes to a single publication about a plaintiff; a non-exceptional number of recipients; in the content, which is not particularly spicy; In advertising for a period of time, which is not prolonged and with a result, which is mainly hurting feelings, it is customary to award an average compensation of between a few thousand shekels and 10,000 shekels or a little more.  See, from recent years, the Civil Appeal Authority 3086/17 Bohadana v.  Marcus (Published on the Judiciary website, May 18, 2017); Civil Appeal 1286/18 Ginzborsky v.  Knafo (Published in Arsh, June 24, 2019); Civil Appeal Authority 6592/19 Kligman v.  Basketer Hefter (Published inR.  S.  18.11.2019); Civil Case (Tel Aviv District) 33784-04-15 Rajwan v.  Itzhaki, in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the The Honorable Judge Magen Altuvia (Published in the databases, August 27, 2015); Civil Appeal (Haifa District) 67940-05-20 Pomerantz v.  Barbie (Published in the databases 6.8.2020); Civil Appeal (Haifa District) 6911-03-21 Jbeili v.  68 (The Honorable Judge Mazen Daoud) (published in the databases, July 19, 2021); Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 26513-11-23 Barak Tamir v.  Dr.  Elroy Price (Judge Cohen) (published in the databases 23.7.2024); Civil Appeal (Tel Aviv District) 58271-09-23 Grinzig v.  Zippori (Judge Etdegi) (published in the databases August 19, 2024); Civil Case (Shalom Jerusalem) 21120-07-16 Jerusalem Municipality v.  Abergel (The Honorable Judge Liat Benmelech) (published in the databases 23.11.2020); Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv-Yafo) 56125-12-20 Adv. Soroker v.  Cohen, in paragraph 60 of the judgment of The Honorable Judge Raz Navon (Published in the databases 22.2.2023); Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv-Yafo) 53246-06-20 Jamchi v.  Kofman, in paragraph 35 of the judgment of The Honorable Judge Pnina Neuwirth (Published in the databases, June 21, 2023); Small Claim (Small Claims Tel Aviv-Yafo) 51792-08-23 Elovitch v.  Shama Hacohen, in paragraph 25 of the judgment of The Honorable Vice President Carmela Haft (Published in the databases 7.4.2024); Civil Case (Shalom Haifa) 44692-12-21 Nahum v.  Mashiach, in paragraph 64 of the judgment of the The Honorable Judge Sigalit Matza (Published in the databases, May 15, 2024).

With regard to the violation of privacy in such a post or tweet - as noted, in "normal" circumstances, where there is no element of excessive severity and no enrichment at the expense of the victim - the average compensation ranges from ILS 15,000 to ILS 20,000 (Civil Case (Shalom Rishon LeZion) 3658-07-18 Kahlon v.  Cohen (The Honorable Judge Rafi Arnia) (published in the databases on February 1, 2022); Civil Case (Shalom Petach Tikva) 24381-07-19 Nir v.  Peer (The Honorable Judge Ashrit Rotkopf (published in the databases 18.1.2023); Civil Case (Shalom Tiberias) 59111-12-21 Ben Moyal v.  A.  Amor Group Trade in Tax Appeal (Honorable Judge Bracha Lachman) (published in the databases on May 9, 2023); Civil Case (Shalom Haifa) 37941-02-20 Ilbigli v.  Dolev (Honorable Judge Ziv Arieli) (published in the databases 26.11.2023); Small Claim (Small Claims Haifa) 67264-08-23 Anonymous v.  Weizmann (Honorable Senior Registrar Milad Telhami) (published in the databases August 25, 2024); Civil Case (Shalom Netanya) 12612-01-20 Hefetz v.  Netanyahu (Honorable Judge Noam Raff) (published in the databases 5.2.2025); compare to Civil Case (Shalom Tel Aviv-Jaffa) 5560-04-22 Parti v.  Aloniel Ltd., Judgment of Judge Goldstein (published in the databases 24.4.2024)).

92. In the case before me, the defendant is obligated to show you that it did not have a momentary whim at the basis of her actions, but rather a deliberate intention. The violation of privacy was severe in the sense that the plaintiffs' personal phone numbers were discussed, which exposed them to the receipt of both text messages and calls.  The content of the publications leaves no room for doubt that the defendant intended that they would harm the plaintiffs, and it is clear that this was against the background of their political positions, the fact that they were of opinion - different from her and against the background of their protest activity.  The publications addressed a significant number of recipients, and the fact that they were the work of a well-known online personality made them more trustworthy of their consumers and deepened the damage.  In terms of defamation, the publications shrank the plaintiffs' self-definition and deliberately ignored the elements that earned them some of their good name.  These publications were, clearly, lies.  Not only did they contribute nothing to the public discourse, they also caused damage to it.  Instead of serious expressions, reflecting even sharp disagreements and calling for positive discourse and debate, these publications sought to ridicule the plaintiffs and reflect the defendant's proposal for the components of a discourse - Offensive - Among those holding the various positions.  The defendant refused to apologize for the injury she caused, and no element of repentance was attached to her position throughout this proceeding.
93. At stake is the fact that the defendant herself understood the difficulty and removed the publications after a short time. Some weight, even if slight, must be given to the fact that this is nevertheless part of the defendant's freedom of expression.  Despite the severity of portraying political opponents - The concrete damage to the plaintiffs' reputation was not severe, especially since it is clear that a significant portion of the respondents to the publications were not those on whose position the reputation that the plaintiffs have built for themselves over the years is based.  Finally, as I noted above, I was of the opinion that significance should be given to the increase in the amount of the claim and the burden on the conduct of the proceeding.
94. Weighing all the elements together, I found room to obligate the defendant, due to the violation of the privacy of each of the plaintiffs, to compensate him in the sum of ILS 17,000; And due to the damage to his good name - An additional ILS 8,000.

The Result

95. The claim is accepted on its grounds. With regard to the remedies, the court obligates the defendant to compensate Everyone from the plaintiffs in the sum of ILS 25,000, plus linkage differentials and interest according to Interest Rulings and Linkage Law, 5721-1961 from the date of filing the claim (August 1, 2023) until today, that is, Sum of 27,690 ILS per plaintiff.

The defendant will also pay, to each of the plaintiffs, the sum of ILS 1,850 for court expenses and encompasses the reasonable amount of the fee and the need to appear for one prolonged hearing in court.  Finally, I order the defendant to pay each of the plaintiffs a sum, including VAT, of ILS 5,900 for attorneys' fees.  This last sum took into account, on the one hand, the estimated scope of the legal fact that was required to be represented and on the other hand, the sum of the claim.