Invasion of privacy
- The Scope and Normative Status of the Right to Privacy
- For nearly three and a half decades, the right to privacy has been recognized in our law as one of the basic constitutional rights of the individual. Section 7 The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty teaches us:
| "7. Privacy and privacy | (a) | Every person is entitled to privacy and the privacy of his life. |
| (b) | One does not enter a person's private domain without his consent. | |
| (c) | A search is not conducted in a person's private possession, on his body, his body or his tools. | |
| (d) | We do not harm the secret of a person's discourse, his writings or his records." |
The Basic Law and the Case Law that Follows - For example, Criminal Appeal 5026/97 Gilam v. State of Israel, in the ninth paragraph of the judgment of The Honorable Judge Hanoch Ariel (Published on the website of the Judiciary, June 13, 1999); High Court of Justice 844/06 University of Haifa v. Prof. Oz, IsrSC 62(4) 167, 206 (2008); Civil Appeal Authority 2558/16 Anonymous v. Compensation Officer, Ministry of Defense, in paragraphs 39-41 of the judgment of Judge Barak-Erez (Published in Aristotle, November 5, 2017); Additional Criminal Hearing 1062/21 Urich v. State of Israel, in paragraph 47 of the judgment of Your Excellency President Hayut) (published in Arachal Pradesh, January 11, 2022) - determine the lofty status of the right to privacy and the scope of its recognition, that is, what falls within the scope of this right of man. The scope of the right is outlined according to the language of the constitutional norm, and in particular according to its purpose.
- Protection of the Right to Privacy
- In contrast to recognition of the scope of a constitutional right, the protection (or non-defense) thereof is regulated, in most cases, and especially when we are dealing with a conflict between individuals, on a normative level below the constitutional one. There are statutory arrangements, usually the virtues of law, that anchor "internal" mechanisms of balancing competing values. This balance provides the legal solution, in any case according to its circumstances, to a dispute whose origin is a violation of the constitutional right. The balance makes it possible to place other important rights, values or interests against the constitutional right and to determine, as the case may be, the result of competition between the constitutional right and whichever of these. This is in the sense of granting or not providing protection for the first time, at the expense of the latter.
Israeli law developed this path according to the understanding that constitutional law, which is one of the branches of our public law, has no direct application to private law; however, both branches of law - the constitutional and the private - are part of a whole. They are in harmony. They share, with each other, a common legal language. They are part of a full and coherent legal, social and moral outlook. Together they create the judgment. Thus, it is possible for "various torts in tort law to protect constitutional rights without turning these torts into constitutional torts" (Civil Appeals Authority 2063/16 Rabbi Glick v. Israel Police, at paragraph 17 of the judgment of Justice Amit (published on the Judiciary website, January 19, 2017)). I've written about this before: