"Not for the purpose for which it was given"
- The term "delivery to another" of that information about the plaintiffs' private affairs, i.e., of their mobile phone numbers, refers to such specific circumstances. In the circumstances of this parasha, it is easy to explain. On the face of it, it is clear that this was precisely the essence of the publication made by the defendant. This publication is all about - Its purpose, the manner in which it is formulated, and the manner in which it is brought to the attention of others - around the idea of handing over these phone numbers to others.
The third link in section 2(9) of the Protection of Privacy Law, which seeks an answer to the question of whether the publication of the telephone numbers was made "not for the purpose for which they were delivered", requires the defense to claim that the plaintiffs themselves made these telephone numbers public. "The phone numbers became public domain a long time ago and even before [my publication]," the defendant said in paragraph 26 of the affidavit. In this, of course, the defense fell into an accident. "I don't hand over my phones so that people will harass me," said Plaintiff No. 4, Mr. Dror, in his testimony in court, and this is the whole thing. Even if we assume that any of the plaintiffs gave his phone number himself or revealed it to the members of discussion groups, in which he is a member of an instant messaging application, he did not do so for the purpose that the defendant had in mind when she publicly expanded those numbers. He did not do this in order to receive telephone calls or messages from strangers, with whom he has nothing to do with them, and who do not wish to disagree with his opinions, but to buy eggs, oil, diapers or barbed wire fences from him, and at least to harass him with requests for the purchase, as it were, of these.
- This conclusion has a basis in the fundamental concept of the right to privacy. In his writing, he pronounced Professor Michael Birnhack and developed a view of privacy as "control." I will compile from things he wrote in 2011, in the hope that I will not distort them or take them out of context. "The essence of privacy," they argued Professor Birnhack"It is a person's control over himself, and especially information about him. He, and only he, will determine what will happen to the information about him. [this,] began with the control of a person in certain places; the continuation of man's control over his autonomous unit, the secret of discourse and communication in general, and personal decisions; A bride in a person's control of trivial information about his habits. Among the categories, the emphasis is on information control. The concept of 'information' must be understood broadly. Control also applies in private spaces, it applies to the media (including media data) and it applies to decisions [for example] when a person decides whether and under what circumstances it is permissible to photograph him" (Michael) Birnhack [Private Space]: The Right to Privacy Between Law and Technology 89 (2011). The round brackets are original).
The learned author went on to explain the basic rationale for the matter: "A person's self-control over information about himself is well in line with ideas about autonomy and human dignity. Information is key to such self-control. The offers we receive - and especially those we don't receive - to buy [or sell!] a product are based on the knowledge we have about us in the market. The information about us that is collected, stored, cross-referenced and analyzed reflects us. There is an identity between the person and the information about him. Another person's control over information about a person is equivalent to that other's control over the person himself. This is tying strings to a person like a puppet, and thus he is no longer independent in his actions, but is subject to the decisions that others make about him based on the information they have about him. Our autonomy is being violated. The ability to decide for ourselves is impaired" (ibid., p. 90).
- It is clear to me that the right not to be exposed to the false distribution of information about a person is also one of the foundations of his privacy as an expression of his control over the information. Here we are not required to ask, particularly the legal one, whether the publication of the information damaged the person's good name or thwarted legal and other interactions to which he is a party. The dissemination of false information takes away from a person what is known about him. It impairs his power to direct this knowledge, define its boundaries, and influence the regions it reaches. The dissemination of false information seeks, in essence, to harm a person's control over the information about him, and as such, according to the concept presented above, it violates his privacy.
Nitol, just for example, is an "ordinary citizen", an active user of social networks, who has made a name for herself and is well known to the surfing public for her views on the true essence of the world, of the state and of society. Expression on social networks is an important means for this surfer in publicly expressing her opinions, and no less so - in her self-definition. This self-determination, an institutionalized element of that surfer's autonomy, found expression even in the permanent nickname used by this surfer on the networks. And now, on what day do surfers come across an entry, supposedly written by this surfer, who bears her name and picture? In this post, the user invites her followers - who are still in the realms of example - to take part, as a sign of support and solidarity, in a demonstration that intends to hold a certain movement, "Brothers in Arms", on Kaplan Street in the city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. The gaze of alert surfers is immediately turned to the top of the post. They do not see the nickname there: "Ronit the Kaplanist". 14 - malicious and perhaps covetous, she used, heaven forbid , a very familiar and well-known name: "Ronit the Bibiist". True, there were those who impersonated this surfer and published false information about her. Thereby, she was stripped of her control over the information related to her. In this there was someone who sought to detract from the basis for her self-definition. In this way, it is as if the surfer is tied with strings, which he wishes to pull at will and against her will. Ignoring for a moment the impersonation (which is a separate problem), does this example not clarify (well, in the opinion of the dogma-thinker) the idea of privacy as control and the infringement of control as a profound violation of the right to privacy? Finding a legal accommodation, including that in section 2(9) of the Protection of Privacy Law, and in particular, by virtue of which the surfer can seek legal remedy, is a fairly easy matter.