In clause 1 of the Appendix to the Payments and Dates, it was determined that the property would be delivered after 12 months -
"After payment of the full consideration and the fulfillment of all the buyer's obligations under the contract."
Clause 2.4 of the agreement stipulated that a delay in the deadlines will bear linkage and interest differences. In practice, the plaintiff did not meet the dates specified in the agreement and had to bear linkage and interest differences. For the sake of illustration, until January 10, 2019, the plaintiff transferred the sum of ILS 5,992,090 plus a tax appeal only. This was when it was required to pay ILS 6,418,656 plus VAT under the agreement. In other words, a delay in payment of a sum of ILS 426,566 for about three and a half years.
- The defendant further claims that the plaintiff was a partner and active party in all the planning proceedings. During the project, the defendant was required to make a change, including increasing the basement floors from 2.5 basement floors to 3 floors. This was a job that required obtaining an amended building permit, and Mr. Appel gave his consent to the application. It was clear that the changes would delay delivery.
- The defendant further claims that the delay stemmed from the lack of a fire extinguishing permit, when the Fire and Rescue Authority delayed the inspection of the property for the purpose of providing Form 4 and the granting of the permits for an unusual and long time, for a reason that is not dependent on the defendant. Appel knew about the delays and even tried to help. A fire extinguisher permit was issued only on October 22, 2018, and even that, after much pressure and effort had been exerted.
- It was further argued with respect to the alleged delay period that possession of the store was already delivered on October 28, 2018, when the form for connection to the electrical system was given, and not as the plaintiff claimed.
Background and Evidence of the Parties
- First, I will note that in the case of the two additional stores, which are owned by A.P.Z. Housing, a lawsuit was conducted in the Central District Court in Civil Case 44600-10-20, Housing A.P.Z. Netanel Group (January 20, 2025), in the framework of which the judgment of the Honorable Judge Zvi Weizmann (hereinafter: the parallel proceeding) was given, while in the parallel proceeding, Dior A.P.Z. placed its claim in the sum of ILS 4,039,637, as a derivative of the size of the two stores that are the subject of this proceeding. This, along with a claim to hand over the plaintiff's parking spaces to her. The claim in the parallel proceeding was accepted in small part, after receiving the plaintiff's substantive claims regarding the lack of timely delivery. However, a significant part of the calculation made by the defendant regarding the loss of the proper usage fees in the stores there was not accepted. In the margins, it should be noted that, as emerges from the judgment in the parallel proceeding (paragraph 1), the shareholders in APC Housing are Mr. Appel and his wife, in equal shares, with Mr. Appel serving as the sole director of this company. After the completion of the evidence stage in the proceeding before me and proceeds to the completion of the summary stage, the judgment in the parallel proceeding will be communicated. Counsel for the plaintiff had time to address the decision in the parallel proceeding in the summaries of the reply on their behalf, while counsel for the defendant sought to address this decision. In my decision of March 24, 2025 on Motion 30, I determined that the defendant's attorney would be allowed to submit their comments to the judgment in the parallel proceeding, while at the same time I would also be required to complete arguments on behalf of the plaintiff's attorney, but despite the defendant's observation of this decision, no reference was provided on the date set by me. Therefore, I decided on April 9, 2025 that the judgment would be sent to the parties' attorney without waiting for the parties to address the parallel proceeding. In the margins of these words, I will note that already in my decision about a month earlier, on March 10, 2025, I expressed my wonder as to whether the judgment in the parallel proceeding had become final, given the rulings in this judgment that constitute a decision for the proceeding before me, and taking into account the plaintiff's petition in the network of summaries of her reply to the decision in accordance with the rulings in the parallel proceeding (with the appropriate changes, according to the plaintiff, given her objections to the determinations of the panel in the parallel proceeding with respect to the calculation of the rent in relation to the lease agreement entered into by Dior A.P.Z. for the rental of its two stores, which are the subject of the parallel proceeding). when, according to the plaintiff, these determinations are "silencing her company"; However, both the plaintiff and the defendant announced that they intended to appeal the judgment, although in the end, and as stated, an appeal was filed against the judgment in the parallel proceeding only by A.P.Z. Housing and not by the defendant there and here. In any event, in view of the certain variation between the cases in question, and taking into account the fact that in any case the judgment in the parallel proceeding did not become conclusive, and since it seems that a final decision in the aforementioned proceeding will not be made soon, I have found that there is no choice but to release my decision in the proceeding before me without waiting for a final decision on the dispute that is the subject of the parallel proceeding.
- Notwithstanding the above, and during the initial work on the draft judgment in question, I became aware that in fact the store was in fact leased (and after the submission of the parties' evidence) to a business called "Tzipora Skewers" (p. 72, paras. 6-7 of Mr. Steindam's cross-examination on behalf of the plaintiff, hereinafter: the Tzipora Skewers Agreement). In this context, I noted in my decision of April 18, 2025 that I did not find that any data was submitted to me in relation to the cost of the rent in respect of the Tzipora skewers agreement, just as I did not find that the defendant referred to this matter in its summaries. In the circumstances of the case, I was asked about the position of the parties in relation to the Tzipora Skewers Agreement. On this issue, a reminder hearing was held with the participation of counsel for the parties, on April 28, 2025. Counsel for the plaintiff announced during the hearing that there was no impediment on the plaintiff's part to produce the new evidence, which concerns the Tzipora skewers agreement, when he announced that the rent under this agreement is approximately ILS 135 per month per square meter. Counsel for the defendant, for his part, announced that it would be difficult for him to relate to the agreement that had not yet been presented, while preserving his right to submit a reference to the new evidence. During the hearing itself, the parties referred to the cocoa agreement that was signed in the matter of the stores of Dior A.P.Z. On the merits of the matter, and with the consent of counsel for the parties, I ordered that the plaintiff produce an agreement on the skewers of Tzipora, while preserving the defendant's rights to submit her response on the matter together with evidence.
- The Zipporah skewers agreement was submitted on May 7, 2025, with explanatory notes on behalf of the plaintiff's attorney. I will briefly note that this is an agreement dated June 6, 2023, which was made, as aforesaid, after the submission of all the evidence of the parties. In addition, it appears from this agreement that it relates to the gross area of the store, and calculates it according to an area of 275 square meters (see section 1.4). It should also be noted that this is a 5-year lease agreement with an option for an additional 5 years. In addition, the consideration is calculated according to the gross area, with variables, in accordance with the lease periods (see clause 4.1 of the agreement). On July 14, 2025, the defendant's response to this agreement was submitted, with an appraiser's opinion of the appraiser Moshe Sapir, dated July 6, 2025, on behalf of the defendant (hereinafter: the appraiser Sapir). On August 17, 2025, the plaintiff's attorney's response to the defendant's attorney's response was submitted, which was also accompanied by two opinions: one on behalf of the defendant by the appraiser Avi Biron on August 14, 2025 (hereinafter: the appraiser Biron), and the second by the decisive appraiser Boaz Barzilai, regarding the betterment fees for the property, dated June 18, 2024 (hereinafter: the decisive appraiser). Shortly after the submission of this response, the defendant's attorney's request was filed to delete the plaintiff's attorney's response, as well as to order that the opinion be removed from her. Already in my decision of August 17, 2025 on the defendant's motion (application 37), I made it clear that I would need to accept the plaintiff's position. However, I suggested that the parties examine hearing the additional evidence that concerns the parties' expert opinions. After receiving the defendant's response, I determined in my decision of September 9, 2025 on application 40, that I could not order the deletion of the plaintiff's expert opinion, in view of the defendant's submission of the defendant's opinion (which itself came after the submission of the Tzipora skewers agreement). I also noted that the two opinions were submitted only after a reminder hearing on April 28, 2025, and following my comment regarding the Tzipora skewers agreement, which constitutes new evidence. I also suggested appointing an expert on behalf of the court, while in this context I suggested different names of appraisers. Counsel for the defendant appealed my aforementioned decision, and in my decision of September 16, 2025, I determined that I do not constitute a court of appeal against my decisions. I also noted that the plaintiff's opinion does not conflict with the defendant's opinion. I have also proposed several options for advancing the proceeding from this stage, and based on the opinions of the parties' experts. Following these remarks, and taking into account the defendant's attorney's notice of September 25, 2025, as well as taking into account what was stated in the plaintiff's response in relation to the defendant's request to order the deletion of the plaintiff's expert opinion, I ordered in my decision of September 25, 2025, that a hearing be scheduled for the purpose of interrogating the parties' experts, and this did ultimately take place on January 8, 2026. I will refer later to the opinions of the parties and their cross-examinations, as they arose in that hearing.
- In addition, at the end of the hearing of January 8, 2026, counsel for the parties accepted my proposal regarding the appointment of the appraiser and engineer Zvi Ron as an expert on behalf of the court (hereinafter: the expert and/or the court's expert). He gave his opinion on March 30, 2026. I will refer to the opinion below. As to the procedure, the defendant ISA sent clarification questions to the expert on March 30, 2026, and the expert answered them on April 26, 2026. The expert was questioned about his opinion on May 14, 2026, when most of his interrogation was conducted by the plaintiff's attorney, who waived his decision to send clarification questions to the expert. Counsel for the parties waived the submission of summaries and additional arguments after the expert's interrogation, and therefore the time was ripe for writing the judgment, after reviewing the transcript of the expert's interrogation.
- I will now turn to the evidence of the parties: on behalf of the plaintiff, affidavits were filed appealing the decision of the Registrar of Ms. Gali Appel Castel, Mr. Appel's daughter, and the person who conducted the negotiations on his behalf in connection with the implementation of the agreement (hereinafter: Appel), as well as of Mr. Steindem. A significant part of the plaintiff's exhibits were attached to Mr. Steindem's affidavit and a minority to Ms. Appel's affidavit. However, it appears that Ms. Appel was the dominant factor and liaison with the defendant's representatives, while Mr. Steindem, one of the plaintiff's shareholders, acted behind the scenes, and I found that he was not necessarily involved in the negotiations between the parties. Moreover, Mr. Steindem testifies that part of his testimony is hearsay testimony, after he heard what he said from Mr. Appel, who shared with him as a partner in the issue of the delay in delivery (from p. 36, para. 30 to p. 37, para. 11). Therefore, I will mainly refer to the testimony of Mrs. Appel. As to the testimony of Mr. Steindem, I will address this testimony briefly and insofar as it relates to the substantive issues in the present case. It should also be noted that in the list of witnesses on behalf of the defendant, Mr. Appel's name was listed, and in the end, the plaintiff did not submit an affidavit on his behalf, and he did not testify. Later on, I will address the arguments of the parties regarding the lack of testimony on behalf of Mr. Appel, and the evidentiary significance that should be attributed to it.
- On behalf of the defendant, affidavits of appeal were filed against the decision of the Registrar of the Defendant's manager and controlling shareholder, Mr. Arie Netanel (hereinafter: Netanel), as well as a short affidavit by the defendant's legal advisor, Adv. Nili Braunstein (hereinafter: Adv. Braunstein).
- As part of the proceeding, two pre-trial sessions were conducted (on November 3, 2021 and May 3, 2023), and two evidentiary hearings. In the course of the first evidentiary hearing (on January 1, 2024), Ms. Appel and Mr. Steindem on behalf of the plaintiff, and Adv. Braunstein on behalf of the defendant, were questioned about the affidavits on their behalf. As part of the second evidentiary hearing (dated March 4, 2024), Mr. Netanel was questioned about his affidavit on behalf of the defendant. References to cross-examinations are in accordance with the relevant protocols. In addition, and following the developments regarding the procedure for a reminder hearing in a visual conference, dated April 28, 2025, in which I made a decision at the end of the minutes, with the consent of the parties, according to which I instructed the plaintiff to produce the Tzipora skewers agreement, all as detailed above. Following these remarks, and as stated above, an additional evidentiary hearing was held on January 8, 2026, for the purpose of cross-examination of the parties' experts, and finally, an evidentiary hearing on May 14, 2026, which was intended for the cross-examination of the court's expert. After these remarks, counsel for the parties agreed that there was no need for additional summaries beyond those that had already been submitted and beyond the supplements to the matter.
- It should be noted that at the beginning of the proceeding, the parties turned to a mediation proceeding before the Honorable Retired Judge Hila Gerstel, and notice of this was given on June 8, 2022. As a result, he was even asked to postpone the submission of the parties' affidavits. However, on May 3, 2023, the plaintiff's attorney announced that the mediation process was unsuccessful.
- With regard to the presentation of evidence, including the presentation of the minutes of the hearing from the parallel proceeding, I was required to do so already in the course of the hearing of January 1, 2024 (from p. 6 of par, para. 33 to p. 7, para. 8). During Mr. Steindem's testimony, he was asked by the defendant's counsel regarding Mr. Appel's testimony in the parallel proceeding (p. 38, paras. 21-39), in an attempt to cure his absence from being summoned to Mr. Appel's testimony in the proceeding before me. According to the defendant's counsel, in his question regarding the matter in the framework of the parallel proceeding, Mr. Appel confirmed that due to the need to amend the project plans, there was a delay in the project, in the receipt of Form 4, and in any case also in the delivery of the store. Steindem was asked about this in his testimony, while referring, as stated, to the testimony of Mr. Appel in the parallel proceeding. Counsel for the defendant asked to present the minutes of the parallel proceeding as evidence before me, while counsel for the plaintiff refused to present the transcript, while raising the argument that there was no reason to present through Mr. Steindem a document that was not related to him and that he had not prepared (p. 42, paras. 1-30). At that point, I rejected the request to present the transcript to myself and to the witness in the parallel proceeding. In this context, I have determined the following:
"First, on the merits of the matter, from page 17 of the transcript (in the parallel proceeding. Y.P. does not explicitly arise as the defendant's counsel claims, as to the questions and answers it appears that Mr. Appel explicitly emphasizes that he is indeed the owner, but did not control the project, nor did he submit plans. He did sign the plans, agreed to them, but did not initiate them.