The bias in the value of an asset will constitute a violation of the provisions of the tender. It is liable to expose all those involved in its bias, including corporations, shareholders and officers, to civil lawsuits on grounds of contract, tort and unjust law. Value bias can also constitute criminal liability on the part of those involved in the bias. All of the above can also lead to negative results on the tender level, if and when a person who was involved in a value bias wishes to enter into a future transaction with a public authority (the aforementioned Four Islands of Desalination in paragraph 28).
The chances of realizing any of the aforementioned risks - the expected risk - are not negligible or purely theoretical. The valuations carried out according to the tender are open to the institutional bodies and even to the public (see - p. 2, s. 1 onwards). Particularly important in this context is the fact that the database is open to all institutional investors. The institutional market includes quite a few "players" among whom the competition is fierce. These are sophisticated "actors". As such, the institutional bodies monitor each other's performance, and as stated by the respondent's representative - CPA Anat Feyer - they do not hesitate to contact the respondent in cases where there is a suspicion of improper acts by any of their competitors (p. 3, 32 - p. 4, 14). To this it should be added that the Respondent, as a regulator, has the ability, both professionally and practically, to supervise the valuations that Miracle will perform. The Respondent is a professional regulator who is familiar with the areas of activity of the institutional bodies. The tender deals with a service that is at the core of the Respondent's work and regulatory expertise. In the tender, the respondent was given tools that enable it to supervise the winner's actions in accordance with the tender. Thus, for example, according to the provisions of the tender, the Respondent is supposed to receive ongoing reports on the activities of the winner of the tender (clause 5.5 of the tender). All of the above was expressed in the words of the respondent's representative, Adv. Eviatar Turgeman, according to which "... We know our bodies, as a regulator we are aware of everything that happens within the bodies, we are a very in-depth regulator and also very penetrating its regulation" (pp. 32, 15-17). It seems, therefore, that the Respondent's ability to control Ness is relatively high. It should be added that the provisions of the tender also require Ness to operate internal control mechanisms, including an independent professional committee (clause 5.5.3 of the tender), internal audit (clause 5.5.6), a research and analysis department (clause 5.5.7), and an event log (clause 5.5.8). Among these internal control mechanisms - whose effectiveness should not be exaggerated but should not be underestimated - special mention is the professional committee, which is supposed to be composed of members "who are not involved in the company's day-to-day activities", two of whom must be senior academics (clause 5.5.3 of the tender).