Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 57596-03-25 Bechor Shushan Zaban v. Eyal Horowitz - part 3

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1. When the written drafts that were exchanged between the parties have room reserved for their signatures. In such a case, it can be assumed that they did so not for nothing, and that they really intended to commit to the agreement only after they signed it."
2. Due to the importance of the matter, the following is the draft that was not signed:
3. Taking into account that the draft reserved room for the signatures of the parties, the conclusion that negotiations were held prior to the signing of an agreement, which did not succeed, is strengthened. Not only did the plaintiff not contradict the presumption that a contract was not made, the following are a number of additional reasons that together form the conclusion that a contract was not made.

The draft does not refer to the appendix that includes the list of furniture and therefore lacks specifics on a substantive matter

9. A perusal of the draft shows that it is missing certain items as it does not include the list of furniture that the plaintiff is supposed to sell to the defendant. The plaintiff claimed in the statement of claim that the draft that was attached to the statement of claim was agreed upon by the parties even if they did not sign it.  He further claimed that although the value of the movables was estimated at the time of the sale in the sum of hundreds of thousands of shekels, the parties agreed that all the movables would be sold for an additional sum of only ILS 125,000 (in addition to the consideration in the sale agreement).  He further claimed that prior to the delivery of the apartment during the month of August 2023, the defendant announced that he wished to give up a number of items, and therefore the sum was reduced from a total of ILS 125,000 to a total of ILS 120,000.  The problem, he claimed, was that towards the date of handing over possession of the apartment, the defendant evaded paying the agreed amount.  This, he claimed, despite the reduction of ILS 5,000 from the amount he was supposed to pay for the movables, which was given to him on October 12, 2023, upon the handover of possession of the apartment to him together with the movables, for which he evaded payment.
10. The defendant claimed in the statement of defense that an examination of the statement of claim shows that there was no stage of offer and acceptance as required by law, and as it appears from the statement of claim and the draft attached to it, the list of items in the framework of the "movables" and their amount were not agreed, and at no stage did there be a meeting of desires between the parties required for the formation of a final decision. He further argued that there is no dispute that the draft does not include a list of items and it is not possible to understand from it what the vague term "movables" includes, in such a way that in any event, even according to the plaintiff's position, additional supplementary negotiations were required. He further argued that there is no dispute that the sum written in the draft (ILS 125,000) was not final, and that accordingly it is clear that it is not possible to learn about the discretion required for the purpose of concluding a contract.
11. The plaintiff claimed in his summaries that the details of the movables appear in the delivery protocol that documented the delivery of the apartment. However, this is a list that was drawn up after the date of the conclusion of the contract, and hence at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the list did not exist. The defendant claimed in his summaries that the plaintiff confirmed that the list of movables that appears in his affidavit and in Mr. Derech's affidavit was prepared retroactively and not at the time of the conclusion of the alleged contract, and in any case includes the statement "and many other items".  The court finds reason in the defendant's remark in his summaries that the plaintiff, who owns a chain of jewelry stores, is expected to understand that there is a difficulty in defining a sale of a considerable sum, in general.
12. As will be detailed below, even in real time, the defendant remarked to Mr. Derech when he forwarded him a draft of an agreement regarding the movables, close to the signing of the sale agreement, that there was no list of the movables. The court rules that it is not by chance that the draft was not signed in its format, when it does not refer to the list of movables that is the basis of the sale, and therefore this finding strengthens the conclusion that the negotiations are not ripe for the conclusion of a binding contract.

At the time of submitting the evidence, the plaintiff presented an additional draft of the agreement, without the amount of consideration

13. The plaintiff attached to the statement of claim the draft prepared in August 2022, the contents of which were presented earlier. At the time of submitting the evidence, the plaintiff submitted by means of Mr. Derech's affidavit, an additional draft, (Appendix 2 to Mr. Derech's affidavit) that Mr. Derech stated that he had forwarded to the defendant on August 22, 2022, according to him, three days before the signing of the sale agreement. In the additional draft, the amount of consideration does not appear.  The plaintiff stated that he had passed the draft to the defendant, and hence the defendant received the draft without the amount of consideration.  The plaintiff stated that he had arrived with the "movable agreement", as he put it, at the time of signing the sale agreement in order to have the defendant sign it, and attached to his affidavit the draft with the amount of the consideration.  A comparison between the plaintiff's affidavit and Mr. Derech's affidavit created a difficulty, since both the plaintiff and Mr. Derech stated that Mr. Derech had transferred an agreement to the defendant, but Mr. Derech attached the draft to his affidavit without the amount of consideration.  Hence, before signing the sale agreement, the defendant received, according to the plaintiff's affidavits, the draft that does not include the amount of consideration.  This is sufficient to drop the ground under the attempt to base the claim on the draft that was attached to the statement of claim, which includes the amount of consideration.  Hence, not only is there no agreed list of the movables in real time, but in real time, the plaintiff transferred to the defendant through Mr. Derech a draft without the amount of consideration.

The content of the draft is contrary to the sale agreement

14. In addition to all of the above, the defendant argued in the statement of defense that the lawsuit should be dismissed in limine because it contradicts the clear provisions of the sale agreement, since clauses 1.2 and 8 of the sale agreement explicitly state that possession of the apartment will be handed over to him when it is free of any person and object. He further argued that these clear provisions contradict the plaintiff's claims head-on, as if he insisted that an integral part of the purchase of the apartment would be the many movables that were there, and that at the time of signing the sale agreement, there was an additional agreement in connection with the sale of movables that he was asked to sign. He further claimed that the plaintiff admits that he violated the provisions of clauses 1.2 and 8 of the sale agreement, when he gave him the apartment with movables, when it was neither vacant nor empty.  He further claimed that the plaintiff admits that he violated the provisions of clause 2.3 of the sale agreement, which stipulates that there is no impediment by law or agreement to the transfer of possession and ownership, by raising the claim regarding the alleged existence of a contrary agreement in connection with movables, which is not mentioned in the sale agreement.
15. From the evidence that was brought, it emerged that the first draft of the sale agreement embodied a total price of consideration both in relation to the connected and in relation to the movables, with the value of the movables being ILS 300,000. The considerable difference between this sum and the amount of the claim here, in itself creates a question mark. The main witness in the eyes of the court, Adv. Mishkovsky, who testified on behalf of the plaintiff, as the person who accompanied him in the negotiations prior to the conclusion of the sale agreement, confirmed that at first the parties were of the opinion that the consideration for the sale of the apartment would also include the value of the furniture, and this was also written in the first draft that was replaced.  He explained in his testimony that he was the one who advised the plaintiff not to include the value of the furniture in the sale agreement due to the concern that the real estate taxation would not recognize the declaration of the parties to the transaction regarding the value of the movables, since the plaintiff did not have invoices that would support the value of the movables.  In his testimony, he noted that at the time the sale agreement was signed, no agreement was entered into for the sale of movables, since the plaintiff had to report this to the real estate tax authorities.  He confirmed in his testimony that when he learned of the plaintiff's version that an agreement had been made for the purchase of the movables, he did not advise him to amend the report to the real estate tax authorities, but emphasized that he was not advising on a violation of the law.
16. In his interrogation, Adv. Mishkovsky was referred to clause 12.1 of the sale agreement and was asked whether the agreement indeed expressed all the agreements, and he replied that this is what is written and that the sale agreement was drafted by both parties. He confirmed that the content of clause 12.1, which denies the existence of agreements not included in the agreement, existed from the first draft he drafted. Mishkovsky was referred to clause 12.2 of the sale agreement, which states that any change is void, unless it was made in writing and signed and confirmed, which means that all the agreements prior to the sale agreement, including with regard to so-called furniture, were cancelled at the time of the signing of the sale agreement.  He testified that the agreement for the purchase of the movables was entered into after the sale agreement was signed, and in the same breath he testified that to the best of his understanding there was always an agreement regarding the movables, and the question was, whether it was included in the sale agreement or not, and how to manage it.  Hence, the plaintiff's argument in paragraph 6 of his summaries, according to which all his witnesses testified that the contract was concluded "on the eve of" the signing of the sale agreement, is incorrect.
17. This testimony is sufficient to bring about the collapse of the argument for the conclusion of an agreement for the sale of the furniture prior to the signing of the so-called sale agreement. In addition, the sale agreement expressly negates the additional version on behalf of the plaintiff, the version of Adv. Mishkovsky, who testified, without personal knowledge, that the sale agreement was changed without written amendment, signed by the parties, as required by the sale agreement regarding its amendment, and that according to this alleged agreement, the defendant requested and even ostensibly undertook to purchase the movables. In addition, Adv. Mishkovsky confirmed that the plaintiff did not declare in the report to the real estate tax authorities that he submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, that an additional agreement was entered into in connection with the sale of the apartment and that no corrective notice was submitted to the Real Estate Taxation regarding the existence of an additional agreement, which was supposedly concluded after the signing of the sale agreement.

00The correspondence negates both the plaintiff's claim regarding the conclusion of the contract before the signing of the sale agreement and the additional version regarding the conclusion of the contract at a later stage

18. 0Contrary to the testimony of Adv. Mishkovsky regarding the defendant's request to purchase the furniture, which is hearsay testimony, according to the documents exchanged between the parties before and after the signing of the sale agreement, there is no request by the defendant and there is also no agreement regarding the purchase of the movables, and even on the contrary, from the correspondence that took place after the signing of the sale agreement, it is clear that there is a dispute. Hence, one of two. A binding contract was entered into at the time of the preparation of any of the drafts with the amount of consideration and without the amount of consideration, as the plaintiff claims, which the defendant allegedly disavowed, and hence the plaintiff falsely declared to the real estate tax authorities that there was no further agreement in connection with the sale of the apartment.  It should be noted that the parties to a real estate transaction must also report an agreement for the purchase of movables, as confirmed by Adv. Mishkovsky in his testimony, since the real estate tax authorities are interested in examining an "agreement for the purchase of movables", whether it is not an agreement for the purchase of real estate, but rather an attempt to increase the consideration for the sale of the apartment on the one hand, and to reduce the betterment tax and purchase tax on the other, since the sale of movable property is exempt from the payment of betterment tax and purchase tax.
19. If the plaintiff did not make a false declaration to the real estate tax authorities, it follows that a binding contract was not concluded before the date of signing the sale agreement, and the plaintiff should have explained the circumstances in which a binding contract was supposedly concluded regarding the sale of the furniture after the signing of the sale agreement, when according to the correspondence the defendant did not consent to the movable property, and more importantly, when the plaintiff claims that the contract was concluded prior to the signing of the sale agreement.
20. The testimony of the plaintiff's son-in-law, Mr. Derech, who prepared the draft, without the amount of consideration, on behalf of the plaintiff and sent it to the defendant, did not help the plaintiff either. He testified about negotiations regarding the purchase of the movables. He could not explain why the purchase of the movables was omitted from later drafts of the sale agreement.  In contrast to Adv. Mishkovsky, he insisted that there was an agreement before the sale agreement was signed.  When asked if an agreement had been made, he asked, "What is a contract?" The court found its answer to be difficult, taking into account his legal education and his status as the CEO of a large real estate company.  He testified that the defendant replied when receiving the draft that he should check and also testified that a list of the movables was supposed to be attached to the draft at the time of its signature.  He was confronted with paragraph 18 of his affidavit according to which the defendant's notice of June 23 contained an admission of the existence of an agreement, and was asked how his statement was consistent with the fact that the defendant's notice did not relate to the furniture, and he replied that the defendant's consent to purchase the furniture should be learned from his words regarding agreements outside the contract.  He was asked to locate in the correspondence, a document in which the defendant agrees to purchase the movables and referred to the defendant's reply, when he received the draft "Okay".  He also testified that he later understood from the plaintiff that the defendant had signed the draft, but retracted his consent.
21. From a review of the correspondence dated August 22, 2022, Mr. Derech claimed in his testimony that it proves the conclusion of a contract, in which Mr. Derech gave the defendant the draft without the amount of consideration, it appears that the defendant replies, "The agreement is only a little, if an agreement is already made. He should indicate what the movables include. As for the amount, you will complete the test.  Remember my honest and correct recommendation..." Hence, there was a willingness on the part of the defendant to consider entering into a contract, but not beyond that.
22. In his summaries, the plaintiff made improvements to Mr. Derech's testimony and claimed that the "smoking gun" to prove the conclusion of a contract was a correspondence dated August 23, 2022 between Mr. Derech and the defendant, which he claimed reflected the parties' agreement to reduce the amount of the movables from a total of ILS 150,000 to a sum of ILS 125,000, and referred to the defendant's words in a text message from that day: "You will add ILS 1,000 to the other agreement that will be ILS 126,000 instead of 125 and please arrange this" as well as the fact that when Mr. Derech sent him a text message on August 24, 2023 in which he stated "completion of 100% delivery + payment for the movables", the defendant did not answer. However, even these text messages that indicate material changes in the negotiations, from a total of ILS 150,000 to ILS 125,000, when the starting point was, as recalled, ILS 300,000, do not lead to the conclusion that the defendant's silence is within the scope of acceptance that overrides the content of the sale agreement that was entered into the next day, and which negates the existence of another agreement. Hence, Mr. Derech's testimony and the documents submitted through him did not contain additional correspondence and drafts, without the amount of the consideration, to substantiate the claim of entering into a contract "guarantor" of the signing of the sale agreement.
23. From the testimony of Mr. Derech it emerged that most of the negotiations were conducted between Mr. Derech and the defendant, and the plaintiff confirmed this fact in his testimony, and therefore from the outset it was difficult for the plaintiff to rely on his affidavit regarding the conduct of the negotiations. The plaintiff confirmed in his interrogation that the purchase of the movables was initially mentioned in the draft of the sale agreement, and that at a later stage there was a proposal to separate the sale agreement from the sale of the movables, and he did not see this as a problem. He did not have a substantive answer to the contradiction between his version of the agreement regarding the furniture prior to the signing of the sale agreement and the content of the sale agreement, which denies the existence of further agreements and states that he must hand over the apartment empty.  In contrast to paragraph 16 of his affidavit in which he claimed that the defendant refused to sign the draft, he testified that the defendant's lawyer told him and the defendant, when signing the sale agreement, to "sign outside." When asked why they didn't sign out, he replied that he didn't believe the defendant would deny it.  He reiterated his claim that an agreement was made regarding the movables prior to the signing of the sale agreement and claimed that Adv. Mishkovsky did not testify otherwise than he did.  However, this argument is incorrect as detailed earlier.
24. The plaintiff testified that the agreement regarding the movables was concluded with a handshake. When he was asked whether there was no list of movables at the time of the draft, and at the time of handing over the apartment, there was a list prepared by Mr. Derech, he did not have a substantive answer. He explained that there was a meeting in the apartment that was intended for the purpose of handing over possession and in which he refused to give possession because the defendant did not give him a check for the furniture and that on the advice of his lawyer he agreed to hand over the apartment to the defendant a week later, even without receiving a check.
25. The plaintiff's version regarding the conclusion of the agreement with a handshake, which he emphasizes in paragraph 15 of his summaries, is a suppressed version that came up for the first time, in his testimony, even though this is an important and central factual claim. Therefore, taking into account the additional difficulties in the plaintiff's version with respect to the content of the sale agreement, the court did not believe his version. For example, when he was asked to explain how his version was consistent with his undertaking to hand over the apartment empty, he had no answer.
26. The defendant testified that the plaintiff constantly raised the price of the consideration for the purchase of the apartment from ILS 12 million to ILS 14 million and even more. Regarding the movables, the defendant testified that the plaintiff suggested that he enter the apartment with suitcases, and that there were a lot of movables, and the plaintiff even told him that he would not have to buy cutlery and tablecloths, and he thought at the time that he would do so. He confirmed that there had been a conversation and that there was even talk of the amount mentioned in the draft in which an amount was mentioned, but it was not agreed and he never agreed.  He was asked why he wrote "Sabba" in response to receiving a draft from Mr. Derech, three days before the signing of the sale agreement, and replied that he had sent him no money, and that he did not know what he meant by the word "Sabba", but he intended to review the draft.
27. He also testified that if he had agreed to purchase the furniture, he would have reported it to the real estate tax authorities. He vehemently denied the plaintiff's version at the time of his testimony, according to which the lawyer who represented him at the time of signing the sale agreement told him and the plaintiff at the time of signing the sale agreement, to "sign outside" the draft regarding the furniture, and claimed that the plaintiff did not take out the draft of the movables at the time of signing the sale agreement. He testified that at the time the sale agreement was signed, he still did not know whether he would accept the plaintiff's offer to purchase the furniture.
28. The plaintiff claimed in paragraph 16 of his summaries that from the date the sale agreement came into effect in December 2022 and until the middle of 2023, "the parties conducted themselves as usual" and that only when he refused to advance the date of delivery of the apartment, did the defendant take revenge on him by "turning his skin". However, if the parties had conducted themselves as usual until the middle of 2023, it would have been expected that the agreement with which the plaintiff had arrived, according to his version, in August 2022 at the time of the signing of the sale agreement, would be signed by the middle of 2023. Why wasn't it signed? There is no pertinent and convincing explanation in the plaintiff's summaries.
29. In addition, when counsel for the defendant, who allegedly told the plaintiff and the defendant at the time of signing the sale agreement, to "sign outside" the movable agreement, an agreement that had never been signed, complained in paragraph 5 of her letter of October 8, 2023 (Appendix 6 to the defendant's evidence) that during a visit to the apartment on October 5, 2023, it became clear that many movables had not yet been removed from the apartment, Adv. Mishkovsky immediately answered on the same day (Appendix 7 to the defendant's evidence) in paragraph 3 of his letter, In view of the delivery date four days after the date of the visit to the apartment, "it is logical that furniture and/or kitchen appliances and/or electrical appliances of this and other kinds will still be in the apartment (as opposed to the date of delivery)." In the same letter, Adv. Mishkovsky wrote in paragraph 6 that the defendant owed the plaintiff ILS 120,000 "for the movables that were sold to him". On October 9, 2023 (Appendix 8 to the defendant's evidence) the defendant's counsel rejected the claim regarding the existence of the alleged agreement and insisted on the removal of the movables. In another letter dated October 10, 2023 (Appendix 9 to the defendant's evidence), counsel for the defendant documented how the plaintiff tried to force the defendant to pay for the movables as a condition for the delivery of the apartment, while repeatedly denying the existence of an alleged agreement for the purchase of the movables.  Mishkovsky responds on the same day (Appendix 10 to the defendant's evidence) that "if I do not receive a notice in my office by tomorrow at 12:00 p.m.  regarding the movables that your client demands to remain in the apartment, all of them will be donated/sold/thrown away."
30. In his interrogation, Adv. Mishkovsky referred to his letter dated October 10, 2023, in which he wrote that if the defendant insists that he does not commit to purchase the movables, they will be evicted, and that the defendant will be silenced from claiming in a future proceeding that he is not obligated to pay because he did not receive the furniture, and he replied that at the end of the day the defendant took the furniture and "asked to leave it at the end". However, there is no request by the defendant before the court, including, after obtaining possession, to receive the furniture. Therefore, according to the letter of the plaintiff's counsel dated October 10, 2023, the plaintiff should have acted in accordance with the letter of his counsel, and removed the movables.  Instead, he left the movables in the apartment, and in this proceeding he reiterated that an agreement had been made to purchase them.  The defendant testified that a week before the delivery of possession, a meeting took place in the apartment with the plaintiff in which he was supposed to receive possession, as the plaintiff testified, and that the plaintiff demanded to receive payment from him for the furniture, and he refused on the grounds that there was no agreement.  He testified that he later agreed to receive possession of the apartment, even though the furniture was not removed in accordance with the provisions of the sale agreement, and that he paid thousands of shekels, after receiving possession, for the removal of the furniture, but did not find a receipt.  The plaintiff claimed in paragraph 17 of his summaries that the defendant did not object in the delivery protocol (Appendix 11 to the defendant's evidence) from leaving the movables in the apartment, and in paragraph 20 of his summaries he claimed that the fact that the movables remained in the apartment "omits the ground under his later claim that the assets were forced upon him".  The defendant explained in his interrogation that he did not condition the receipt of the apartment on the delivery of possession of the movables, as he saw this as an attempt by the plaintiff to force him to purchase the movables, since the plaintiff knew that he was interested in receiving possession of the apartment as soon as possible, and therefore he also agreed to make payments in advance.  The plaintiff confirmed in paragraph 7 of his summaries that the defendant requested to receive the apartment earlier.
31. The court finds the defendant's explanation for the fact that he did not refuse to accept possession of the apartment due to the failure to remove the movables as reasonable, especially since the plaintiff did not persist in his position to prevent the delivery of the apartment until he received the sum of ILS 120,000. The plaintiff emphasized in his summaries that the defendant did not record in the delivery protocol a reservation in view of the inclusion in the minutes of a list of items delivered. An examination of the list shows that from section 6 of the list of items that were delivered (from sections 1 to 6 we are talking about keys and signs that are ostensibly customary to be given away without additional charge), which are not items that are customarily left in the apartment when selling it as part of the sale, such as an oven, microwave, refrigerator, sofa, speakers, etc.  However, to the same extent, it was expected that the plaintiff's representatives, when registering the delivery protocol, would state in the "payment" section of the minutes, in addition to the cumulative sum of ILS 1.4 million, the sum of ILS 120,000 that the defendant was obligated to pay for the items he purchased.  Hence, the result is that the plaintiff's absence of protest against the abandonment of the items, and the absence of a demand in the minutes to remove them, as required in the minutes to remove objects from the parking lot, should be regarded as waiving his right under the sale agreement to view the leaving of the movables as a breach of the agreement, and also waived his right to demand indemnification for eviction, and nothing more.  Therefore, the court rules that leaving movables in the apartment, at the time of delivery of possession, contrary to the letter of the plaintiff's attorney, should not be regarded as an offer and acceptance of the purchase of the remaining movables.
32. The plaintiff claimed in his summaries that he presented "a solid and coherent evidentiary system... Backed by real-time documents that are not hidden." However, in practice, the various testimonies on behalf of the plaintiff contradicted each other, such as regarding the date of the conclusion of the contract, and the correspondence from real time contradicted the claim of the conclusion of the contract. In addition, the plaintiff devoted paragraphs 23 to 31 to his summaries in order to indicate changes in the defendant's version during the course of the proceeding.  The court agrees that the defendant's version is also not orderly and consistent, to say the least.  However, the backlog shows that both parties confirm that negotiations took place regarding the purchase of furniture by the defendant, but the plaintiff failed to prove, as his duty as a plaintiff, that the negotiations, which included the preparation of a draft with the amount of consideration that was not signed, and another draft that was not signed, without the amount of consideration, amounted to the conclusion of a contract by way of acceptance.  This is in view of the fact that the defendant received a draft without the amount of consideration and without a list of movables, and that the sale agreement explicitly negates the plaintiff's claim regarding the conclusion of an additional agreement to the sale agreement, i.e., an agreement for the sale of the furniture that the plaintiff left in the apartment, even though he undertook in the sale agreement to remove the furniture.  As if all this were not enough, the plaintiff highlighted in his summaries several times an allegation of a "handshake" that was born during his testimony.  In light of all of the above, the court rejects the claim to enforce an unsigned contract for the sale of furniture, including those that were actually left in the apartment.

Should "gentleman's consent" be enforced?

33. The defendant argued in the statement of defense that the lawsuit was dismissed in limine because it was based on a "gentleman's consent", according to the plaintiff, and not on a binding legal contract , while referring to the claim in the statement of claim that the draft was part of a "gentleman's agreement" between the parties, which was ostensibly not signed, where the parties waited for the sale agreement to be perfected. In other words, he argued, according to the plaintiff, the draft, which was not signed, was not a contractual agreement, but rather a "gentleman's consent", which, as is well known, does not constitute a binding contract, and is not legally enforceable.
34. The court ruled that the plaintiff's claim regarding "gentleman's consent", which contradicts the content of the sale agreement, which the parties were waiting for its approval, and the plaintiff's declaration to the real estate taxation authorities when he signed the sale agreement, also contradicts the claim that a binding agreement was entered into and cannot live with it in tandem, and the very fact that it was brought up constitutes a contradictory version of the claim that a binding contract was concluded with a supposedly handshake, according to his suppressed version at the time of his testimony.

The lawsuit was filed with delay

35. The defendant argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed out of hand because it was tainted by bad faith, delay and abuse of court proceedings, and that the plaintiff was trying to get rich at his own expense and receive a sum of ILS 120,000 for old and damaged objects, which he explicitly announced in writing that he did not want. He further argued that the plaintiff's lack of good faith must be added to the long delay in filing the claim, which the plaintiff is trying to excuse and attribute to the "iron sword" war that began on October 7, 2023, despite the fact that the plaintiff himself attaches correspondence between the parties' counsel dated October 8, 2023, October 10, 2023, and a delivery protocol dated October 12, 2023. The plaintiff claimed in his summaries that he was under enormous mental and physical pressure due to the complex move, and therefore he was prevented from "dealing with those difficult days...  In a man who has broken his promises." However, he did not find a response to the plaintiff's letter from December and filed the claim about a year and a half after the possession was delivered.  The plaintiff claimed in paragraph 18 of his summaries that the defendant did not complain after receiving possession about leaving the furniture in the apartment and did not demand evacuation, including not in his letter from December 2023.  He also claimed in paragraph 19 of his summaries that the defendant testified that he did not send a demand for the removal of the movables, while in paragraph 70 of his statement of defense he claimed that he sent many requests for the disposal of the belongings after receiving possession.  As stated above, the court agrees that the defendant's version is also not free of inaccuracies, but it was expected that the plaintiff would sit immediately after the delivery of the presumption that the defendant had not yet paid him the consideration that was supposedly agreed, and would certainly respond to the defendant's request in December 2023, even if it did not refer to the furniture that was left, to which the defendant owed ILS 120,000 in accordance with that alleged consent.
36. The court ruled that there is no justification for rejecting the claim solely because of the delay, but the delay in filing the claim should be seen as reinforcing the conclusion that the claim that a contract was entered into should be rejected.

The court rejects the claim that a contract for the sale of furniture was entered into

37. In view of all of the above, the court rejects the argument that a contract was entered into in which the plaintiff sold furniture to the defendant.

Should the defendant be obligated to pay for a breach of the duty to conduct negotiations in good faith?

38. Alongside the request to enforce a contract by virtue of the Contracts and Remedies Law and to be charged by virtue of section 39 of the Contracts Law (General Part) 5731-1970 (hereinafter: "the Contracts Law, General Part"), the acceptance of which requires recognition of the conclusion of a contract, and the court rejected the claim that a contract had been made, the plaintiff argued in paragraph 33 of his summaries that the defendant should be obligated for a breach of the duty of good faith to conduct negotiations by virtue of section 12 The Contracts Law has a general section. The plaintiff did not specify what type of compensation he was referring to, existential compensation or reliance compensation. With regard to subsistence compensation, it has already been determined in other municipal applications 6370/00 Cal Building v.  R.M.  (published in Nevo) that the court will grant subsistence compensation relief only in exceptional cases, and the court did not find in this proceeding, in view of the plaintiff's conduct, justification for determining subsistence compensation, even if it had determined that the defendant had negotiated in bad faith and he did not do so.  With regard to reliance damages, even if the court had determined that the defendant had conducted negotiations in bad faith, and it did not rule so, the plaintiff did not bring evidence regarding the amount of compensation for his reliance on the negotiations.

Should the defendant be obligated by virtue of unjust enrichment?

39. In addition to the claim that a contract had been made, the plaintiff claimed in the statement of claim that the defendant had enriched himself and not at trial, and that he had received movables worth hundreds of thousands of shekels without paying for them. However, the plaintiff did not provide an appraiser's opinion, and did not know how to explain in his interrogation why he did not submit an opinion. The plaintiff claimed in paragraph 21 of his summaries that there was no need to submit an appraiser's opinion on his behalf, since the amount was determined "by explicit consent".  However, the court rejected the claim that a contract had been made.  In addition, the defendant claimed, and rightly so, in his summaries, that there is difficulty for the plaintiff to demand, on the one hand, the sum of ILS 120,000, and on the other hand, to inform the defendant that if he does not announce that he is interested in the furniture, they will "donate/sell/throw away." Therefore, the court dismisses the claim for the additional ground, according to the Unjust Enrichment Law, 5739-1979, in the absence of essential and necessary evidence regarding the value of the movables left in the apartment.

Should the defendant be obligated by virtue of the Guards Law?

40. In his summaries, the plaintiff raised a new argument according to which the defendant should be obligated by virtue of the Guards Law, 5727-1967. The argument constitutes an extension of the front and therefore the court rejects it. However, even in her body, there is no substance in her.  According to the sale agreement, the plaintiff was supposed to remove the movables, but he chose to violate the sale agreement, even though he was warned by the defendant's attorney that he was in breach of the sale agreement, and to leave them in the apartment, in order to try to force the defendant to sign an agreement according to an unsigned draft.  Therefore, there is no place to view the defendant, in these circumstances, as a guardian of the movables.  The claim that the defendant did not give the plaintiff an opportunity to remove the movables is inconsistent with the evidence, according to which the defendant demanded several times before receiving possession to remove the movables, but the plaintiff insisted on leaving them in the apartment, and even after the possession was delivered, he did not raise any claim both with regard to a desire to receive the movables that he deliberately left in the apartment despite being warned that he was in breach of the sale agreement, and with regard to a demand for payment for the alleged sale of the movables.

The daughter's share

41. The defendant claimed in the statement of defense that even according to the plaintiff's denied position, he holds half of the rights in the "movables", since there is no dispute that even according to the draft drafted by the plaintiff, while his wife was still alive, she is registered as a seller and owns half of the rights claimed. Accordingly, he argued, the plaintiff had a claim in the sum of ILS 60,000 at most, even according to his method, while the claim was filed on behalf of the plaintiff only for ILS 120,000. After the evidence was submitted, the defendant attached evidence regarding his right to sue also on behalf of his daughter, who inherited the rights of the deceased with him.  The court did not find that this argument of the defendant should be addressed, since in any case it dismisses the claim in its entirety.

The court dismisses the lawsuit

42. In light of all of the above, the court dismisses the claim in its entirety.

Discussion of expenses

43. Since the court rejected the claim in its entirety, it must obligate the plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney's fees. The court takes into account the amount of the claim, the fact that only two hearings were held, and three witnesses were cross-examined by the defendant, and that the defendant's version was also not orderly and consistent, even if this did not lead to the acceptance of the claim, due to material failures in the claim.  Therefore, the court obligates the plaintiff to pay the defendant his attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 17,700 only.

Conclusion

44. The court dismisses the lawsuit.
45. The court obligates the plaintiff to pay the defendant his attorney's fees in the sum of ILS 17,700, plus ILS interest, from the date of the judgment until the date of the actual full payment.

Given today, July 08, 2026, in the absence of the parties.