In our case, I do not believe that there is a determination that the Civil Service Commission Concentrate The committee's work in order to indicate an intention to grant the commissioner substantial more powers than the other members of the committee (compare to the House High Judgment for Justice 1711/24 The Movement for Quality Government v. Minister of Justice, paragraphs 1-2 of the judge's judgment A. Grosskopf [Nevo] (8.9.2024)). In this context, and subject to what is stated in section 59 below, I accept the judge's position שטיין, in the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing, according to which in the circumstances of the case before us, the Commissioner's standing at the head of the committee grants him only procedural auxiliary powers (paragraph 12 of his judgment).
- Thus, I accept the position that the concentration of the committee's work naturally and simply entails authorization to carry out technical-procedural actions, such as determining the order of the hearing, determining the dates of meetings, their location, assistance in drafting the committee's decisions, and more (in this regard, compare, for example, sections 4.b, 6.a, and 8.a of the Commissioner's directive; sections 5.c, 7.a, and 9.a of the updated directive). In contrast, there is difficulty in reading into the word "concentrate" an authorization to conduct an examination procedure Substantial, at the end of which a minister's request is rejected out of hand without the committee convening, in contrast to the other clauses of Resolution 4062, which indicate that agreements are given to the committee as a whole, as stated.
- To complete the picture, and although it seems that this argument has been abandoned by the Applicants, I will add and briefly note that I do not believe that the Commissioner's directive even grants the Commissioner the authority not to convene the Committee. In this context, it should be emphasized that the Commissioner's directive is on a lower normative scale in relation to the government's decisions, and therefore it is clear that it does not in itself substantially change the arrangement set out in Resolution 4062, which granted the authority to consider the Minister's request to the Committee as a whole. Beyond that, the Commissioner's directive in itself deals mainly with In the Appointment Process of the senior officer, and does not include a detailed regulation of the process of termination of office. In any event, even if the directive could be seen as a guiding source for our case, it does not include a clear provision anchoring the commissioner's authority. Thus, and even with respect to an appointment process, where the commissioner believes that there is a legal impediment, the final decision on the matter is made by the committee itself (see section 6.b of the Commissioner's Directive; section 7.b of the updated Directive).
- [In a parenthetical article, with regard to the status of the position of a committee of the type of the Appointments Committee, the case law held that "its opinion submitted to the government [...] is of particularly great weight, 'almost decisive'" (High Court of Justice 5657/09 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, paragraph 48To the judge's judgment A. Procaccia [Nevo] (November 24,2009)). However, this ruling relates to the committee's authority when its opinion is requested regarding an appointment; whereas the wording of Resolution 4062 implies that, contrary to this, termination of office will not be made "but according to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments" (emphasis added - 10; and it should be noted that in accordance with Resolution 1148, the relevant committee for our matter is the Appointments Committee). In these circumstances, in which the argument that the power to dismiss is contingent on the recommendation of the committee may be heard, it is even more appropriate that the committee as a whole be required to comply with the request of the Minister, and not by the Commissioner alone. However, this issue has not been fully clarified, and I do not see that it should be put in place].
- In view of the aforesaid, the obvious conclusion is that the government's decision granted the authority to consider the minister's application to the committee as a whole. In any event, there is no source of authority that authorizes the commissioner to refrain from convening the committee and to determine, alone, that the minister's request does not establish a factual basis, even prima facie.
I will note that for the purpose of the hearing before us, I am not required to rule on distant extreme cases in which, for example, a request is completely laconic or lacks any detail or reasoning (it should be noted that this issue was permitted by the judge to review the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing Elron). In such extreme cases, it may be argued that the Minister's request should not be regarded as a "request" at all for the purposes of section 4.d(1) of Resolution 4062, in a manner whereby - in practice - the Commissioner is not required to convene the Committee. In any event, and since these circumstances are not required for our case, I do not find it necessary to elaborate further on this issue and will leave the decision on it for the time being.
- The conclusion of this part is that there is no provision in the law granting the Commissioner the substantive authority to choose whether or not to convene the Appointments Committee at the request of a Minister. In this sense, I mainly accept the majority opinion in the judgment that is the subject of further discussion. However, as I have already noted, this is not the end of our discussion. The lack of the Commissioner's authority to conduct, alone, a preliminary examination of the Minister's application, does not mean that such a preliminary examination cannot take place at all. In my opinion, the answer to the weighty concerns raised by the Applicants lies on another level - within the authority of the Appointments Committee itself. I will now turn to this.
Preliminary Procedure in the Appointments Committee
- As stated, the focus of the applicants' approach is the argument that the majority opinion in the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing did not give adequate weight to the need to ensure that the procedures for terminating the term of office of senior officers - in particular those who hold enforcement powers and are required to exercise independent discretion - are not abused or used arbitrarily. In this context, it was emphasized that the existence of a preliminary examination process by the Civil Service Commissioner is required in order to prevent a "chilling effect" among senior officers in the public service, which may arise if it is possible to easily initiate termination proceedings even in cases in which the Minister's request does not meet the "threshold conditions" at all. Although, as stated, this does not establish an independent source of authority for the Commissioner not to convene the Committee, I am of the opinion that the existing law allows the Appointments Committee to provide a response, even if partially, to the aforesaid concerns.
- In our case, it is impossible to dispute the great public importance inherent in maintaining the independence and professionalism of senior officers in the public service, who act as the trustee of the public (High Court of Justice 154/98 The New General Workers' Union v. State of Israel, IsrSC 52(5) 111,118-119 (1998); High Court of Justice 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 45(1) 28,33 (1990)). This is all the more so where we are dealing with positions with regulatory-enforcement powers as in our case, which by their very nature require that their holders act in a professional, impartial manner and independent of political influence. In this context, it is not superfluous to reiterate that in Resolution 345 the Government determined that with regard to the position of Competition Commissioner, the implementation of the policy of the Minister and the Government is not the dominant characteristic of the position. This classification is necessary in view of the fact that in the course of the performance of its duties "the Commissioner decides to open a criminal investigation and the Competition Authority conducts these criminal proceedings as a prosecutor's body; the Director-General imposes financial sanctions; the Director-General approves mergers and restrictive arrangements, etc." (paragraph 10 to complete the Applicants' argument of May 15,2026). These powers highlight the clear need to ensure that the termination proceedings are not used as a tool by the Minister in order to impose his policy, while improperly interfering in decisions that are supposed to be made by the Director-General independently.
- It should be emphasized that this Court reiterated the vital need to ensure the independent activity of the various law enforcement agencies, while minimizing the fear that political considerations will penetrate the manner in which they exercise their powers. This was only recently clarified In a High Court of Justice case 8987/22 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset [Nevo] (January 2,2025), in which the relationship between the Minister of National Security and the Israel Police was discussed. In this regard, it was clarified, inter alia, that:
"The danger of mobilizing police force for political interests is considerably more serious and powerful than that of other bodies in the executive branch. First and foremost, political use of the powers of the police severely and significantly harms the rule of law, and the principle that all individuals are equal before the law. For example, politicization of the police may lead to the use of criminal enforcement powers to promote partisan interests or to over-enforcing a group that opposes the government; it may lead to over-policing or under-policing of groups according to their religious, national, or ethnic affiliation; it may lead to the use of criminal investigation tools, with its harmful consequences, against political opponents. It is clear that this danger undermines the most basic foundations of democracy, and it undermines the very foundations of the 'social contract, ' in which the individual entrusts the government with a power that has the potential to be severely harmed, inter alia, with the aim that the government will grant him equal protection. This also entails a severe violation of human rights" (ibid., at paragraph 112).