(1) the existence of a clear incompatibility with the position;
(2) The existence of an acute and ongoing crisis of confidence, or the existence of substantial and prolonged disagreements between the senior officer and his superiors, which create a situation that prevents efficient and proper functioning" (ibid., in section 4.b).
- In addition, Resolution 4062 also anchored provisions regarding the committee's work procedures:
"The committee will determine its work procedures, subject to the following:
1) The request for the Committee's opinion regarding the termination of the term of office of an officer pursuant to this decision shall be submitted to the Committee in writing by the Minister or the Director General of whose office the position is a member, detailing the relevant factual basis, and the reasons for the request, together with the documents supporting the application, if any.
2) The committee will formulate its position after it has given the officer whose matter is being discussed an opportunity to speak before it, in writing or orally, and will submit its reasoned written recommendation to the minister and the officer.
3) The Civil Service Commission will coordinate the work of the committee" (ibid., in section 4.d).
- To complete the picture, in addition to the aforementioned government decisions, it is also necessary to briefly mention the Civil Service Commissioner's Directive 1.3 "Procedure for the Work of the Appointments Committee" (January 1,2019) (hereinafter: The Commissioner's Directive). The Commissioner's Directive establishes rules regarding the activities of the Appointments Committee and details the Committee's work process in all its stages and its work procedures. Among other things, Section 2 of the Commissioner's Directive deals with a minister's proposal for the appointment of a candidate; Section 3 regulates the procedure for obtaining an opinion from the Legal Counsel of the Civil Service Commission to the extent that there are grounds for disqualifying the candidate; and Section 6 states that the Commissioner, as chairman of the Committee, will determine its work procedures if they have not been determined, and that the Committee is required to examine the candidate's qualifications and suitability for the position. It should already be noted that on December 25,2025, following the issuance of the judgment that is the subject of the additional hearing, the Commissioner's Directive was updated (hereinafter: Updated Directive). Among other things, clause 1.b of the Commissioner's directive, which stated that "these are the positions that the government has decided to exempt from the obligation of a tender and which require the recommendation of the Appointments Committee" was changed so that it now states that "Appointment for the next positions that the government has decided to exempt from the obligation of a tender and which require the recommendation of the Appointments Committee will be carried out in accordance with this procedure[emphases added - 10]. In addition, various provisions were added regarding the obligation to maintain adequate representation (sections 3 and 12 of the updated directive).
- In summary, the Competition Commissioner is one of those senior positions in the civil service that, due to their unique characteristics and the need to ensure the independence of their owners, a special arrangement has been established with respect to the appointment process and termination of the term of office holders. As stated, this arrangement stipulates that the appointment of the Competition Commissioner will be made in accordance with the recommendation of a search committee and a government decision; that her term of office is limited to six years, with no possibility of extension; and that to the extent that it is requested to terminate her term of office during the fixed period, it is possible to do so only by virtue of limited and defined grounds, and only in accordance with the recommendation of the Appointments Committee, accompanied by legal advice.
- In order that the picture is not lacking, at the end of this section it is appropriate to discuss, if only in general terms, the nature and special status of the position of the Competition Commissioner (an issue that in itself is not in dispute between the parties). The Competition Commissioner stands at the head of the Competition Authority and serves as a central regulator in protecting the Israeli economy and the consumer. At the core of the Authority's role (and that of its head) is the promotion and protection of free competition in the economy (Civil Appeal 8709/23 Central Beverage Distribution Company Ltd. v. Competition Commissioner, paragraph 31 [Nevo] (9.3.2026); Criminal Appeal 2299/24 State of Israel v. Mor, paragraphs 13-16 [Nevo] (4.2.2025); Civil Appeal 8387/20 Ashdod Port Company Ltd. v. Competition Commissioner, paragraphs 49-50 [Nevo] (8.1.2024)).
Thus, in a nutshell, the authority is responsible for enforcing The Economic Competition Law and the Law for the Promotion of Competition in the Food and Pharma Industries, 5774-2014. By virtue of this role, the Competition Commissioner has unique and exclusive statutory powers. At the same time, on the criminal level, it is authorized to open investigations, file indictments, and conduct criminal proceedings for violations of legal provisions in this field (see, for example, Section 46 Law Economic Competition); On the administrative level, it has significant enforcement powers, including imposing financial sanctions on corporations that can reach a sum of over ILS 100 million (Section 50D to the Economic Competition Law) and the declaration of monopolies and concentration groups (Sections 26 and31B to the Economic Competition Law). In addition to the criminal and administrative enforcement powers, the Commissioner also has extensive regulatory powers, including the power to approve mergers (Section 19 Law Economic Competition), to give instructions to monopoly owners (Section 30 to the Economic Competition Law), to grant exemptions to restrictive arrangements (Section 14 to the Economic Competition Law) and to require data for the purpose of supervision and enforcement. Moreover, in addition to the Director-General's hat in the field of enforcement and regulation, the Commissioner also has an advisory hat - and in doing so, she advises government ministries regarding the possible competitive implications of their moves, has the authority to conduct research, and serves as the Chair of the Committee for the Reduction of Concentration and as an advisory body to the government.