[...]
The Committee may recommend the termination of the Employment within the term of office allotted to the position or during the period of the Employment Officer, if it is proven to its satisfaction that one of the following exists:
(1) the existence of a clear incompatibility with the position;
(2) The existence of a severe and ongoing crisis of confidence, or the existence of substantial and protracted disagreements between the senior officer and his superiors, which create a situation that prevents efficient and proper functioning.
[...]
The committee will determine its work procedures, subject to the following:
1) The request for the Committee's opinion regarding the termination of the term of office of an officer pursuant to this decision shall be submitted to the Committee in writing by the Minister or the Director General of whose office the position is a member, detailing the relevant factual basis, and the reasons for the request, together with the documents supporting the application, if any.
2) The committee will formulate its position after it has given the officer whose matter is being discussed an opportunity to speak before it, in writing or orally, and will submit its reasoned written recommendation to the minister and the officer.
3) The Civil Service Commission will coordinate the work of the committee" [emphasis added].
- Our eyes see that the language of Resolution 4062 explicitly authorizes the The Committee as a Whole, all of its members must accept the Minister's request, which includes details of the relevant factual basis and the reasons for the request; formulate its position; and finally submit its recommendation, after hearing the relevant officer. In this sense, the argument that the Commissioner in itself has independent authority to reject the Minister's request in limine and without convening the Committee does not have a basis in the language of Resolution 4062 [In parentheses, it should be noted that this conclusion stands out in comparison to other arrangements that apply in relation to the activities of other advisory committees. In this context, compare, for example, Procedure 1.14.0001 of the Population and Immigration Authority: "The Procedure for Regulating the Work of the Professional Committee Advisory to the Minister in accordance with Go' 7 Law Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) 588"II 2022" (December 30,2024). The procedure deals with a professional committee whose role is to examine special humanitarian reasons in requests for residence permits and to recommend them to the Minister of the Interior, and it grants explicit authority to the committee coordinator to reject applications in limine without transferring them to the committee for discussion (see section 2.e. of the procedure); As to the scope of the committee's supervisor's authority to reject applications in limine, see: 77"m 2357/14 Ashbrook v. Ministry of the Interior [Nevo] (19.3.2015)].
- Against this background, the applicants' position that the commissioner has the authority not to convene the committee sought to be constructed throughout the stages of the proceeding from two possible sources of authority: first, it argued that the convening of the committee by the commissioner is an administrative decision in itself, and as such, it must be based on a proper factual basis; and second, section 4.d(3) of Resolution 4062, which states that the Civil Service Commission Concentrate the work of the committee. As will be detailed below, I do not believe that these arguments are sufficient to establish the position that the commissioner has the authority to prevent the convening of the committee on the request submitted by the minister.
- I will begin with the argument that the convening of the committee constitutes an administrative decision that requires a proper factual basis, and therefore, if it is found that there is no factual basis for the minister's request for termination of office, the commissioner may not convene the committee.
I do not believe that the requirement for a proper factual basis can in itself confer an independent source of authority, and in fact, this argument assumes to a large extent what is sought. Indeed, the foundation of the institution is in our administrative law that every administrative decision must be based on a factual basis that is appropriate to its nature and characteristics (see: High Court of Justice 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of CommunicationsIsrSC 48(5) 412,423 (1994); High Court of Justice 297/82 Berger v. Minister of the InteriorIsrSC 37(3) 29,50-48 (1983)). Accordingly, as is well known, the absence of a factual basis may sometimes establish an independent ground for judicial intervention (see, for example: High Court of Justice 58681-11-25 Israel Bar Association v. Minister of Justice, paragraph 7 of my judgment [Nevo] (3.12.2025); High Court of Justice 8647/22 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Security, paragraphs 81-82 [Nevo] (18.9.2025); High Court of Justice 6745/19 Luvton v. Military Advocate General, paragraphs 63 and 80 of the President's judgment A. Hayut and the judge's judgment Solberg [Nevo] (14.3.2022); High Court of Justice 635/95 Hadarim Taxis Service Rehovot K. Ekron Mazkeret Batya Ltd. v. Minister of Transportation, IsrSC 51(5) 723,747-748 (1997)). However, this requirement relates to the stage of the proper administrative process (see: Barak-Erez Administrative Law, at pp. 261-263) - does not replace the first stage in examining any administrative decision - the stage of authority.