Caselaw

High Court of Justice 41953-07-26 Free Israel v. Knesset - part 14

September 3, 2026
Print

Thus, according to the assessment of military officials, as of May 10,2026, there were about 73,664 ultra-Orthodox conscripts who had not regularized their status.  Greatly reduced estimate In relation to the actual situation (since the number of non-ultra-Orthodox dodgers does not relate to the current situation, but rather to the total number of non-ultra-Orthodox dodgers "Throughout the decades of the state's existence"and the number of ultra-Orthodox defined as dodgers is expected to increase greatly in the near future), which is about 80% of the total number of dodgers.

  1. These figures were brought only in order to shed light on the following data, regarding the scope of the arrests, in their proper light. Therefore, according to what is stated in the aforementioned update notice, from January 16,2026 to June 11,2026,165 conscripts who were declared deserters or evaders as a result of arrests initiated by the Military Police were arrested; of these, 16 are members of the ultra-Orthodox public (i.e., less than 10%).  In addition, during this period, 81 deserters and evaders were detained by the Israel Police during a random encounter and transferred to the Military Police for further detention; Seventeen deserters and evaders from IPS custody were transferred to the custody of the Military Police, due to their involvement in disturbing the peace (regarding the last two figures, it was not explicitly stated that these were deserters and evaders from the ultra-Orthodox public, but it seems to me that the context indicates this).  In addition, of the 333 IDPs who were declared to be evaders and arrested at the border crossings between January 1,2025 and May 10,2026,105 are members of the ultra-Orthodox public (i.e., less than 30%).
  2. Thus, in total, during the aforementioned period, we are talking about 219 ultra-Orthodox conscripts who were arrested - andit is not impossible that they were "released a few days after their arrest, with great fanfare" (High Court of Justice 5819/24, para. 52) - so that we are dealing with only 0.3% of the total number of ultra-Orthodox conscripts who were declared evaders or in whose case an order was issued (in order to explain the situation, The corresponding rate among the non-Haredi population is almost 7 times higher, when the number of evaders in relation to this population has been since the establishment of the state, so that in fact the gap relative to the relevant period is immeasurably high).
  3. We find that the bottom line is that the scope of the arrests - both in absolute numbers, as a proportion of the total number of evaders from the ultra-Orthodox community, and in relation to the general population - is very low; perhaps even negligible. Despite the public relations with the arrests, and despite the firm statements of the lawbreakers, the data show that in practice, the actual situation is completely different.  Thus, in view of the above, I find it difficult to see how that very low rate of enforcement proceedings does indeed create a 'pressing social need', one that may justify, even prima facie and primitive, an injury of the kind we are dealing with.  It can be argued, even though it seems to me that this has not been done, that even if the true scope of the enforcement proceedings is not high, it is the very concern that they exist that establishes that pressing social need, since it is capable of 'threatening', at least on the declarative level, the recognition of the importance of Torah study.  Is it possible to accept this approach, even if it is not supported, even if it is not basic, with a factual basis? I doubt it.  In any event, given my decision on the level of the content of the purpose, as detailed above, I see no need to elaborate on this.
  4. Before concluding the discussion on the question of proper purpose, I will note that both in the response on behalf of the Cabinet Secretary and in the request to join on behalf of the association "Truth to Yaakov in Israel, " it was argued that the amendment was necessary in order to prevent "a decline in the number of ultra-Orthodox enlistees in the IDF." Similar arguments were also raised in the framework of the legislative process, during the discussions in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. As for myself, I am of the opinion that if it was possible to establish that this was indeed the purpose of the amendment (despite the explicit language of the purpose clause, as detailed above), and that there was a significant decrease in the number of ultra-Orthodox recruits as a result of the existing enforcement policy, then against the background of the security situation and the urgent need to increase the number of soldiers in the IDF, as well as the desire not to harm the integration processes, it is possible that this was a proper purpose (of course, this does not say anything, one way or another, regarding the proportionality tests).
  5. The problem is that this argument was not properly substantiated, and in fact, it was not supported by any factual basis or data. I do not diminish the importance of the words of those who are engaged in the work of integrating members of the ultra-Orthodox public into the IDF from within the ultra-Orthodox society itself, but general statements, which are not supported by data, are not sufficient to overcome the position of the professional authority in charge of conscription, i.e., the IDF, whose position is that these are effective and necessary enforcement tools.  It seems to me that the entire aforementioned discussion illustrates, once again, the great importance of supporting claims based on factual assumptions on a factual-empirical basis, for the purpose of holding an appropriate legal hearing; This is the case in general, and in particular in public and constitutional law, where litigation often suffers from this aspect (see, for example: Netta Barak-Koren, "Empirical Tools in Constitutional Law, " Mishpat on Site 19 (2024); Dafna Barak-Erez, "Public Law and Empirical Data: In Those Days and Now, " Mishpat on Site 19 (2024); High Court of Justice 8298/22 Public Defender's Office v.  Attorney General, para.  89 [Nevo] (August 31,2025)).
  6. Interim summary: The concrete purpose of the amendment, as it emerges from its explicit language, is "to freeze the detention of yeshiva students whose Torah is their art." This purpose raises considerable difficulty, and does not meet the test of proper purpose. Therefore, at least according to the "track" of the concrete purpose, it is possible to stop the analysis at this stage, and to determine that the amendment is unconstitutional, since it does not meet the conditions of the limitation clause.

According to the "trajectory" of the abstract purpose, does a different result be obtained? As I will show below, I would even analyze the correction according to its abstract purpose only - i.e., "Recognition of the Importance of Torah Study" - Therefore, he determines that we are dealing with a proper purpose in the circumstances of the case, yet the amendment in question does not pass the tests of proportionality.  I will proceed to discuss this.

Previous part1...1314
15...28Next part
Skip to content