The letter also stated, with reference to a component of the arrangement that includes the examination committee - as recalled, the Chief of Staff is the one who is required to establish it according to the arrangement - that "It is inconceivable that the military system under my leadership, which demands unprecedented sacrifice from its servants, will simultaneously sign off on the granting of mass exemptions from prosecution. Such a move will create a deep rift in the face of the conscripts, who have been bearing the brunt of the fighting for the past two and a half years, and will increase inequality.". What's more, the IDF "There is no relative advantage" In examining the criteria set out in the amendment, and"Imposing this complex and controversial task on the IDF in the coming months will constitute a heavy organizational burden, and will divert critical command attention from operational missions.".
- After all this, and after the Knesset Committee discussed the claim of a 'new issue' - and rejected it - the amendment was approved by the committee for a second and third reading, and subsequently, on July 14,2026, the bill was passed in the plenum and entered the statute book.
Hence the petitions before us.
The main arguments and the proceeding at hand
- The arguments of the petitioners, who believe that the amendment is unconstitutional, are divided into two main heads: arguments on the procedural level, according to which there was a serious flaw in the process of enacting the amendment, which justifies its disqualification; and arguments on the substantive level, according to which the amendment violates constitutional rights, with an emphasis on the right to equality, in a manner that is inconsistent with the provisions of the limitation clause in section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
- I will begin on the procedural level. The starting point for the petitioners' arguments in this aspect, is the gap between the bill in respect of which the law of continuity was applied, and the amendment that was enacted. Thus, "the original bill that was approved in the first reading established a comprehensive arrangement for the recruitment of yeshiva students and for regulating their status. The original bill did not deal at all with the question of how the law enforcement systems would operate vis-à-vis those who are obligated to enlist and evade it. And in fact, with the exception of the definitions clause, no clause of the bill that was approved in the first reading was discussed at all as part of the wording of the bill circulated by the chairman of the committee for discussion, and on the contrary, all the clauses in the chairman's proposal did not exist in the version that was approved for the first reading."
- Based on this starting point, the petitioners argue that in practice, the amendment was not passed in three readings at all. Thus, given that "the amendment that was brought before the Knesset for the second and third readings is not only different, its purpose is opposite and has no substantial similarity, linguistic or otherwise, to the government bill that was approved in the first reading" - according to the Knesset Regulations, it should have been reapproved in the first or preliminary reading, like any other bill, and it could not be seen as a continuation of the bill that was approved in the first reading. In this context, it was emphasized that the ratification of a law that was passed in such a proceeding is liable to have particularly severe broad implications, since it would in effect empty of "the obligation to vote on legislation in the first reading, and the public debate that accompanies it." In fact, this will enable - and even incentivize - "to bring to the first reading a variety of superficial bills that are devoid of real content, on a variety of issues, as 'keepers of place' immediately at the beginning of the first Knesset session of each term, or even to apply the law of continuity to all the bills that were raised in the previous Knesset. This is based on the knowledge that at any stage of the Knesset's term - even two, three or four years after the bill is approved in the first reading - its members will be able [...] to replace the 'Keeper of the Place' bill with a bill that intends to advance at lightning speed directly to the second and third readings."
- From another point to that point, the petitioners argue that given that the wording discussed by the committee is not the product of government staff work, nor of the work of the committee itself, but rather that it was put forward by the chairman of the committee in isolation from the legislative proceedings that preceded it in the committee, it is in fact a private bill by MK Bismuth. The problem is that according to the Knesset Regulations, as opposed to a government bill, a private bill is required to pass approval in a preliminary reading, as well as a process of preparation for the first reading, when this is "the stage at which the substantive, principled discussion of the core arrangements of the legislation takes place." The amendment in question did not pass these stages as required, and for this reason, it is also argued, it is doomed to be disqualified.
- It was further argued from the procedural aspect that the very decision to apply the law of continuity in the circumstances of the case creates a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding; this, in essence, is based on the position of the legal advisor to the government in this context, as noted above. It was also argued that despite the position of the legal counsel to the Knesset, as presented at the top of the legislative process, the flaws in the decision to apply the law of continuity were not adequately addressed later in the proceeding.
- On the substantive level, it was argued that the amendment leads to a severe violation of the constitutional right to equality. This is both because it violates equality in the burden of military service, as is evident from the ruling of this Court on the issue - an infringement that is even more pronounced, in light of the long war in which the state is finded, and its many and severe consequences for those serving in the IDF and their families; and because of the violation of the principle of equality before the law, and the inherent discrimination that the amendment creates in the enforcement of criminal law, based on the "religious-sectoral" distinction. It was also argued that the amendment violates the rule of law, in its most basic sense, since it "does not change the criminal norm, it does not establish an exemption from conscription, but rather determines that the law is not enforceable against a certain population group." Thus, "the fact that a conscription obligator can enter a police station and declare that he is breaking the law, while the enforcement authorities will be prevented from enforcing the law against him, is a situation that fatally violates the validity of the law as a whole." It was further argued that the amendment also violates other rights of the "serving public": the right to freedom of occupation, the right to liberty, and the right to life and bodily integrity.
- Subsequently, it was argued that the harm created by the amendment does not meet the criteria of the limitation clause. On this level, it was argued that the purpose of the amendment is improper, since even if the value of recognizing the importance of Torah study was recognized in the past as a proper purpose in the context of the recruitment of yeshiva students, it was only "alongside and in accordance with other values that the wording of the bill is intended to promote and protect - first and foremost the value of equality and the reduction of inequality in bearing the burden of service." In the absence of an appropriate balance with the other purposes that were recognized as relevant in this context, the purpose of the amendment cannot be seen as appropriate. Moreover, given that the entire function of the amendment is to provide sweeping group immunity from criminal enforcement, it is possible to doubt whether recognition of the importance of Torah study is indeed its true purpose.
- In addition, the petitioners argued that the amendment does not meet the tests of proportionality. In this context, it was emphasized, inter alia, that "the amendment to the law encourages those who are obligated to conscript not to comply with the law, as it guarantees them an exemption in advance"; that there is a considerable difficulty in the fact that the amendment suffices with a written declaration only, and does not require reporting to the recruitment authorities, as was customary in previous recruitment arrangements; that the amendment does not allow for a practical distinction between those who are indeed yeshiva students who do not work, as required by the amendment, and those who are not; that it does not include any sanction for a false declaration; that the supervision and control mechanisms established therein are not applicable and ineffective; that the amendment, which grants sweeping immunity from enforcement, refrains from taking more moderate but effective measures as well, such as "financial sanctions, administrative sanctions, effective digital supervision, or conditioning benefits on the fulfillment of the obligation to show up"; and that the damage to national security, the rule of law, and the principle of equality far outweighs the benefit of the amendment, to the extent that there is one.
- The position of the legal advisor to the government - as that of the petitioners. On the procedural level, it was argued that "there is no connection between the original bill to which the Knesset sought to apply the law of continuity, and the bill that was about to be voted on in the second and third readings. This is in fact a new and completely different proposal [...] Applying the law of continuity to the previous bill and using it as a 'legislative skeleton' for the purpose of circumventing the obligation to bring it to a vote in another reading (and perhaps in two additional readings), leads to the conclusion that there was a serious flaw in the legislative process that goes to the root of the proceeding." On the merits, it was argued in the reply affidavit that the law establishes a severe violation of the right to equality - both in the principle of equality before the law, and in the right to equality "of those who serve in the army". With regard to the latter infringement, it was noted - in addition to the arguments also raised by the petitioners, and detailed above - that it is of all the severity, against the background of the fact that the various enforcement measures that were taken, including "the activity to increase criminal enforcement and the use of the enforcement tools at the disposal of the army", were found to be "effective and significant, and together led to an increase in the number of enlisted members of the ultra-Orthodox public", so that the law directly harms the possibility of promoting equality in the burden of service. This is all the more so, taking into account that in parallel with the enactment of the amendment, Amendment No. 29 to the Defense Service Law was also enacted, which extended the length of service in certain positions to 32 months, instead of shortening the service to 30 months, as originally planned. This severe violation, it was argued, does not meet any of the tests of the limitation clause, and in particular is disproportionate.
- The position on behalf of the Legal Advisor noted that the Cabinet Secretary had been informed that the government and the Minister of Defense, who were responding to the petitions, would be able to receive separate representation in the petitions in order to protect the constitutionality of the amendment, but that the government had chosen to refrain from doing so, and accordingly also to present its position in the proceeding. However, the Cabinet Secretary requested to attach a response on behalf of the Government. The response noted, inter alia, that "the purpose of the temporary order passed by the Knesset for a short period of time until November 30 was to prevent civil war and a decline in the number of ultra-Orthodox enlistees in the IDF. This is according to clear indications from the bodies that actually recruit ultra-Orthodox fighters for the Hasmoneans and Netzah Yehuda, and from the heads of the ultra-Orthodox Hesder yeshivot, that random arrests of yeshiva students keep ultra-Orthodox recruits away from the [...] . It was further argued that the claim that "the arrests of yeshiva students who must be drafted are effective at some level and actually lead to an increase in the number of enlistments" was not proven; and that "reducing the burden on the IDF's combat system will come through ultra-Orthodox enlistment and not through the arrests of yeshiva students. Opposition to this temporary order harms the enlistment of members of the ultra-Orthodox community in the short and long term, and will lead, God forbid, to a rift in the people." In addition, various claims were raised against the Legal Advisor to the Government, claiming that until the expiration of Chapter C1 of the Law (as its previous version), "the Legal Advisor to the Government did not deal at all with the enforcement of the Defense Service Law on evaders from the general public and did not instruct the head of the Personnel Directorate to carry out arrest operations as he instructed him to do after the expiration of the law, " which raises "doubts regarding the sincerity of his arguments regarding equal enforcement procedures for those obligated to enlist."
- In the Knesset's position, the legislative process was presented in detail, in all its stages. Against the background of the course of the proceeding, the Knesset argues that there was a real flaw in the legislative process, which consists of "two intertwined components." The first component that formulates the defect relates to the fact that the amendment in question exceeds the scope of the subject matter of the original bill, and amounts to a "new subject, " as stated in section 85 of the Knesset Thus, "it is very difficult to say that the final version of the Temporary Provision Law deals with the subject of the original bill, and only makes changes to it in order to polish, amend or complete it"; This is because the wording that was placed on the committee's table is "completely different from the bill that the committee discussed throughout its deliberations", which is expressed, inter alia, in the fact that the main purpose of the original bill - promoting the integration of yeshiva students into the IDF and reducing inequality in this aspect - was abandoned, as well as the myriad of practical arrangements that were discussed in order to advance this purpose. The significance of this, it was argued, is that "the arrangement that was approved in the second and third readings was not brought to the Knesset for approval in the first reading. The process of enacting this law did not conform to the provisions of the bylaws, and in any case did not comply with the provisions of section 19 of the Basic Law: The Knesset."
- The second component that constitutes the flaw, according to the Knesset's position, is that the legislative process "did not meet the high standard required by the Knesset Legal Advisor's opinion prior to the vote on applying the law of continuity to the original bill and then to the vote on replacing the committee chairman." This, inter alia, took into account that the previous version was discussed for only about two weeks, replacing comprehensive outlines that had been discussed for several years, when "the core components of the arrangement that had been formulated in the committee up to that point in time were not included in it"; that the amendment does not take into account at all the significant change in circumstances that occurred after the outbreak of the war with regard to security needs, as well as the IDF's position, with regard to "the need for additional soldiers derived from the security situation", both regarding the "necessity of criminal enforcement against evaders"; and that it raises "very significant constitutional difficulties", such as those that lead to the conclusion that the arrangement "is unequal, unconstitutional, and unbalanced, since it effectively exempts a defined population group from complying with the provisions of the Defense Service Law, without anchoring ancillary arrangements intended to encourage enlistment in the IDF."
- Shortly before the oral hearing, several motions were submitted to join the hearing of the petitions as respondents. The more relevant request, in terms of the arguments raised therein, was submitted on behalf of the "Emet Le'Yaakov in Israel" association and Rabbi Jonathan Reiss, who presented themselves in their application as elements from within the ultra-Orthodox society who are interested in promoting the integration of members of the ultra-Orthodox community in the IDF. The motion argues that "the proposed law is proper, proportionate, and even a small amount that is insufficient." In the meantime, it was argued that the applicants' permission "has real indications" that the enforcement measures against those obligated to enlist, with an emphasis on the "wave of arrests, " do not advance - and even actually harm - the integration of yeshiva students into the IDF. This is in view, inter alia, in view of the damage to trust, the creation of a sense of alienation between the military authorities and the ultra-Orthodox conscripts, and the like. According to them, therefore, "the widespread use of detentions [...] strengthens the resistance, distances the moderate public, and harms the ultra-Orthodox conscription frameworks." It was further argued that this is only a temporary arrangement, which does not exempt yeshiva students from the very obligation to enlist, "leaves in place other civil and economic consequences, " and is intended to "prevent immediate harm to recruitment processes and future arrangements"; therefore, even if it violates constitutional rights, its harm is proportionate.
- On July 15,2026, my colleague, Judge Grosskopf, as a judge on duty, decided to issue an order nisi in the petitions, along with a temporary injunction, which freezes the entry into force of the amendment, until a different decision is issued. Subsequently, on July 28,2026, we held an oral hearing on the petitions, in which the parties essentially reiterated their written arguments. After the hearing, and after weighing the parties' arguments, an interim order was issued by the panel, according to which the law will not enter into effect, pending a decision on the petitions.
Discussion and Decision
- After review, I have come to the conclusion that the petitions are lawful - to be accepted; I will therefore suggest to my colleague that we make the order nisi absolute. Below I will explain the reasons for this. First, I will discuss the arguments in the legislative process, and examine whether the amendments made to the original bill, the one that passed in the first reading, deviate from the scope of its subject matter, and the implications of this deviation. Next, I will discuss the arguments on the merits of the amendment, and I will examine its provisions in accordance with the terms of the limitation clause.
Before I turn to the discussion of the various aspects of the amendment, 4 preliminary remarks:
- First, basic concepts: Judicial review of legislation that has been passed by the Knesset requires extreme caution and increased restraint. As is well known, "the court does not come to replace the legislature's considerations with its own. The court does not step into the legislator's shoes. It does not ask itself what means it would have chosen if it had been a member of the legislature. The court exercises judicial review. It examines the constitutionality of the law, not its wisdom. The question is not whether the law is good, effective, justified. The question is whether it is constitutional" (High Court of Justice 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 51(4) 367,386 (1997) (hereinafter: the Investment Managers Association case); High Court of Justice 35810-08-25 Union of Representatives v. Knesset of Israel, paragraph 34 of the judgment of my colleague, Justice Grosskopf [Nevo] (May 3,2026); High Court of Justice 8987/22 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset, paragraph 68 of the opinion of my colleague, Justice Willner [Nevo] (January 2,2025) (hereinafter: High Court of Justice 8987/22)). We are therefore required to approach the task "with reluctance and mercy, with moderation, with dignity" (HCJ 10042/16 Kwantinsky v. Knesset of Israel, para. 34 [Nevo] (August 6,2017) (hereinafter: the Kwantinsky case)). Further, I will emphasize that judicial review is carried out in accordance with the manner in which this Court has interpreted its authority to conduct constitutional review, as well as the way in which it has done so, for many years; It is clear, however, as we have pointed out many times in the past, that it is better that the issue, in all its parts, be regulated in the Basic Law: Legislation, which we all need - and it would be better to do so one hour earlier.
- Second, the amendment before us was enacted as a temporary provision that will be valid, 'on paper', until November 30,2026. However, as was known to all at the time of the law's enactment, since the matter was discussed in the committee (see, for example, the words of MK Yuli Edelstein, in Transcript No. 614 of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 25th Knesset 11-11 (June 30,2026)), in view of the provision of section 38 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, from a practical point of view, it will remain in effect for at least an additional 3 months after Election Day, which falls on October 27,2026. That is to say: We are dealing with a temporary arrangement, but it is expected to have a considerable period of application, which may even be further extended. A preliminary question, therefore, is whether, given the temporality of the amendment, we must withdraw our hands from dealing with its constitutionality.
- The answer to this is no. The case law held that even if the temporality of a particular provision may mitigate the harm it establishes, it should be given appropriate weight in the framework of the proportionality analysis, but it should not be said that "the very limitation of the validity of any legislative act - or in its definition as a 'temporary provision' - is sufficient to immunize the act of legislation from constitutional review" (High Court of Justice 24/01 Ressler v. Knesset of Israel, IsrSC 56(2) 699,713-714 (2002), and the references therein; see also: HCJ 8425/13 Eitan Israeli Immigration Policy v. Government of Israel, paragraphs 33-34 of the opinion of President Grunis [Nevo] (September 22,2014); High Court of Justice 2008/24 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset, the opinion of my colleague, Justice D. Barak-Erez [Nevo] (May 12,2024)).
- The rule, therefore, is that the degree of restraint in the exercise of judicial review of temporary legislation will, as a rule, be higher, and the scope of the intervention will be more limited, but this does not preclude the constitutional review itself (see also: High Court of Justice 7052/03 Adalah v. The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 61(2) 202, paragraph 118 of the judgment of Deputy President (ret.) Cheshin (2006) (hereinafter: High Court of Justice 7052/03); Daniel Stauber, Gaya Harari-Haight and Itay Bar-Siman-Tov, "Temporary Legislation in the Time of Corona, " Mishpat Ve-Mishmal 24,80-69 and 45 (2022); On the need for a careful examination of the proportionality tests with respect to temporary legislation as well, see: Itay Bar-Siman-Tov and Gaya Harari-Hait, "The Beautiful Hour of the Temporary Provisions? The Rise of Temporary Legislation and Principles for its Improvement, " Iyunei Mishpat 41,539,591-592 (2019)).
- In this context, I will also note that it seems to me that the validity of the said restraint rule, which deals with the examination of the law on the substantive level, is not necessarily as good as it is with regard to the examination of the law on the procedural level, at least when we are dealing with the question - mainly technical - whether a 'law' has indeed been passed by the Knesset, according to all its mitzvot and constitution. In this sense, the ability of temporality to cure the defect is less; after all, if the basic conditions required for the existence of a 'law' are not met, how can temporality justify its validity?
- Third, the truth can be said, the proceedings in this case were not optimal, to say the least. As is well known, "the Israeli legal system, at its core, is adversarial" (Civil Appeals Authority 73497-06-25 Development Authority v. Kassas, para. 15 [Nevo] (June 2,2026; for some of the rationales and benefits thereof, see there, at paragraph 23). This is the case in general, and so it is also in proceedings conducted before this Court, sitting asthe High Court of Justice. In our case, with the exception of the reference from the Cabinet Secretary, and the request to join on behalf of the 'Truth for Yaakov in Israel' association, no comprehensive position was presented that protects the constitutional validity of the amendment. This must be regretted. An adversary proceeding, as it stands, was not conducted in this case, and as I am doing, I see this as a great difficulty.
- Fourth, and further to what has been said, one of the reasons for the lack of adversariality of the proceeding is the government's choice not to present its position in the framework of the proceeding, despite the permission given to it for separate representation. Although the government's choice not to defend the constitutional validity of an amendment that is the product of a government bill may raise questions, this is, of course, a matter of its discretion. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that this is sufficient to attest to a deeper point regarding the amendment in question. With all due caution, it seems to me that I will not go so far as to say that the parties who were in charge of the enactment of the amendment, and at least the majority of them, did not genuinely believe that it was constitutional, even at the time of its enactment (and indeed, we see that in a variety of other contexts, the government respondents choose to use the services of separate representation, and often even reap legal achievements through it; in other words, their choice to refrain from that particular representation in this case may teach us that this stems from their own position regarding the constitutionality of the amendment). The obvious flaws, both in the realm of the procedure and in the level of the violation of constitutional rights, were even reflected to those engaged in the work during the legislative process again and again by the legal counsel. The matter is so clear and clear that I see no need to elaborate on the matter, other than to express deep regret over the state of affairs that led to this. Either way, we, for our part, are required to fulfill our duty and rule according to the law; for the better and for the better.
I will now turn to the examination of the legislative process.