This means that a committee in the Knesset that prepares a bill for the second and third readings is authorized to make amendments to the original bill - that is, the one that passed in the first reading - but these amendments are within the scope of the subject matter of the original bill, and only to them. Further to this provision, states Section 85(b) to the articles of association that to the extent that"A member of Knesset, a minister, or a deputy minister in the affairs of the ministry in which he serves, claimed that the proposed amendment exceeds the scope of the subject matter of the bill (in this section - a new issue), the chairman of the committee will bring the matter to the decision of the Knesset committee.". The Knesset Committee's decision on a new issue is a condition for completing the discussions on the bill (Section 85(c) to the Regulations).
- In the case of Abu Arar, the purposes of this section (which was then contained in section 119 of the bylaws) were discussed . The main of them, so it was determined there, is as follows:
"To equip the Knesset Committee, which is working diligently on a bill that was approved by the Knesset plenum in its first reading, with the necessary powers in order to formulate the bill into final legislation. The provision of section 119 of the Knesset Rules allows the committee to amend the bill. It allows it to create the bill from the flaws that adhered to it. It allows it to refine the arrangement, to fill in the gaps, to remove the superfluous or harmful, so that the Knesset will be presented with a bill that is as good and effective as possible to achieve its intended purpose. This provision streamlines the legislative process. It prevents unnecessary awkwardness, which could have occurred if any amendment to the bill had required the reopening of all legislative proceedings, starting from the stage of the first reading" (ibid., pp. 35-36).
- Thus, the need to enable an efficient legislative process, together with the desire to enable the improvement and accuracy of the bills, are what justify granting the committee that discusses the law the broad authority to amend it at the top of the process. However, this power is not unlimited:
"A restriction was set for it, which prevents the committee from deviating from the subject of the bill. The purpose of this restriction is to prevent the 'theft' of provisions and arrangements that were not included in the bill and were not accepted in the first reading in the Knesset, and therefore there was no open public debate about them, in the Knesset as well as outside it. Regarding this restriction, it was stated that: 'The prohibition on raising a 'new issue' at the stage of the committee discussion is intended to prevent a situation in which matters will be decided in this way and submitted for final approval matters that neither the public nor the Knesset plenum could have considered, because they were not mentioned in the bill as it was published prior to the first reading, and were not discussed during the first reading in the Knesset plenum' [...]. It follows that in the absence of any restriction on the scope of the amendments and additions that the committee is authorized to introduce, there was no limit to legislation that could be obtained away from the public eye, and in this way evade the public debate, which involves the stage of publication of the bill and the first reading. This is why the limitation on the subject under discussion in the legislation comes about" (Abu Arar, p. 36; see also: Amnon Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, vol. 1,647 (1996); Rivka Weil, "Continuity in Legislation in the Audit Test, " Iyunei Mishpat 37 563-595 (2016)).
- The tension is therefore clear: on the one hand, we do not want the committee to accept an arrangement by way of a kind of 'take it or leave it', but rather to be able to make decisions regarding its change, in accordance with the discussions that are being held within it. But on the other hand, a new subject is forbidden by the bylaws (according to Mishna, Orla 3:9); In other words, a situation in which the possibility of a later change becomes the basis for entirely new laws must be prevented, so that there will be no change from the existing one, but rather entirely new legislation, which did not undergo important "stages of development" at the outset. If so, how should we interpret the term "new subject"? How do we know whether the amendments made to the bill go beyond "the scope of the bill's subject matter"; whether "new faces have come here" (Bavli, Eruvin 24:1), or perhaps even if we are dealing with a "new jar" - it is entirely "full of old" (Mishna, Avot 4:20)?
- In the Abu Arar case, it was noted that "a substantive connection is required between the amendment, which the committee seeks to make, and the particular bill on the agenda." Indeed, this is the case, but it seems to me that it would be good if we could create a slightly more concrete content in these terms. Admittedly, the term 'new subject' is a bit elusive; drawing the boundary line accurately is not possible. However, it is possible - and in my opinion even appropriate - to give indications to it (see and compare: High Court of Justice 8987/22, paragraph 42 of my opinion).
- Before I elaborate on the considerations, I will emphasize that both for considerations of separation of powers and for considerations of expertise, it would have been better if the Knesset had regulated this issue itself, in the way it deems appropriate, and added content to this section (see and compare, from a recent period: High Court of Justice 12634-06-26 Ressler v. Knesset, para. 39 [Nevo] (July 2,2026)). However, since we do not do so, given that we are required to interpret the section, and in view of the importance of the matter, I am of the opinion that there is a point in carefully drawing guidelines with a forward-looking view. It is clear that to the extent that the Knesset is required to address the issue, it has priority in shaping the outlines and outlining the arrangement in a more concrete manner (see: section 19 of the Basic Law: The Knesset; an expression of this kind of dialogue between the authorities, and the Knesset's reference to rulings relating to the provisions of the bylaws and legislative procedures, can be found in the footnotes scattered throughout and throughout the Knesset Regulations). I will also reiterate that in accordance with the provisions of section 85 of the Regulations, as detailed above, a claim on a new subject is brought before the Knesset Committee, and it has the authority to decide on it. The significance of this, especially given that this is an intra-parliamentary proceeding, is that, as a rule, the Committee's discretion is broad; the flexibility given to it is great; and the scope for intervention in its decisions is extremely narrow, and reserved for extreme and very exceptional cases (see and compare: the Abu Arar case, p. 37; the Litzman case, p. 593).
- On the merits of the matter, the following is a charter, without pretending to exhaust some of the relevant considerations for examining the claim of a 'new subject' (these considerations appeared, in one way or another, in the position of the legal counsel to the Knesset). I will emphasize that these are not rigid criteria, but considerations that must be examined as a whole:
(-) The Relationship between the Purpose of the Proposal and the Purpose of the Passed LawIn this context, we can think of an amplitude in which at one end is a law whose purposes are identical to those of the original bill, and at the other end is a law whose purpose is not even mentioned in the bill. The closer we get to the other side of the spectrum, the more it will tip the scales in the direction of determining that this is a new subject, which deviates from the scope of the bill's subject matter. Obviously, between the two poles it is possible to think of many intermediate cases. Thus, for example, if a law to which a secondary purpose was added, but whose primary purpose was preserved, the tendency would be to say that the subject matter of the original bill was preserved. On the other hand, if the main purpose of the bill was completely neglected, this may be an indication that we are dealing with a new subject, even if one of its secondary purposes has been preserved.