Civil Case (Center) 4585-02-19 Ephraim Naveh v. Hadas Steif - part 66

"Q.  What was in the settlement agreement?

1. We set a sum of money that is much less than what I deserve, there was no appraiser's opinion, it was a market negotiation, they threw a sum of money and said I could buy an apartment for me and my five children, alimony was awarded and even there the judge didn't do me justice, to say the least, we signed a waiver of claims and that's it."

(Par.  p.  228, paras.  15-18)

210. The explicit testimony of Hani (who has a different interest than Naveh's) shows that no "price tag" was set for the waiver of the tort component. It therefore follows that the waiver was part of a comprehensive negotiation.  Thus, the ground is dropped under the defendants' claim that Naveh was repaid or received double indemnification for the damage to his privacy.  If so, this testimony sheds light on the content of the agreement on the issue in dispute and is capable of refuting the presumption of Naveh Shikma's obligation for not disclosing the divorce agreement.

In these circumstances, I do not see any justification for accepting the defendants' claim regarding their exemption from payment of compensation by virtue of the divorce agreement that was entered into between Hani and Naveh in June 2019 in the Family Court.

The tort of defamation

211. According to Naveh, on May 28,2019, Shteif posted a split photo on her Facebook account: on the right is a picture of her and one of her acquaintances, and on the left is a picture of Naveh with a link to an article from the "TheMarker" website regarding the delay in the investigation of the lawsuit filed against Naveh. Above the two photos, Shteif wrote as follows: "The one who distinguishes between the sacred and the profane.  On the right is the holy.  On the left, the garbage worm.  Patience.  It is not for nothing that my silence is thunderous...  A barrier to wisdom..." Naming Naveh "a garbage worm" caused him to be humiliated and humiliated.  Hence, this is a publication that amounts to defamation, as mentioned In Section 1 of the Prohibition of Defamation Law.
212. On the other hand, according to Shteif, she was under tremendous pressure from Naveh, who filed baseless complaints against her with the police, backed up with false claims. Through the Facebook post, Shteif expressed her opinion about the difference between those engaged in the sacred work of bringing the truth to the public's attention and those who operate in hiding and in the dark, and who try to crawl and hide from the public's scrutiny.  According to her: "This is my opinion, whoever calls me a burglar and a thief is a garbage worm.  B.  From everything I knew about him, and what Chani shared and the material I had, this is my opinion" (Par.  p.  171, paras.  7-8).  Naveh, as a public representative, is exposed to criticism, even if they are harsh and harsh.  In this context, we are dealing with nothing more than trivial matters.  In any case, according to Steif, she has the permanent defenses In Sections 15(4) and15(10) of the Prohibition of Defamation Law.
213. Section 1 The Prohibition of Defamation Law defines defamation as something whose publication is liable to humiliate a person, humiliate him, or make him a target of hatred, contempt or ridicule. There is no need to prove that the injury did indeed occur.  It is sufficient that the publication is liable to cause it.  The decision is not made according to the victim's subjective feeling or the intention of the advertiser, but rather according to the meaning that a reasonable person would attribute to the expression, taking into account also the external circumstances and the implied meaning of "between the lines" (Shenhar, at pp.  226-227).
214. In this case, Shteif called Naveh a "garbage worm." The case law held that filtering a curse against a person, in public, is liable to humiliate and humiliate him and therefore constitute "defamation." However, since curses and insults are part of social life in the country, not every curse, and not all circumstances, will establish a cause of action by virtue of Prohibition of Defamation Law. The concern is that sweeping judicial recognition of insults as 'defamation' will lead to the courts being flooded with lawsuits for which this is the cause of action (Civil Appeals Authority 10520/03 Ben Gvir v.  Dankner, paragraph 26 of the judgment of Judge (as he was then called) E.  Rivlin (Nevo 12.11.2006) (hereinafter - The Ben Gvir case)).
215. The nickname "garbage worm" is not a neutral description or a substantive criticism, but rather a phrase that presents him in a disgraceful, inferior and despicable manner that is liable to humiliate and degrade him (regarding the use of the term "worm", see: Civil Appeal (Central District) 38795-07-22 Katsover v. Yedioth Ahronoth Newspaper Ltd., paragraph 72 (Nevo, January 31,2023)).

The derogatory nickname was posted as a "post" on the social network FACEBOOK"".  In the Civil Appeal Authority 1239/19 Shaul v.  Nidley Communications Ltd., (Nevo, January 8,2020) held that: "At this stage of the development of the case law, there can be no doubt that the direct action of writing a 'status' or a 'post' on the social network is indeed publication as defined in the law, and therefore may establish a cause of action insofar as it constitutes defamation" (paragraph 42 of the judgment of Justice D.  Barak-Erez).  For these reasons, I determine that this is a publication that amounts to defamation.

216. According to Steif, this publication is protected under the permanent protections In section 15(4) and15(10) of the Prohibition of Defamation Law. Article 15 The law applies the requirement of good faith to all of its sub-clauses.  As emerges from the Ben Gvir case, the question of good faith is examined, inter alia, taking into account the intention that underpinned the publication, its proportionality, its language, its style, and the connection between the expression and the matter in which the publication deals with (the Ben Gvir case, paragraph 32 of the judgment of Justice E.  Rivlin)
217. In our case, the derogatory nickname was not stated in the context of the content of the article to which it was attached, and no substantive connection was found between it and the subject of the publication. Moreover, consideration must be given to the fact that the derogatory nickname was said against the background of a tense relationship between Shteif and Naveh.  This matter strengthens the conclusion that the expression did not stem from a substantive context to the publication, but rather reflects the personal tension between them.  This nickname is also inconsistent with the requirement of proportionality and is capable of intensifying the harm to Naveh without substantive justification.  For these reasons, I determine that the derogatory nickname was uttered in bad faith.
218. In respect of this publication, Naveh petitioned to obligate Steif to compensate him in the sum of ILS 141,000 by virtue of Section 7A(c) of the Prohibition of Defamation Law. Section 7A(b) The Prohibition of Defamation Law states that the court may obligate the defendant to pay the victim for defamation compensation not exceeding ILS 50,000, without proof of damage.  Section 7(a)(c) The law imposes an additional requirement on the very existence of defamation, according to which it must be proven that the publication was made "with the intention of harming" and it is not sufficient that the publication actually harmed the object of the publication or was done in bad faith.  The case law held that the double compensation is not an autonomous result of determining liability, but is reserved for cases in which an actual intention to harm has been proven, while examining the circumstances of the publication, the conduct of the advertiser and the content of the publication (Civil Appeal Authority 2015/15 Palevsky v.  Formica Source Company Ltd., paragraph 3 (Nevo, August 4,2016); Defamation Laws, p.  795).
219. After examining the entirety of the circumstances of the publication, I am not persuaded that the intensity of the publication and its distribution establish grounds for awarding double compensation according to Section 7A(c) to the Prohibition of Defamation Law. It should be remembered that the publication was carried out in circumstances in which mutual accusations were exchanged between the parties, as part of a broad dispute (para.  p.  170, para.  21).  In this situation, there is no justification for determining that there is an exclusive intention to harm that justifies double compensation.  However, it must be taken into account that this is an insulting expression, which rode on the public interest that accompanied the exposure of the "sex for a subscription" affair.  Considering the balance between the severity of the derogatory expression and the state of Naveh's good name at the time, and taking into account the background circumstances of the publication and the personal rivalry between Naveh and Steif (which was accompanied by several publications), it is appropriate to set the compensation for this publication at ILS 25,000 on the day the judgment was rendered.
220. As part of her summaries, Shteif raised a claim of offset for defamation and estimated her damages, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, in the sum of ILS 1,000,000, and in any case no less than ILS 200,000 for each statement in the media or an appeal to the police. According to her, the plaintiff and his agents attributed serious offenses to her in inflammatory publications and false complaints with the aim of harming her.  In this context, Shteif referred to exhibits N/27 and N/28, where Shteif was described as a "thief" and a "burglar".

Shteif's claim of deduction should be rejected.  An examination of exhibits N/27 and N/28 shows that these are news articles on the websites of "Walla" and "TheMarker", where the relevant parties were interviewed, including their lawyers, with each side presenting its version and arguments on the matter.  A review of those articles does not indicate the publications that Shteif attributed to Naveh.  I do not consider the arguments raised in those articles to be the publication of defamatory expression.  Even if it had been such a publication, it would have been protected under the protection of a legitimate personal interest - as has been established In section 15(3) The Prohibition of Defamation Law - during a press interview intended to cover a news affair, so that these are circumstances to which the defense of good faith applies (Shenhar, at pp.  582-583).

221. I did not find any substance in the other arguments of the parties, and they are rejected.

Ruling

222. Considering the totality of the reasons I have detailed above, I order as follows:
223. The lawsuit against Razi Barkai is dismissed. The plaintiff (Naveh) will bear Barkai's expenses in the global sum of ILS 5,000 and will also bear his attorney's fees as a result of the scope of the proceeding and the resources invested in his defense by way of an estimate of ILS 100,000.
224. The lawsuit against Nurit Kanetti and Ilil Shachar is dismissed. The plaintiff (Naveh) will bear expenses in the global sum of ILS 5,000 to the credit of each of these defendants.  It is clarified that I do not rule on Naveh's obligation to pay rent, since these defendants will be represented by the state's attorneys, in respect of which the result is different.

III.       The claim against Hadas Shteif for the phone incident and the invasion of privacy is partially accepted.  The same applies to the claim against the state (Army Radio) by virtue of its vicarious liability for Hadas Shteif's actions.  I order these defendants to pay together and severally to Naveh the sum of ILS 450,000 on the date of the judgment.  In addition, I award Naveh expenses in the amount of half of the court fee and the full fees of the witnesses as ruled in the hearing.  I do not impose on Shteif and the state the cost of the expert CPA Steinmitz since it did not contribute to the assessment of the damage.  Component The expenses will be borne by Steif and the state jointly and separately.  As for the charge of fees, since the lawsuit against Canetti and Shahar was dismissed and given that they were represented by the state's attorneys from the State Attorney's Office, I charge the state to pay Naveh's attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 50,000.  On the other hand, Steif will bear Naveh's attorney's fees in the amount of ILS 90,000 (taking into account the outcome of the judgment).  The charges for the fees are separate charges.

1. The claim for defamation by Steif on the "Facebook" platform is partially accepted. I oblige Steif to pay Naveh the sum of ILS 25,000 for this publication as well as a global fee of ILS 5,000.  This component is a separate and independent charge.
2. The charges under the judgment will be paid within 60 days from today.

Granted today, October 05,2026, in the absence of the parties.