Language
- The starting point in the act of interpretation – an examination of the language of the law – is intended to map the boundaries: it determines "the scope of meanings that language 'suffers,' i.e., the 'range of linguistic possibilities'; The law will not be given legal meaning that falls outside the boundaries of tolerance" (Aharon Barak) Interpretation in a sentence Volume Two - Interpretation of Legislation (1993) (Lightning), p. 98).
- In examining the scope of linguistic interpretations, consideration can be given to a variety of aspects and tools: accepted grammar rules, dictionaries, and other linguistic sources; "natural" meanings that are used in the language of people and meanings exist, even if they are exceptional; Explicit meaning and implied meaning; rules such as interpretation against the background of the context of the word or phrase being examined; the period in which the work of interpretation is carried out and the changes that have occurred in the meaning of the language; And more (see Lightning pp. 97-139 and extensive case law).
- In the case before us, in practice, the examiner and the registrar reached a similar conclusion, even if the matter is not formulated that way. An examination of the reasoning shows that both of them were of the opinion that the appellant's interpretation of the term "inventor" exceeded the range of possible linguistic possibilities.
- The examiner was of the opinion that in view of the dictionary definition, the word "inventor" can linguistically carry an interpretation that includes a machine, and even wrote that since he did not see a contradiction between this interpretation and the purposes of the law, the machine can be recognized as an inventor (paragraph 6.5 of the refusal letter A/5). In practice, however, the examiner found himself "blocked" when he tried to apply this conclusion to the definition of "inventor." The examiner found that since the machine does not have a legal personality, it is not possible to "come by virtue of it", a phrase that he interpreted differently from its interpretation by the Registrar (paragraph 7.8 of the refusal letter).
It seems that the examiner's statement that it is possible by law to recognize a machine as an "inventor" stemmed from the fact that the examiner focused the stage of the linguistic examination on the literal dictionary meaning of the word and believed that it could also include a person who was not a human being. However, the linguistic test stage is not limited to lexical and verbal options; The examination is conducted, inter alia, against the background of the context of the word being examined in the matter of legislation. It is the reading of the term in the context of the law (the definition of "inventor"), that led the examiner to the end of the road and the refusal of the applications.
- The Registrar's path was different. The Registrar emphasized the "natural meaning" of the language of the law, held that "the definition in the dictionary assumed that an inventor is always a human being, since until recently there was no other option" (section 23 of the decision) and noted that even if dictionary definitions do not explicitly refer to human beings, "the usual meaning of the word refers to a person" (section 25) (compare: the Registrar's note in the discussion regarding the way in which the word can or should be read; p. 2, paras. 9-19 of the transcript of August 2, 2022, M/11).
The decision emphasized that the starting point for the interpretation of legislation is the language of the law, "and in particular the natural meaning of the language of the law" (section 20 of the decision; emphasis is in the original – T.A. ), and a quote was brought from Prof. Barak's book regarding the legislature's use of language that is acceptable to the public and therefore the provision of an acceptable and habitual meaning to the legislation. Later on, the Registrar referred to the natural meaning and the usual meaning of the term (as one that does not include a machine).
- In this last matter, it should be clarified: there is indeed an assumption that the legislature makes use of language that is acceptable to people and speaks "in the language of human beings," and this even has significance and importance in the interpretive process (see below). However, and also in accordance with Prof. Barak's book from which he was quoted in the decision, at the stage when the range of linguistic possibilities is determined, the interpreter must take into account not only the ordinary meaning of the language, but also a meaning that is not such (Lightning, pp. 117 and pp. 135-136; See also Aharon Barak on this matter Purposive Interpretation in Law (2003), p. 150). There may be cases in which at the end of the day the purpose of the legislation will lead to the use of a meaning that is not natural and ordinary.
- The dispute as to whether the dictionary meaning of the word 'inventor' can also include a machine has no practical implication in our case. Both the examiner and the registrar reached the conclusion that the appellant's position could not be accepted by examining the established connection. The examiner was required to formulate the definition of "inventor" and believed that the expression "derived from his power" could not be attributed to the machine. The Registrar is required to refer to other provisions in the Patent Law in which the word "inventor" appears, from which he learned that an inventor cannot include a machine.
- It is not for nothing that the examiner and the registrar acted in this way. The linguistic examination stage is carried out against the background of the context of the word being examined in the matter of legislation. In the interpretation of the law, "More is needed than the interpretation of each word on its own" (Civil Appeal 282/73 The Tax Assessor, Haifa v. Arison, P.D. 28(1) 789 (March 18, 1974), p. 793), The word is examined in context, as part of the linguistic stage.
"The meaning of the word [...] In the dictionary [...] it is significant and can be relied upon, but when the word appears in the statute, the meaning in the dictionary is not the sole thing that determines and the word must be interpreted in the context in which it appears" (Civil Appeal 362/79 Customs and Excise Administration v. Telrad, Telecommunication and Electronics Industries Ltd., IsrSC 35(2) 57 (December 17, 1980), at p. "In examining the language of the legislation, the word that is the subject of interpretation should not be isolated from the context in which it is found in the provision of the law, since it is not possible to determine the meaning of an expression except in its full context" (HCJ 8987/22 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset (January 2, 2025), section 166).