The EPO's Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (April 2025) states that an inventor must be a "natural person", with reference to a decision on DABUS[15].
- In Australia The Patent Office refused to register the applications. On appeal, the result was reversed and it was determined Single Dan Because Instructions Patent Law The Australian does not rule out the possibility that a machine will be defined as an inventor. The result was reversed in an expanded composition and it was determined that a machine could not be an inventor[16]. The Supreme Court Reject Request Permission Thaler's Appeal (Noting Because None This is the appropriate way to discuss these essential questions He's trying Upload)[17].
- Germany - In a judgment given on June 11, 2024, he ruled Also TheFederal Court of Justice Because an inventor can only be natural person[18]. At the same time It was determined that even if artificial intelligence is used, a person can be listed as an inventor, when it comes to someone who was "significantly involved in the discovery of the technical teaching". It was also written that according to today's scientific knowledge ("current state of scientific knowledge"), human involvement of preparation or influence is necessary ("there is no such thing as a system that searches for technical teachings without any human preparation or influence") (ibid., section 40). The court did not rule on the question of the type or extent of human contribution necessary for a human being to be named as an inventor in the case of artificial intelligence involvement. The court was of the opinion that a certain current format of Dr. Thaler's patent application had already made it sufficiently clear that he was the inventor and that artificial intelligence was not a joint invention but only a means used ("means used by the applicant to find the claimed technical teaching") and therefore it is possible to continue its examination process at the Patent Office.
- In other places, including Japan, Canada, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, New Zealand, Brazil and Saudi Arabia, decisions were made in a similar spirit to those given in the United States, England, the European Patent Office and Australia.
South Africa is the only place where Dr . Thaler's patent application (in which DABUS was named as the inventor) was accepted, when it is agreed that no substantive examination is carried out in South Africa (p. 14, paras. 18-21 of the minutes of the hearing with the Registrar M/11; Appendix 2 to the notice of appeal; paragraph 41 of the Response to the Appeal).
- The compilation shows that the global situation in the field, In the matter of patents, the practice The legislature gives its opinion on it and declares Frequency about the desire for harmony, does not support the appellant's position (although he is of the opinion that it is possible to see "buds" of developments in the field; pp. 53, 23-28). It seems that in the issues in which The need for a "unique balance" (in the words of section 23 of the appeal) At the local level, This was discussed by the legislature as such. This is also evident from the judgment to which the appeal was referred in this matter: Civil Appeal Authority 8127/15 Israel Manufacturers Association v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.f/k/a (15.6.2016).
- The aforesaid does not detract from the halakha that foreign law constitutes an interpretive source and that an approach to comparative law should be done with caution (Civil Appeal Authority 5267/09 H.Lundbeck A S v. Unipharm in a Tax Appeal (March 15, 2010), art. 72); Considerations in foreign courts based on other legal systems are not necessarily identical to considerations in proceedings conducted under Israeli law (Objection to a Patent Application 138831 Elbit Systems in Tax Appeal v. Rafael Advanced Combat Systems in Tax Appeal (June 30, 2013), Section 82(. Accordingly, the Registrar noted in one of the hearings held before him, that "if our law says one thing and something is permissible under our law, then the fact that in Australia or the United Kingdom or in other countries they thought this way or that, it will not affect my interpretation here" (p. 3, paras. 9-12 of the minutes of the hearing of March 21, 2022, M/8). If there had been an infrastructure that justifies this, it would have been possible to establish an interpretation in Israeli law that is inconsistent with interpretations given in parallel applications in other international frameworks. This is not the case.
- For the sake of good order, I agree that no objective purpose has been brought, reflecting the basic values of the system (such as: the Jewish and democratic character of the state, the principles of separation of powers, and the independence of the judiciary). Social values such as good faith, fairness, honesty, reasonableness, and the prevention of conflicts of interest. Human rights, including the right to equality (Matter Lindorn, section 13), which can affect the interpretation.
- The need for an interpretation that will best realize the purpose of the law is a central consideration. Like the Registrar, and after reviewing the additional documents that the appellant sought to attach as evidence in the appeal, I too was not persuaded that defining a machine as an inventor and striving in this way to grant patent protection to inventions created solely by artificial intelligence, would serve the purposes of Patent Law; At the very least, without making any further adjustments and changes. As noted in the decision, this is a complex question with many aspects, and there is reason to argue that it should be brought first and foremost to the legislature's doorstep (compare: Matter Lindorn, the judgment of Judge Turkel). See also: "Monopoly, on-In principle, if it should be granted at all, it is right for the legislature to grant it, whereas the halakha should be cautious-Be careful about this swampy land" (Matter A.S.I.R., section 85).
- This is not a case in which the language and the purpose are "pulled" in opposite directions, adherence to the language will lead to difficult results (Matter Neumann, paragraph 92 of the judgment of Justice Grosskopf) and the granting of the usual meaning will not correspond to its purpose. There was no justification for assigning "an unusual or natural meaning" to the words of the law, because "it is required by the purpose" or an interpretation in which there is "limited conformity" to the language in view of "a clear purpose calling for it" (Matter Neumann, paragraph 6 of the judgment of Justice Kanfi-Steinitz). This is certainly not a "formulaic error" (as determined in the case Neumann).
- At the hearing, the appellant's counsel argued that "When there is no prohibition, purposive interpretation dictates reaching a possible result" (p. 50, paras. 4-5).
No reference was found in the appeal to this claim. The way in which the wording of the argument conceives of the rule according to which a person is free to act unless a certain action is prohibited by the legislature (High Court of Justice 1/49 Bejarano v. Minister of Police, IsrSC 2 80 (February 10, 1949)) and perhaps also the interpretive rule in criminal law, according to which "if a particular piece of legislation has more than one reasonable interpretation that fulfills its purpose [...] From these interpretations, the more lenient interpretation will be chosen with regard to someone who is supposed to bear criminal responsibility under the same piece of legislation" (Additional Criminal Hearing 10987/07 State of Israel v. Cohen (March 2, 2009), paragraph 10 of the judgment of the judge as described at the time, Beinisch; see section 3421 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977: "A law is given to several reasonable interpretations according to its purpose, the matter will be decided according to the most lenient interpretation with the person who is supposed to bear criminal responsibility under that law").
- Beyond other difficulties in this argument, in the concrete case the interpretation requested by the appellant is not intended to determine that a person will not be considered to have violated a criminal or administrative law, but rather in order to acquire a right – an intellectual property right – which, in view of its essence and as long as it is valid, will even apply prohibitions to others. An intellectual property right is a product of the law and exists within the scope and limits set by the legislature. The scope of the right can even change in the same country itself at different times.
"Intellectual property, as its name implies, is the creation of the human spirit, its birth is by law (or halakha), [...] It is based on the law and ends with the law. Intellectual property is, in essence, an abstract normative creation [...] The law or the halakha determines – and they are supposed to determine – when a certain intellectual property will arise and will be, what will be the conditions for its existence, what will be the scope of its development, what will be its limitations" ( A.S.I.R., paragraph 42 of the judgment of Justice Cheshin). "Each and every law, for itself, determines the proper balance in its eyes – both with regard to the content of the intellectual property right and with regard to its lifetime – between the existence of the principle of free competition and the need for a dynamic market for the exchange of ideas, and the desire to protect inventors and creators in order to encourage and reward them as they deserve [...]. We have said and we will repeat: Intellectual property – its very existence, its content, and its boundaries – all of these will be found in the law itself: it is inverted in the law, and it is inverse in it" (ibid., section 44).