Caselaw

Criminal Case (Tel Aviv) 4637-12-15 State of Israel – Tel Aviv District Attorney’s Office (Taxation and Economics) v. Binyamin Fouad Ben-Eliezer (Proceedings Stopped Due to Death The Defendant) - part 97

August 28, 2019
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Whether the terms of the agreement were determined by the defendant or by Ben-Eliezer, it is clear that The Gap Between the Agreement and Reality existed already at the time of the transfer of the money, or close to it (when the defendant signed the agreement upon his return from abroad).  This gap deepened as time passed, and it became clear that the loan had not been repaid (after 6 months as stipulated in the agreement or at all), and the defendant did not even demand it from Ben-Eliezer despite the sale of the lot.  Contrary to what is stated in clause 5 of the agreement, Ben-Eliezer did not even pay the defendant linkage differentials and arrears interest, even though he did not repay the loan on the repayment date specified in the agreement.

 

Moreover, the claim that "a loan was given against the background of Ben-Eliezer's desire to move into an apartment that suits his needs and difficulties" is inconsistent with the fact that the purpose of the loan according to the agreement was to purchase Pitch, an asset that certainly cannot bring about the realization of the purpose within a reasonable time frame.

  1. If the defendant understood and believed that the transfer of the money would be reported to the Knesset in the usual procedure (according to his alleged demand), it would have been expected that he would insist on a correspondence between the details included in the agreement and reality, and would even understand that after a certain period of time, and once the loan was not repaid, a problem would arise in the authenticity of the report submitted to the Knesset (since the report, to the extent that it existed, was based on an agreement that did not correspond to reality).

The prosecution argued in its summaries in this context: "The defendant's claim that he was "calm" because he knew that the loan agreement was reported is inconsistent with the fact that even when he saw that the years had passed, old houses were sold and a new penthouse was purchased, not only did he not demand his money back, but he did not even act to change the type of reporting.  This is despite the fact that the defendant's claim is that all he wanted was for the loan to be reported in accordance with the law" (paragraph 25 of the summaries of the claim).  I believe that there is a point in things.

  1. The fact that a copy of the loan agreement was transferred to the bank does not necessarily support the defendant's claim regarding the "absence of a concealment tendency", since the defendant also understood in real time that the agreement was essential for the bank ("... A bank asks you where you are transferring money...", P/1A, p. 53, s. 10).
  2. I cannot accept the defense's argument that since the defendant, according to his version, was interested in transferring the money to Ben-Eliezer as a gift, he did not go into detail about the details of the agreement (paragraph 429 of the defense's summaries). It is reasonable to assume that precisely in view of the sensitivity of the matter, and the "report" requirement that he allegedly set to Ben-Eliezer, the defendant should not have signed an agreement that did not correspond to reality, even if, according to his version, he was willing to transfer the money as a gift.  In this context, I will add that an examination of the defendant's versions by the police shows that in his first interrogation he insisted on the fact that this was a loan backed by an agreement, whereas only later in his interrogations did the defendant correct his version and stated that as far as he was concerned, he would have given the money to Ben-Eliezer as a gift.

 

  1. In the same way, I am unable to accept the defense's argument that the very fact that the defendant Luknin openly appealed (in order for him to take care of the contract) supports its claim that the loan was given on the basis of friendship and without the intention of concealment. Beyond the fact that there is difficulty in transferring such a significant sum of money without the knowledge of any party, it should be remembered that Vaknin is a confidant of the defendant, and serves as his advisor in a number of businesses.  A referral to Luknin, who is perceived by the defendant as a discreet person, is not equivalent to turning to an external party, or receiving orderly legal advice regarding the significance of transferring such a large sum to a public servant.

Moreover, Vaknin understood from the defendant that Ben-Eliezer's identity should remain discreet, and so he even presented this to Attorney Almoznino, whom he used to obtain a generic draft of a contract.  It appears that the discretion required by Moknin is ostensibly inconsistent with the defendant's alleged demand that Ben-Eliezer report the loan to the Knesset.

  1. The defendant conducts businesses around the world, which, naturally, require close legal accompaniment and advice. In these circumstances, his choice not to seek legal advice regarding the manner of transferring the money, and his decision to carry out the process only through Vaknin (who is not a lawyer), should be seen as strengthening the prosecution's thesis, and acting in accordance with his version with all that this entails.

In this context, I would like to refer to the defendant's testimony the description of his financial conduct vis-à-vis Ehud Olmert in September 2011 (in the midst of the legal proceedings against Olmert, and years after his retirement from public office):

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