There may also be situations in which partial enforcement will be found to be improper and establish a defense from justice, even though it is not based on improper considerations, but rather it is deficient in a different aspect (Borowitz [7], at pp. 815-816). However, the remedy sought by the Applicant - the suspension of the proceeding for the sake of protection from justice - requires a factual basis (see also Criminal Appeals Authority 4934/98 Kahane v. State of Israel [12], October 27, 1998, at paragraph 5). The appellant did not assume that. Among other things, it was not proven that anything other than substantive reasons served as the basis for the decision in his case. We were not convinced that the decision was discriminatory. Nor was it claimed that a request was made to extradite any of the other defendants to a foreign country (including the Dadosh brothers before it was decided to prosecute them in Israel).
- As for the extradition of Baruch and Alan Dadosh to the United States: There is no dispute that the agreement reached with them is unusual. I am prepared to assume that "benefits", in the words of the appellant's counsel, were granted to the Dadosh brothers in exchange for their agreement to serve as state witnesses against the appellant. However, a perusal of the documents presented before us leaves no room for doubt that the extradition of the two is not intended to resolve the issue of where the appellant will be tried. It was part of a complex proceeding in which the two agreed to testify against the appellant if they were placed in the framework of a "witness protection program" in the United States, in which the institutional element, more possible than in other countries, is to increase
The chance to protect their lives and guarantee their safety. The conclusion of the agreement with them was therefore a legitimate action on the part of the prosecution in their efforts to ensure that anyone found guilty in the affair would be brought to justice.