The law proposes two solutions to these problems, which are intertwined: the first is by looking at the connection as an act of transgression that stands on its own without dependence - with regard to the crystallization of its foundations - on the acts that it is intended to develop. In Israeli law, this is reflected in section 499 of the Penal Law, which recognizes the commission of a crime or misdemeanor as an independent offense. The same applies to the other individual offenses that the Penal Law attributes to a person who conspired to commit an offense (sections 92, 121, 133, 440 and 500 of the Law). All this is detached from the question of whether these acts of conspiracy actually gave rise to the offense for which they were connected (see the Issa case [36],
at pp. 52-53 in the judgment of President Barak). American law establishes a similar approach, according to which the conspiracy offense, which is part of the group of independent inchoate offenses, stands as an offense in itself even if it has not been completed to the point of the planned offense (see United States v. Rabinowich (1915) [108], at p. 86; Williams v. United States (1950) [109], at p. 649; United States v. Carlton (1973) [110],
at p. 106). And as I have already noted, in conspiracy offenses such as those involving dangerous drugs, there is no requirement for the existence of any act in order to realize the relationship. Meanwhile, in the extradition treaty between Israel and the United States, the conspiracy is recognized as a ground for extradition alongside the extradition offenses specified in Article 2 of the Convention.
The second solution - which I discussed at length in the previous part of my remarks - is recognition of the ability to prosecute conspirators in a country where the consequences of the conspiracy were to be realized on the basis of a "broad" territorial connection. In our law, this is enshrined in the definition of a conspiracy that was concluded abroad and whose purpose is to commit an act within Israel as an "internal offense" in section 7(a)(2) of the Penal Law.
- I said earlier that the basis of the "broad" territorial application lies in the ability of a state to defend its sovereignty even against acts intended to harm it from the outside. In conspiracy offenses, this approach is sharpened against the background of the correlational nature of the offenses (see pp. 52-53 In the judgment of President Barak In Parashat 'Issa [36]). Despite the fact that these offenses are separate and independent offenses - A principle that rests, as stated, on the purpose that seeks to stop evil before it occurs - maintain a close connection to the offenses that are planned to grow out of them. The act of conspiracy is nothing but "... A material encounter between two or more people, with the same intention to commit a prohibited act, and turning it into a joint conspiracy, while making an alliance to realize it" (S.Z. Feller: "Criminal liability without action, On what basis?" [135], p. 22; My emphasis is A, A, 30). The purpose of the connection - The offense for which it was agreed to be committed - It is what gives the prior consent its criminal nature. It drives the actions of the conspirators. Elsewhere, Prof. Feller added:
"At the stage of tying the knot, the entire aspiration of each of the conspirators is to obtain the consent of his friend to act in the future for the unkosher mission for which the knot was tied. If the covenant between them was indeed concluded, as stated, then the conformity of this factual element - the making of the covenant - the emotional element that accompanied this action and the transgression is realized, as it was portrayed at that stage before the eyes of those who made it.