The first part of the constitutional examination requires an examination of the relationship between the act of extradition and the public interest. To the extent that the two are not compatible, there is no need to continue, since an extradition action that does not serve the interest of the company is in any case unfounded. But
Once it is found that the extradition is appropriate for the public interest, the way is opened to the second stage of the examination, in which the act of extradition is placed in front of the constitutional mirror. As noted earlier, at this stage we will find the means to examine the provisions of the "Limitation Clause". To the extent that the extradition action meets the conditions set forth in this paragraph, it will be possible to approve it despite the infringement inherent in it to the basic right. If, on the other hand, it is found that the extradition does not meet the requirements of the "limitation clause", there will be no choice but to disqualify it, or at least to change it to suit these requirements. This is the "vertical" balance, which is used in the constitutional examination of actions that derive from the public interest (see: the words of President Barak in the case of the High Court of Justice 2481/93 Dayan v. Commander of the Jerusalem District [59], at p. 473 and the words of Justice Dorner in the case of the High Court of Justice 1514/01 Gur Aryeh v. The Second Authority for Television and Radio [60],
at p.
So far - the law.
From the general to the individual
- Is the extradition of the appellant, in the circumstances of the case before us and in light of the normative foundation laid above, lawful? My answer to this is in the affirmative. Before I explain my reasons for this, I saw room to emphasize that at the basis of the parasha before us is nothing but prima facie evidence. However, it is clear that the decision is limited to the issue of extradition only, and it does not establish any finding on the question of the appellant's guilt or innocence, which will be clarified separately.
The appellant's case meets the procedural and substantive requirements enumerated in the Extradition Law: the act attributed to it meets the rule of "double criminality" and has not yet become statute of limitations, the appellant has not been exposed to double jeopardy, and the offense of which he is accused carries a sentence of more than one year in prison. The background to the extradition is not political or security-related, and as I have shown, it is not done out of discrimination against the appellant. I am satisfied that the prima facie evidence presented in the extradition request and in the Attorney General's response is sufficient for the purpose of extradition. The United States undertook that if the appellant is convicted, he will be returned to Israel to serve his sentence, and the act of extradition is subject to this undertaking.