Moreover, the same people who did the bad deeds in the United States, the United States judged most of them and sentenced them to the punishments it decreed. This was the case for Roash and Ashkenazi, and so it was for my letter, for Cohen and for Vivos. There is no dispute that all of them deserved to be tried in the United States - and indeed they were tried and their sentences were handed down - and it is more wonderful to me how the appellant's sentence differed from the law of all of these. Indeed, the appellant was not physically in the United States. He lived in Israel. But from where he sat, he pulled the strings and moved the others to his will. We will agree, of course, that the others were not like those puppets hanging on a rope, which the one who pulls the strings - and only he - moves them to his will, right and left, up and down. However, according to the evidence underlying the extradition request, it was the appellant who controlled, at least partially, the transactions that were made; His people in the United States were his representatives and his agents. And as a necessary conclusion from here, we will know that the appellant's physical absence from the United States was only a minor and minor event, at least for the issue of extradition. The appellant "was" in the United States and did so in the United States through the others who were his long hand. Substantively, and with regard to the jurisdiction and application of the legal system prevailing in the United States to the actions of the appellant, the appellant's status was no different - neither morally nor legally - from the status of the others; His status was no different - and it is not appropriate that he should be different.
Justice A. Rubinstein
- I agree with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague Justice Levy, as well as the comments of my colleagues Vice President. The foundation, in my opinion, in the balance of considerations in our case, which on the face of it was not simple on the legal level, and it is not for nothing that we argued extensively and skillfully on behalf of the appellant's counsel and did not leave behind an argument that they did not argue, is the moral component.-The moral. If the scales were hostile in the legal sense,-Formal - and it is not hostile, as my colleague has suggested Justice Levy - Without a doubt, this element would have overwhelmed her. According to the prima facie evidence, the appellant sought to harm the residents of the United States; Apparently he believed that in the land of unlimited possibilities, the possibilities of crime are also not limited. The fact that he lived in Israel did not forgive the fact that his fortress was spread into the United States. The law allows it to be judged here, but it also allows it to be judged in the United States, and the question is based on discretion. It seems that all the moral justice-The morality points in the direction of the appellant's judgment in the place where he aimed his arrows. It would not be excessive in the circumstances if the appellant's emissaries were tried in the United States and he himself, who was ostensibly the "brain" behind them, were tried here. Indeed, these days are not like the first days, and in some areas of our lives, including technological development the likes of which we will not be fooled by