Therefore, in the said agreements, the power was given to decide how long the appellant would hold the land in the hands of the state and not to the appellant, and according to the conditions set by the state – the appellant could hold the land for a maximum of a few years, and in any case – much less than 25 years. The second reason that the appellant claims is that even during the short period in which she held the land, her status was not that of a "lesee" within the meaning of this term in the law, in light of the many significant restrictions imposed by the agreements with the state on the appellant's possession and use of the land, so that she was deprived of the maximum economic benefit from the land.
The appellant also argues that the profit model of the winner of the "Buyer's Price" tender, as well as the risks and chances accompanying winning such a tender, are more characteristic of the execution of planning, construction and construction of projects, than the receipt of a "right in the land". The purpose of the "Buyer's Price" program also negates the possibility of viewing the appellant as having received a "right in the land" at the time of winning the "Buyer's Price" tender, since in doing so the purpose of the said plan would have been thwarted. The appellant also argues that none of the three alternatives to the definition of "sale" exists in our case. It was further argued that, contrary to the Respondent's claim, The appellant's position does not contradict the agreements she signed, but rather it allows the provisions of the said agreements to be given full effect.
- The Respondent's Position, the transactions that are the subject of the appeals are clearly transactions in real estate according to Real Estate Taxation Law, and in the entire set of agreements signed by the appellant, it was explicitly stated that this was the acquisition of a "right in real estate" under the law.
In addition, the terms of the "Buyer's Price" tender do not differ materially from the terms of other tenders published by the ILA, in respect of which there is no claim that the ILA sells any single right, other than a "right in real estate". The state has no special involvement or supervision in the "Buyer's Price" project. The appellant received a "right in the land" by signing a lease contract with the ILA for a period of 98 years with an option for an additional 98 years, and she was even registered as the holder of lease rights in the land and by virtue of this she transferred the lease right to the purchasers, entitled to the Ministry of Housing. Therefore, there is no basis for the appellant's claim that she cannot hold the land for a period exceeding 25 years, since a distinction must be made between the type of property that was purchased, which is the lease right. which constitutes A legal right to enforce, and the period of actual possession of the property, which is a result of the contractual agreements between the parties to the agreement – the appellant and the state. The contractual limitation does not infringe on the appellant's right to lease, which is a legal right for 98 years and another 98 years.