Hence, where we have a specific cause of action in the Aviation Services Law regarding a flight delay or cancellation, there is no need to resort to other laws as a specific law prevails. Although the Montreal Convention does provide compensation for the late arrival of a flight, even if it can apply, the liability regime in section 6(e) of the Aviation Services Law is more stringent than section 19 of the Montreal Convention, and therefore if it is determined that there is no entitlement under the Aviation Services Law, all the more so it will not apply under the Montreal Convention (see small claim 8480-09-24 Tomer Noah v. Israir Aviation and Tourism in Tax Appeal (August 28, 2025)). Although in Civil Appeal 8456/19 Iberia Spanish Airways v. Fleischer Peled Liora (June 14, 2022), the Supreme Court ruled that compensation for mental anguish can be awarded by virtue of the Montreal Convention (a claim that was not claimed by the plaintiffs), there it was discussed that the Aviation Services Law does not apply. Therefore, where we are dealing with the same direct damage that the Aviation Services Law relates, when it is not a matter of causes other than those expressly regulated in the Aviation Services Law (such as the tort of defamation, for example), then everything involved in the cancellation of a flight regulated in the Aviation Services Law will be regulated only in accordance with what is stated in the Aviation Services Law - "If the legislature finds it necessary to prescribe remedies for disruptions in flight according to a closed list, and which do not depend on the degree of personal injury caused by any of the passengers, there is no reason to allow this provision to be circumvented by relying on grounds outside the Aviation Services Law. And if the legislature finds that it is necessary to establish a right to services and even compensation in fixed amounts that depend on the conduct of the carrier but do not depend on the extent of the personal damage caused to the passenger, there is no reason to allow this deliberate deviation and to clarify a claim of personal injury in an amount that exceeds that determined in the case of aviation services... Therefore, on the basis of the principle of "uniqueness of cause", the passenger cannot sue the carrier for compensation for a flight that went wrong, except on the basis of the Aviation Services Law. The passenger does not have the right to take the same obligations that a carrier owes under the Aviation Services Law, and on the basis of which he can claim grounds from another source" (see Civil Case 7262-10-18 Haziza v. Arkia (January 10, 2021), paragraph 4 of the judgment).
- In summary, Section 16 of the Aviation Services Law establishes the observance of laws and refers in practice to the Montreal Convention and the Air Transport Law, which stipulates the uniqueness of cause and the absence of application to other laws, and therefore liability must be examined only by virtue of the Aviation Services Law or a criminal appeal of the Montreal Convention by virtue of the Air Transport Law (see Class Action 2767-08-16 Vaknin v. El Al (March 16, 2023)) Therefore, the conclusion is that it is not possible to sue for flight delays or cancellations by virtue of grounds that are not set forth in the Aviation Services Law and the Air Transport Law due to the principle of the uniqueness of the cause, including not the cause of action for negligence under the general law for flight cancellation or other remedy by virtue of the Torts Ordinance or the Contracts Law. This is also evident from class action 55278-03-18 Hila Be'er v. Aeroflot, where it was held that in view of the explicit wording of the section on the uniqueness of the cause, an air carrier should not be sued on grounds that are not by virtue of the Aviation Services Law, in circumstances in which the Montreal Convention applies, and also in the protection clause of the Aviation Services Law, are of no use, because if there is an exception that exempts an air carrier from compensation in accordance with the law, then it is not possible by virtue of another law to be entitled to compensation or any other cause of action (see also Civil Case 7262-10-18 Haziza v. Arkia, supra).
As mentioned, statutory compensation embodies the mental anguish and indirect expenses (similar to the cancellation of a ticket by a customer and the embodiment of administrative expenses and the loss of a seat - the airline can lose a seat and refund the entire amount of the trip minus the cancellation fee - 100 ILS or 5%, whichever is lower - where there was a cancellation on time and alternatively sell a seat and make a profit twice if the ticket is not canceled and the loss is significant to the passenger because it was not canceled on time according to the Consumer Protection Law). I do not believe that the legislature's intention was to award mental anguish independently, since any case in which the legislature intended to grant protection to an airline in a manner that exempts it from statutory compensation, there will be a slippery slope of mental anguish rulings, since there is no dispute that the cancellation of a flight involves mental anguish, whatever justifiable reason there will be for the cancellation of the flight. The law recognizes compensation for pecuniary damages even where the airline has a defense, since this does not exempt it from providing assistance services, and therefore where it cannot provide assistance services and the passenger takes care of himself for assistance services, then it must compensate him for that financial damage. Therefore, where the law recognizes this, there is no reason to award additional compensation for actual damages, including indirect damages (for example, loss of work days as claimed in the statement of claim or events due to failure to reach the destination on the original date), since according to case law, we are dealing with alternative routes that do not add up to each other (see, for example, small claim 35646-04-17 Danan et al. v. Air France (September 30, 2017)). In other words, where according to the Aviation Services Law there is compensation for pecuniary damage in the form of reimbursement of expenses and the airline has received an exemption from statutory compensation, which means compensation for indirect expenses and mental anguish, when uniform compensation is determined without the need to prove damage (and thus there is a balance when sometimes a passenger loses more and sometimes a passenger loses less and still receives the same statutory compensation determined by distance), There may be a situation in which the damage caused by a passenger whose destination is shorter is greater than that of a passenger who traveled to a more distant destination, and therefore the compensation is greater, but the damage caused to him is less - see and compare section 18a(d) of the Consumer Protection Law, 5741-1981 regarding statutory compensation for the non-arrival of a technician limited to ILS 600, when in one place a consumer can lose a day of work that the amount does not compensate, and in another place a consumer who works from home and was not injured will receive the same compensation). Therefore, a ruling on compensation for mental anguish due to the cancellation of a flight, and as stated, there is no dispute and cannot be disputed regarding the great mental anguish caused to the plaintiffs, constitutes in fact an attempt to circumvent the statutory compensation.
- Indeed, there are sales rulings by virtue of section 16 of the Law (Observance of the Laws) in awarding tort compensation on the basis of the tort of negligence and mental anguish rulings. Thus, for example, in a small lawsuit 46294-05-24 Gila Kadosh v. Easy Jet Airlines (April 6, 2025), a case was discussed in which although the airline had notified in advance that the departure date had been postponed, it demanded that the plaintiffs report for check-in at the original time, and they were ignored for 8.5 hours at the airport, and then informed them that the flight would not depart on the same day, but only the next day under the same circumstances that were detailed there, when it was possible to know that the flight back from Israel would not depart on the same day and therefore it had to inform the passengers that the flight was canceled and that it did not will arrive at the airport and in relation to this conduct (regardless of the circumstances that led to the cancellation of the flight, whether you grant an exemption from statutory compensation) awarded compensation for pecuniary damage due to negligence under section 35 of the Torts Ordinance (General Law) in light of the unreasonable behavior of a flight operator who acted while prioritizing her economic interest over the passengers and that she should be considered as having deviated from the standard of reasonable behavior expected of an airline, With reference to Section 16 of the Law (Preservation of Laws). However, beyond the fact that we are not dealing with an examination of the damage caused as a result of the cancellation of the flight itself due to the circumstances of the announcement of the flight cancellation, even if it is concise to say that it would have been possible to sue by virtue of the tort of negligence in isolation from the principle of the uniqueness of the cause, I would not have agreed to compensation by virtue of the tort of negligence in the framework of the claims of the plaintiffs on all sides for breaches of the general law. Their argument in the statement of claim and in the summaries is that they should be awarded compensation alternatively for non-pecuniary damages and for the tort of negligence and breach of statutory duty. The plaintiffs refer to section 35 of the Torts Ordinance, but it is based on the question "Is there any doubt as to who was negligent in managing the event? The fact that they misled the plaintiffs and did not mention to them the fact that the defendant could cancel the flight back to Israel if there was only a delay of less than an hour at take-off, a cancellation that would not entitle them to compensation in any way" does not meet the requirements of proving the elements of tort. In any case, where the legislature granted the exemption, there is difficulty in claiming negligence when it was not obligated to inform passengers in advance of that flight even when purchasing the tickets that the return flight, for those who purchased it, landed about an hour before the start of the holiday, and that they will not be compensated if and when there is a delay that will lead to the cancellation of the flight, when the law is briefed on its defenses and the arrival times are published. The plaintiffs claim a breach of a statutory duty by virtue of section 63 of the Torts Ordinance and a breach of the duties imposed on it by virtue of the Torts Ordinance - but they do not refer to any statutory duty by virtue of section 63 of the Torts Ordinance, when a breach of a duty in the Torts Ordinance cannot be used as a duty for the purposes of this section, and there is no breach of the Aviation Services for Statutory Compensation Law.
As to section 2 of the Consumer Protection Law, I will note that there is substance to the defendant's claim that this is an extension of the façade that was not claimed in the statement of claim, but only in summaries, at the end of the proceeding. In any case, the time was clear and known, and the beginning of Shabbat or a holiday is also known because they wanted to come to celebrate. How much safety range was also known and it is possible to take into account in advance as a passenger that there will be a malfunction that can last an hour or two. With this in mind, it is a far-reaching burden to require a company that is supposed to land before Shabbat to "bring a calculator" and to announce that if there is a delay then the flight will be postponed/cancelled and the traveling consumer will not be entitled under the Aviation Services Law that it published and brought to his attention, when the slots are held continuously even in the middle of the week at fixed times (and as Mr. Zamir also testified, the slots are held continuously). "On a fixed time" and that slot is mid-week). It is not required to publish its policy in the reservation, even though a contract of carriage is attached in which it is claimed that it is anchored, and this was not contradicted. It is possible that the difficulty in determining the dates of a flight that landed close to the beginning of the Sabbath or holiday in a manner that grants an exemption from compensation at the time of the consumer is not necessarily aware of the local time of the destination with regard to the times of the beginning of Shabbat or holiday, and given that this is a consumer law that emphasizes the duty to inform regarding the rights of the traveling consumer - but it is also a matter for the legislature to discuss. Although the Knesset emphasized that this is not an "El Al" law, there is no dispute that it is the company that has not operated flights on Saturdays and holidays for many years. It is difficult to expect that the general public, including passengers who are not members of the Jewish religion, will be familiar with the dates of the Sabbath or holiday, and certainly not when ordering the ticket, especially in the case of a return flight. The obligation currently on the passenger to calculate the dates of the holiday in the destination country each time he books a flight may be difficult, given the disparity in the balance of power between the flight operators who determine and are aware of the schedule and the individual passenger. Even if the summary of the law is available on the El Al website, it is doubtful whether the reasonable passenger is indeed looking at the exemptions from the duty of compensation and when the flight lands at the time of purchase of the ticket, all the more so where we are dealing with a passenger who does not observe Shabbat and certainly a passenger who is not a Jew and the defendant's claim that a religious passenger would not have purchased a flight ticket that lands close to the beginning of Shabbat does not meet a situation in which a passenger has purchased a ticket that he does indeed have no interest in if the time of landing borders on the beginning of Shabbat since he is not observant of Shabbat, but he does This means that the flight will be postponed for at least 24 hours if you are flying with the same airline, and even without receiving compensation, and this cannot be argued against his purchase of a ticket that is the date of landing close to the beginning of Shabbat that the defendant is aware of when the flight schedule is executed (examining how not to schedule on Shabbat), but the passenger is not necessarily aware of this or the consequences of this that his rights will be limited or he will be deprived of the medication he could have received in light of the cancellation of the flight. Therefore, even reading the exemption, among other provisions of the law, and the excess of information that requires reading the entire law before purchasing a ticket, is of no benefit to him. Given that a review of the minutes of the Economic Affairs Committee shows that the person making use of the law is in fact El Al, although they tried to claim that this is not an "El Al" law, but El Al is the one that initiated the move and there is no other airline that does not fly flights on Shabbat as a matter of policy, then perhaps there is room in the order form to clarify that it does not fly on Shabbat, so that it can also be linked to a clause in the law that grants an exemption from providing compensation and allows the passenger autonomy consumer, including an informed choice whether to fly with her in the first place (all the more so, from the testimony of Avi Zamir on behalf of the defendant, El therefore informs its passengers - p. 170 of the transcript, paras. 27-28, and if this is the case, it is not clear how it informs, and why not anchor it in a clear and clear manner to every customer?). It is possible and appropriate to enact regulations by virtue of section 14(a)(4) with regard to the publication of information to passengers in the framework of the sale of tickets (similar to the Tourism Services Regulations (Duty of Due Diligence), 5763-2003). Where there is a consumer failure, all the more so it is a standard contract that was drafted in advance by the airline and intended for the general public, the legislature must give its opinion. It seems that such a legislative move is consistent both with the consumer purposes enshrined in the provisions of the Aviation Services Law, with the Standard Contracts Law and with the Consumer Protection Law (and in this regard, see and compare section 4 of the Law).