(c) [...].
(d) The provisions of this section shall apply notwithstanding the provisions of any law.
According to the Appellant's approach, it is true that by virtue of these sections, the Director is required to take into account considerations of industry competition when discussing an application for renewal of a license, but Section 45 The law does not grant him explicit or implied authority to refuse to renew a license solely for these considerations. According to the claim, the only grounds on which the director may refuse to renew a license are those listed In Sections 8 and10(A) to the law.
- At first glance, it can be believed that the appellant's argument is captivating. This is because while sections 8 and 10(a) of the Law explicitly state that the Director has the authority to refuse to renew a license if certain conditions are met, Section 45 of the Law establishes a general provision in nature that does not include a similar explicit provision. At the same time, a reading of the provisions of the Law in their full context shows that the interpretation that the appellant seeks to give them cannot stand.
- As detailed at the outset, the legislature established an orderly procedure for the purpose of renewing a license, which includes submitting an application to the director and examining the fulfillment of the conditions listed in the law for granting the relevant license. With regard to a direct importer's license, as in our case, the legislature determined individually that in the framework of that examination, the Director is also required to address industry competitiveness considerations. A perusal of sections 8 and 10(a) of the Law, on which the Appellant relies its hope, clearly shows that these are not provisions that seek to change that orderly proceeding, or to negate the discretion given to the Director in the framework thereof. All they are intended to do is to provide the manager with administrative supervision tools for the benefit of cases in which, as a rule, improper conduct by the license holder is discovered. In other words, the provisions of sections 8 and 10(a) of the Law – which apply in situations in which it is discovered that there was a defect in the conduct of the license holder or his applicant – do not negate the provision of section 45 of the Law, which applies even when there was no defect in his conduct.
- In practice, the significance of the appellant's interpretation is that considerations of industry competition have no real effect on the director's decision to renew a license. However, section 45 of the Law explicitly and unequivocally instructs that the provisions of the Concentration Law, including the provisions that require consideration of industry competitive considerations, also apply to the renewal of a license. If the appellant is indeed correct in her argument that considerations of industry competition cannot lead to a refusal to renew a license, why did the legislature determine that the administrator must take these considerations into account when making a decision on an application for renewal of a license? The appellant's interpretation therefore renders section 45 of the Law meaningless with regard to the renewal of a license, and as is well known, the legislature does not corrupt its words in vain (see, for example: Additional Hearing High Court of Justice 7335/21 Minister of the Interior v. Marincheva, paragraph 8 of my opinion and paragraph 12 of the opinion of my colleague Vice-President Sohlberg (November 13, 2023); Civil Appeal 4603/22 Hapoel Nir Ramat Hasharon v. Kfar Saba Assessor, para. 18 (June 28, 2023); High Court of Justice 7194/21 Adv. Ariel Siboni v. The Public Committee for the Formulation of a List of Individual Trustees, para. 12 (January 23, 2022)).
- The appellant does indeed disagree with this conclusion, noting that even according to its interpretation, there is importance and relevance to considering considerations of competition "in a wide variety of situations". However, the same variety of situations was claimed, not detailed or explained. The only example given by the appellant, and even that only in her petition, was that even if one of the grounds set forth in section 10(a) of the Licensing Law exists, the director is entitled to renew a license if it would weaken concentration and increase competition. First, reducing the consideration of industry competitive considerations, but in these cases it is unacceptable. It is difficult to fit the assumption that the legislature sought to grant the Director the authority to consider competition considerations only in those cases in which a license holder who has "sinned" in the sense that one of the grounds specified in section 10(a) of the Law exists , will be rewarded and will receive a "reward" in the form of renewal of his license. Second, this argument has no basis in the language of the section. The legislator noted that the director must consider considerations of industry competitiveness when renewing a license as a rule, and did not limit this to renewing a license only in cases where there is a reason not to renew it. Third, we are dealing with the provision that refers to the Concentration Law, when an examination of its provisions and explanatory notes to it shows that the paradigm case before the legislature is actually a case in which the allocation of the right will harm competition due to excessive concentration by that entity, and not a case in which its allocation will promote competition (see, inter alia: sections 11 and 13 to the Concentration Law; Explanatory Notes to the Proposed Law to Promote Competition and Reduce Concentration, 5772-2012, H.H. 706, 1085 and 1096-1098). Therefore, it is very difficult to accept the interpretive position of the appellant, according to which considerations of promoting industry competitiveness can lead to the renewal of a license despite the existence of a reason justifying the refusal to do so, but cannot lead to a refusal to renew a license in the absence of such a reason.
- In addition, if indeed when examining an application for renewal of a license, the director may refuse to renew it only if the grounds specified in sections 8 and 10(a) of the law are met , what is the reason why the legislature saw fit to limit the validity of the license and obligate the license holder to submit an application for its renewal? After all, section 10(a) of the law also grants the director the authority to order the cancellation, suspension or restriction of a license. and the circumstances specified in section 8 of the law are also included in it. Therefore, if the Appellant is indeed correct in her interpretation, it would have been possible to suffice with the authority given to the Director in section 10(a) of the Law, without requiring the license holder to submit an application for its renewal every few years. However, the legislature did not suffice with this power, and chose to limit the period of the license and require the license holder to submit an application for its renewal, thus expressing its opinion that the discretion exercised by it is not limited to the grounds that it had in any case at the time the license was in force. The appellant's interpretation is also capable of rendering meaningless the provision of section 7, which limits the validity of the license to 6 years, and "the rule is that a section of the law should not be interpreted in a way that empties another section of the same law" (Civil Appeal 180/99 Purchase Tax Administration v. Tempo Beer Industries Ltd., IsrSC 57(3) 625, 636 (2003); see also: Civil Appeal 3498/21 Cenzifer Grain and Fodder Import Company in Tax Appeal v. Director of the Customs and VAT Department, Paragraph 26 of the opinion of my colleague Justice Kasher (June 5, 2023)).
- In an attempt to establish its interpretation, the Appellant relies on section 10(a)(8) of the Law, according to which the Director may revoke a license, suspend it until conditions are met, limit it or refuse to renew it, if "the Commissioner of Competition has determined that [the licensee] is a party to a restrictive arrangement or that he is a monopoly holder who has abused his position in the market, according to [...] The Economic Competition Law, 5748-1988, or imposed a financial sanction on it [...]." According to the appellant, this section expresses the legislature's position that only serious and ongoing violations of the competition laws can serve as an independent ground for refusing to renew a license, and therefore it is not possible to reach the conclusion that the general provision of section 45 of the law will allow this. However, I did not find that this section could help her. The circumstances detailed in section 10(a)(8) of the Licensing Law relate to violations by virtue of the Economic Competition Law, 5748-1988 and not to the Concentration Law. Although we are dealing with two pieces of legislation that belong to competition law, and although they are to a large extent complementary to each other, each of them is intended to promote different purposes, and there is no reason to assume that reference to one of them excludes the applicability of the other. In any event, this section in itself does not overcome the other interpretive difficulties detailed above.
- In view of all of the above, I do not believe that the appellant's interpretation falls within the scope of the possible linguistic interpretations of the Licensing Law. The language of the law indicates that even where the circumstances specified in sections 8 and 10(a) of the law do not exist , the director has the authority to refuse to renew a license due to considerations of promoting industry competitiveness.
- Although the discussion could have been stopped already at this stage, I will add that even if I were to assume that there is a linguistic anchor for the appellant's interpretation, it is far from being an interpretation that best fulfills the purpose of the legislation.
- As is well known, the purpose of legislation consists of a subjective purpose and an objective purpose. The subjective purpose reflects the intention of the legislature as it is learned from the legislative history of the law; and the objective purpose reflects the purpose that the legislation is intended to achieve in a democratic state (see: Civil Appeals Authority 67114-01-25 Anonymous v. As'ad, para. 15 (December 22, 2025); High Court of Justice 6494/14 Gini v. Chief Rabbinate, paragraphs 36-37 and 49 (June 6, 2016); Appeal Petition/Administrative Claim 816/23 Petah Tikva Municipality v. Enterponet Systems 2004 Ltd., para. 36 (January 1, 2025); Civil Appeal 39037-02-25 Audacity - Fairchild Technology Venture in Tax Appeal v. Alfred Mann Estate, para. 40 (July 2, 2025)).
- I will begin with the subjective purpose. The legislative process of the Licensing Law spanned about three years and included 40 meetings of the Knesset's Economic Affairs Committee, the minutes of which are more than 2,850 pages. The parties did not place before us or before the Court for Administrative Affairs any real detail regarding the content of these hearings, and we will not pretend to encompass every detail stated therein. We will therefore present below only the main points that we have been able to locate from the legislative process, which shed light on the interpretation of the section that is the subject of our discussion.
- As for the Licensing Law as a whole, a review of its legislative history clearly shows that one of the main purposes that the legislature had in mind throughout all stages of the legislative process was to promote competitiveness in the automotive industry in general and in the field of imports in particular. This began at the stage of bringing the bill that formed the basis for the Licensing Law – the Vehicle Services Licensing Bill, 5773-2013 (hereinafter: the bill) – for first reading in the Knesset plenum (see in particular the words of the Minister of Transport: D.C. June 24, 2013, 76-77); Continuation of the Economic Affairs Committee's deliberations on the bill, the vast majority of which discussed the question of how to promote competition in the automotive market (see, inter alia: Minutes of Session 67 of the Economics Committee of the 19th Knesset (July 22, 2013); Minutes of Session 158 of the Economics Committee of the 20th Knesset (February 8, 2016) (hereinafter: Minutes of Session 158); Minutes of Session 163 of the Economics Committee of the 20th Knesset (February 14, 2016)) (hereinafter: Minutes of Session 163); and ending with the presentation of the bill for the second and third readings in the Knesset plenum (see in particular the remarks of the Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee: D.C. June 28, 2016, 34-46).
- As to the purpose of section 45 of the Law, tracing the exchange in the deliberations of the Economic Affairs Committee clearly shows that the legislature intended that in every application for the renewal of a license placed before the Director, it would also be required to consider the promotion of industry competitiveness. Thus, in the course of the discussions on the Licensing Bill in meetings of the Knesset's Economic Affairs Committee, questions were raised by various parties regarding the practical significance of section 45 of the Law regarding the application of the provisions of the Concentration Law to the granting and renewal of vehicle import licenses. At a certain point, the representative of the committee's legal counsel asked for clarifications from government representatives on the matter, and as a result, the committee's chairman instructed a representative of the Competition Authority to explain the matter. This is how she explained:
"A, [...] The regulator is authorized to consider the consideration of competition when allocating licenses under this law. [...]. Second, the law allows the Antitrust Commissioner, if he finds it significant for competition, to advise [...] the manager – in this context, it is not mandatory. [...] The third thing that this section says, [...] the Ministry of Transport says: I want to determine specifically with regard to these licenses, that whenever such a license is renewed, the consideration of competition will be considered" (Minutes of Session 158, p. 39; emphasis added).
- It is not superfluous to note in this context that in the framework of the Concentration Law, a unique arrangement was established regarding the renewal of the assigned right (as opposed to its allocation for the first time). The essence of this arrangement, in the context of our case, and in general terms only, is that the considerations of promoting industry competition in cases of renewal of the right will be examined only in cases where the holder of the right has held it for more than 10 years. During the Economic Affairs Committee's deliberations on the Licensing Law, the question arose as to whether it is appropriate to apply this arrangement to the renewal of import licenses as well, or whether an individual arrangement should be established that will obligate the Director to consider considerations of promoting industry competition every time he is submitted with an application to renew the license. Ultimately, it was decided to determine an individual arrangement that would suit the needs of the licensing market, according to which these considerations would be examined every time an application for license renewal was submitted. The minutes of the hearing were described as follows:
"The Concentration Law, when it talks about sectoral competition, it talks about the allocation of rights. There is a question according to the wording there as to whether the granting of a commercial vehicle importer's license constitutes an allocation of a right within the meaning thereof. In order to remove any doubt, we are here explicitly that the same mark will apply to the granting of importers' licenses with one fundamental change: that it will also apply to innovations. If, according to the Concentration Law, the issue of competitiveness is examined once every 10 years, here we wish to examine it with every innovation when [...] the innovations, I would like to mention, are once every six years" (Minutes of Session 216 of the Economic Affairs Committee, 20th Knesset, 43 (March 28, 2016); emphases added).