The Petitioner's argument that it sought to exhaust the proceedings prior to the filing of a petition cannot be of any benefit to it, since the rule is that an application for the purpose of receiving the tender documents and correspondence in this matter, as well as correspondence regarding claims against the tender, do not stop the delay race (Application for Administrative Leave to Appeal 682/11 Morris v. Economy and Economy Company [Nevo] (January 25, 2011); Application for Administrative Appeal 9536/10 Association of Quarry Materials Manufacturers in Israel v. Israel Lands Administration [Nevo] (December 26, 2010)). Thus, even a request for reconsideration and even the Authority's willingness to examine a claim regarding defects in its action (or to hold a hearing, as in the present case) do not stop the race for delay (High Court of Justice 410/78 Mills Israel in Tax Appeal v. Minister of Finance [Nevo] (1979)).
And even according to the Petitioner's approach, she could have filed the petition shortly after receiving the Municipality's response on January 26, 2025, and not about a month later.
- Moreover, in the petitioner's application to the municipality (January 5, 2025) and in the letter of her counsel (January 14, 2025), the claim she raised was an error in the punctuation, i.e., in the criteria, and a demand to reduce it. No claim of non-compliance with the threshold conditions was raised. In other words, in relation to this argument, the weight of the delay increases.
- The Petitioner's claim that she was immersed in another professional matter is not of the same kind. As a rule, such circumstances do not justify an extension of the deadline that also harms the winner of the tender. Moreover, if the Petitioner had believed that this reason justified an extension of the deadline, it should have applied for an extension of the deadline by virtue of Regulation 3(c) Since it did not do so, it cannot be ruled out that at that time the Petitioner waived its intention to petition against the results of the tender.
- The Petitioner's correspondence with the Municipality ended on January 26, 2025, about a month after the announcement that Respondent 2 had won the tender, and since it had not done anything since then, the Municipality, and certainly Respondent 2, had reason to believe that it did not intend to file a petition against the results of the tender. In any case, both the Municipality and Respondent No. 2 set out, the engagement agreement was signed, and the work began to be carried out, thus fully fulfilling the element of objective delay.
- I have examined the Petitioner's argument, according to which the violation of the threshold conditions goes to the root of the validity of the tender, and there is no room to agree with it despite the delay.
In this regard, it is difficult to deny that the expression "at least 3 years" refers in plain and clear language to three full years (or "calendars" in the language of the municipality), i.e., 36 months. This is the difference between 'three years' and 'at least three years,' and I have expressed this approach during the discussions. According to this interpretation, Respondent No. 2's proposal did not meet the prerequisites with respect to the years 2020 to 2024, since according to its proposal, it began operating only in March 2022 (at the Atid network), and its activity exceeded the scope of 10,000 annual hours only in August 2022 (when work began at Majdal Shams).